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This thesis presents three empirical analyses in the economics of Higher Education 
within the United Kingdom.  
 
The first analysis evaluates the impact of student funding reforms on participation 
and course choice, through the use of a difference-in-differences strategy with 
heterogeneous treatment effects. The results show that students who received the 
largest increase in study costs were less likely to move further away and also more 
likely to study a subject with lower graduate wage premia due to the significant 
reduction in the risk of investing in higher education. Students who received the 
largest increase in up-front financial support were more likely to attend a university 
further away.  
 
The second question addresses whether undergraduate subject choice is affected by 
changes in the expected benefits and opportunity costs of investing in HE through 
variation in the labour market. Students who reside in areas of high unemployment 
are found to be less likely to choose subjects with the largest graduate wage and 
employment premia. This suggests that students may be afraid of failure in 
challenging labour markets and instead choose to study subjects with a greater 
chance of success. However, lower socioeconomic status students are more likely 
to study subjects with the highest graduate wage and employment premia. This 
suggests that the students who may be the most aware of the costs, are also the most 
aware of the benefits. 
 
Finally, the third analysis investigates whether students who are socioeconomically 
disadvantaged incur a further penalty in terms of degree attainment. The results 
show that the most disadvantaged students outperform their advantaged 
counterparts. This may be due to pre-university attainment being an imperfect 
measure of ability in the most disadvantaged students, or that students who have 
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had to overcome the most challenges to attend university are better-equipped and 
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This thesis presents three empirical analyses of Higher Education (HE) within the 
United Kingdom (UK), with an emphasis on estimating factors that can influence 
students’ study choices and their degree outcomes. HE is defined as the final level 
of education that a student can undertake, after he or she completes compulsory 
schooling, and any pre-requisite education after school-leaving age (Further 
Education). Whilst there are a variety of different Higher Education Institutes 
(HEIs) in the UK, ranging from conservatoires (institutions that specialise in music) 
and specialised vocational providers; for most students, HE is obtained by going to 
a university. 
 
The three analyses investigate two major themes: first, the question of how students 
at university respond in their study behaviour when the relative costs and benefits 
of acquiring HE are changing; and second, the question of whether socioeconomic 
factors have any deterministic effect on university academic achievement. Chapters 
1 and 2 address the former, whilst Chapter 3 addresses the latter. If there is one 
central finding to these chapters, it is that the undergraduate student population is 
incredibly diverse and as such, any policy evaluation or empirical research design 
must be approached accordingly. 
 
 
A Brief History of Higher Education in the UK 
The research presented in this thesis focuses mainly on the period 2000-2008, which 
was a period of significant change for the higher education sector in the UK. 
However to place those analyses in context, it is useful to consider how the UK HE 
sector has changed in the period preceding. Historically, HE was provided free of 
tuition costs to students that attended, as funding was awarded from the public 
sector. This may have been sustainable when only 3% of 18-30 year olds 
participated in HE - as was the case in the UK in the 1950s - however student 
demand and participation in HE has increased significantly. As Wyness (2010) 
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notes, the participation rate amongst young people had increased to 40% in 2000. 
This rising demand for, and participation in, HE and the lack of private direct 
contributions to the costs of the HE provision resulted in a significant lack of 
funding per student across universities in the UK. In response, the Dearing Report’s 
recommendation of means-tested tuition fees were introduced for all new entrants 
to undergraduate study in September 1998, although contrary to the report they 
were introduced as an up-front cost rather than a graduate tax. However, although 
fees continued to be increased in line with inflation, this funding infrastructure did 
not provide sufficient increases in funding for universities.  
 
 
Higher Education during the analysis period 
In 2004, the introduction of  the Higher Education Act (2004) brought about 
significant changes to the funding of HE in the UK. The up-front, flat-rate, means-
tested tuition fees of £1,000 were replaced by variable, non-means tested tuition 
fees of up to £3,000 for all students independent of parental income, however they 
would be repaid on an income-contingent basis after graduation and the graduate’s 
earnings were at least £15,000 at a rate of 9% of earnings above this threshold. This 
meant that students from lower income households who were previously exempt 
from paying towards their HE post-1998 would now be forced to pay the same as a 
student with the highest levels of parental income. Additionally, although the fees 
were designed to be variable, where a university could charge any amount up to a 
maximum of £3,000 per year, in practice almost every university charged the full 
amount in the first year. A further implication of this is that whilst the returns to an 
undergraduate degree may vary by subject, the pecuniary costs of acquiring HE did 
not. In addition to the fee increase, the amount of up-front financial support 
available to students was also increased. This was in the form of a non-means tested 
student loan (which, like the tuition fee loan, would be repayable through graduate 
earnings), and a means-tested, non-repayable maintenance grant for the poorest 
students. The maximum maintenance grant that a student could be awarded was 
£3,000, thus for the poorest students, the introduction of tuition fees was completely 
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off-set by the new maintenance grant. However, as Chapter 1 identifies, students 
whose parental income was above the threshold for the full off-setting maintenance 
grant but who were still classed as low income may have experienced the largest 
relative increase in the costs of HE.  
 
 
Recent developments in HE 
In the 2009, the Browne Report outlined further student funding reforms, which 
increased the variable tuition fee cap from £3,375 per year in September 2011 to 
£9,000 per year in England from September 2012. As this represented a significant 
increase in the costs of tuition, the tuition fees charged varied by both institution 
and subject, such that higher quality institutions could charge the maximum fees 
possible, especially for subjects that they experience high demand for. As of 
September 2016, a further change to the funding of HE in the UK came into effect, 
which was to completely remove means-tested, non-repayable grants that students 
from the poorest families received to help fund the living costs of attending 
university.  
 
In the context of introducing and increasing the tuition fees in the UK, there has 
been much emphasis on simultaneously improving the access to HE for students 
with disadvantaged backgrounds. Indeed, the report that detailed the case for the 
2012 tuition fee increase stated that “everyone who has the potential should have 
the opportunity to benefit from higher education”. (Browne, 2010: 24) However, to 
provide an opportunity to benefit from HE is not the same as ensuring the students 
(especially the poorest and the most socioeconomically disadvantaged students) do 
not make sub-optimal investment decisions due to a fear of debt, a fear of failure, 
or through cost-minimising behaviour such as a limiting of study choices by 
attending a university close to home. Since the introduction of the £9,000 per year 
fees in 2012, media and political debate has focused on the impact on student debt 
and student choices. Atherton et al. (2015) note that poorer students were on 
average 20% more likely to stay close to or live at home whilst attending university 
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due to the increased costs of HE. This should not have been a surprise, as this thesis 
will show that students responded to the 2006 fee increase in exactly the same way. 
Furthermore, O’Leary (2016) reported that the increased fees in 2012 have led to 
decreased demand for undergraduate study of arts and humanities subjects (in 
particular, languages). However, this thesis will also show that when the relative 
costs of acquiring HE are directly increased (through tuition fees - Chapter 1) or 
indirectly increased (through labour market conditions - Chapter 2), this behaviour 
was also evident throughout the 2000-2008 period. 
 
 
The Journey to Higher Education in the UK 
Before proceeding to the empirical chapters, the final section of this introductory 
chapter presents a brief overview of the HE system in the UK, with particular 
reference to the transition from schooling and further education (FE) to HE. 
Throughout the UK, young people are required to remain in secondary education 
until the age of 16, which has been the case since 1972 when the minimum school 
leaving age was raised from the age of 15. Since 2013, students are required to enrol 
in some form of educational activity until the age of 18 which may take the form of 
an apprenticeship (a practical, work-based learning engagement where students 
learn a vocation and are paid a salary), a traineeship, or studying towards FE 
qualifications. If students decide to stay in full time education beyond the minimum 
school leaving age of 16, they can study towards their FE qualifications either at an 
FE college (which typically offers a range of academic and vocational subjects) or 
at schools that offer FE2 (where the subjects offered are typically academic rather 
than vocational or practical). Given that students who attend university will usually 
be those who have pursued academic subjects at an FE college or by staying on full 
                                                          
2 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, these are known as Sixth Forms; a student will typically 
undertake two additional years of education before deciding to enter university. The first year is 
known as Lower Sixth and the final year at a sixth form is known as Upper Sixth. In Scotland, 
these two years are called S5 and S6, as they represent two further years at a Secondary school 
beyond the minimum school year (S4).  
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time at school or at a Sixth Form, students partially decide to attend university two 
years in advance of their eventual entry into HE.  
 
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the educational system is almost identical 
except for minor subject differences such as compulsory Welsh language education 
in Wales until the age of 16. In these three countries of the UK, students will study 
towards General Certificates of Secondary Education (GCSEs) or equivalents 
during the final two academic years of compulsory schooling. The grades the 
students receive at GCSE level (and the subjects in which they receive them) will 
determine what subjects they are permitted to study at FE level between the ages of 
16 and 18. Students who wish to attend university will typically study towards three 
or four Advanced Levels (almost always abbreviated to A-Levels) during these final 
two academic years, and an overall grade for their studied subject is awarded in the 
August of the student’s last year of study.3 These grades range from A (the highest) 
to E (the lowest), thus a student who obtains three A grades at A-Level are denoted 
AAA.4 During their final year, students will apply to university through the 
Universities and Colleges and Admissions Service (UCAS) and receive a 
conditional offer, such that the results they receive in August will determine 
whether or not a student has met the conditions set by the university to attend in 
September. These conditions are usually that a student obtains a set of minimum A-
Level grades (and potentially a minimum grade in a subject designated by the 
university). 5 If the student is successful in meeting those requirements, they can 
                                                          
3 Since 2015, there have been changes to the A-Level format, whereby a student’s overall grade is 
determined by an exam at the end of the two years of study. Furthermore, it used to be the case 
that an A-Level was comprised of two parts (reflecting the first and second years), namely the AS-
Level and the A2-Level. Before 2015, students would typically choose four A-Levels to study in 
the first year of further education, and in the second year they would choose three of these four A-
Levels to convert into a full A-Level by completing the ‘A2’ year. The period of analysis for this 
thesis however, does not contain these changes. 
4 In 2010, an additional grade was introduced of A*, however the change does not affect the period 
of analysis. 
5 Universities in the UK advertise their minimum requirement for entry onto a degree programme 
for a particular subject. Some universities may advertise a minimum grade for a particular subject, 
some may require simply a set of minimum grades from any of the student’s chosen A-Levels, or 
the university may instead advertise a minimum UCAS tariff entry score. This tariff score is often 
used as A-Levels are not the only qualifications a prospective HE entrant can use to apply to 
university with, especially in the case of international students. The tariff score is computed by 
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confirm their attendance on an undergraduate degree course at university starting 
in September6, which typically last for three years.  
 
In Scotland, the process is largely the same, however the educational framework in 
Scotland is aligned to the Scottish Credit and Qualifications Framework (SCQF), 
where each progressive stage of education is considered a numerical level higher 
than the last.7 Whilst the school-leaving age is still 16 in Scotland, there is no 
requirement to stay engaged in an educational activity past this age. Furthermore, 
students do not study GCSEs, but Higher Awards (shortened to Highers) which are 
the most common qualification used for entry into a Scottish university. This 
qualification, however, is not as advanced as the A-Level, and as such, degree 
programmes in Scotland last for four years. Students at Scottish schools and FE 
colleges do have the option to undertake Advanced Higher Awards (shortened to 
Advanced Highers), however this level of study is similar to the first year of the 
four year Scottish undergraduate degree programme in terms of difficulty. Students 
who do obtain Advanced Highers and who attend a Scottish university typically 
enter into Year 2 of the degree programme.8 
 
Such fundamental structural differences mean that, even before considering the 
significant differences in student funding and tuition costs, direct comparisons 
between Scottish and English universities are complex. This is the fundamental 
reason why Scottish universities should not be used as a counterfactual for policy 
evaluation at English universities; and on the contrary, why Welsh universities can 
be used. This identification of a valid counterfactual case is used in Chapter 1 to 
                                                          
converting grades and qualifications into a numerical indicator of pre-university attainment, where 
the best grades on the highest qualification types score the largest numbers. A student’s overall 
score is computed by aggregating their individual tariff points computed from their individual 
grades and qualifications. A table tariff points by grade and qualification can be found in 
Appendix C, Table C1.  
6 Or alternatively the student may elect to delay entry by one year, known as a gap year. 
7 For instance, a doctoral degree is the highest at level 12, a masters degree is level 11, and an 
undergraduate is level 10. 




evaluate the impact of the 2006 funding reforms. Where policy evaluation through 
a natural experiment is not the research design, Scottish universities are included in 
the identification strategy, with attention paid particularly to start dates and degree 
programme lengths to correctly assign students and their influencing factors the 
appropriate time dimension. Chapter 1 therefore includes by definition only 
England and Welsh universities, whilst Chapters 2 and 3 are allowed to use 





Evaluating the Impact of the 2006 ‘Top-Up’ Fees on Subject 
Choice & Geographic Mobility 
 
 
“The social class gap among those entering higher education is unacceptably wide. 
Young people from professional backgrounds are over five times more likely to 
enter higher education than those from unskilled backgrounds.” 




It remains a rational argument that an individual who benefits from education in the 
form of higher lifetime earnings should be expected to contribute towards the cost 
of acquiring that education. An important caveat is that those who are unable to 
afford the education at the outset should not be required to contribute to the costs 
until the benefits begin to realise, otherwise this will provide disincentives to 
participate in Higher Education (HE).  
 
The right to an education is a fundamental element of most societies, founded on 
ethical, moral and legal considerations. Unlike basic schooling however, HE is an 
optional extension to an individual’s investment in human capital. Whilst the 
provision of schooling in the UK – as in most developed economies – is free and 
universal, a student who enrols to study at the HE level must contribute to the costs 
of the HE provision. Following Becker’s (1964) seminal work, the acquiring of HE 
is ultimately an investment decision for the individual, where the investment is 
undertaken if the costs (tuition costs, foregone earnings, living costs, relocation 
costs and psychic costs) are outweighed by the discounted net present value of the 
increase in lifetime earnings. However, since the returns to a degree not only allow 
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higher lifetime earnings, but also allow upward social mobility, it is crucial that 
those who wish to, and have sufficient school attainment and ability,9 are able to do 
so. Therefore, even if HE is not provided free of charge, there should be a right of 
access which particularly applies to students from lower income or otherwise 
disadvantaged backgrounds.  
 
In the absence of means-tested grants, increases in or introductions of tuition fees 
have been widely found to cause a reduction in university enrolment. A significant 
body of research exists for tuition fees in the US, where there is both a large degree 
of heterogeneity in fee levels between states, as well as a reduced geographic 
mobility since fees are higher for out-of-state students. The collective consensus is 
that a $1,000 increase in fees reduces enrolment by around 2-5 percentage points 
(Hemelt & Marcotte, 2008; Kane, 1994; Heller, 1997; McPherson & Shapiro, 1991; 
Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Dynarski (2003) also finds that a $1,000 increase in 
grants (the reverse of a fee rise) increases enrolment by 3.6 percentage points. In 
Europe, there is mixed evidence on the effect of tuition fees on participation. When 
fees were introduced in some German states in 2005-2007 at a rate of €500 per 
semester, Hübner (2012) and Dwenger et al. (2012) find that they reduced 
participation by 2-2.7 percentage points, in line with the US findings. However, 
other studies of the German tuition fee experiment (Bruckmeier & Wigger, 2014; 
Alecke et al., 2013) and evidence from tuition fees in the Netherlands (Huijsman et 
al., 1986; Canton & De Jong, 2005) find that there was no impact on enrolment. 
 
In addition to the student’s perspective, the universities’ financial needs must also 
be satisfied for a student to obtain HE of a sufficient quality. In the UK, the 
university participation rate amongst 18-30 years olds has risen from around 5% in 
the early 1960s, to 40% by the year 2000, whilst university funding per HE student 
had reached its historic low.  (Wyness, 2010). 
 
                                                          
9 New entrants to HE are not constrained to school leavers, however they are the group for which a 
fair right of access is arguably the most important. 
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These two sentiments were the main motivation for the Higher Education Act 2004 
which aimed to reform the provision of student support and the financing of HE 
provision, whilst encouraging widening participation amongst school leavers. In 
September 2006, tuition fees for new entrants to HE were increased from a means-
tested £1,175 in the previous year to a flat fee of £3,00010, but now the fees would 
be paid after graduation on an income-contingent basis, instead of being paid up-
front under the old scheme. In addition to the tuition fee changes, the reform also 
introduced a large increase in up-front, non-repayable, means-tested maintenance 
grants to promote wider access to universities for lower-income background 
students.11 
 
This chapter evaluates the impact of the 2006 funding reforms on the participation 
and choice behaviour of lower income background students to study at the 
undergraduate level. The contribution is that it is the first research to examine the 
policy change using the entire student population, using Welsh Higher Education 
Institutes12 (HEIs) as the counterfactual in a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
approach. A further contribution is that unlike other research designs, the estimate 
of the treatment effect of the policy change in this analysis is allowed to vary across 
different types of students, depending on their subject and university choice, which 
relaxes the assumption that all student types and subjects were affected equally by 
the policy change. The evaluation is performed in a natural experiment setting, 
since the student support package available in England and Wales was identical, 
except for fees being increased in England, and being kept constant in Wales in 
September 2006. 
 
The data used is the complete student population who left a UK HEI between the 
academic years 2005/06 and 2009/10. Their recorded start date, expected length of 
                                                          
10 The new fees were widely known as ‘top-up’ fees, as they were introduced to top-up the funding 
shortfall for universities. Furthermore, although the fees were variable with a £3,000 cap, almost 
all universities chose to charge the full amount (Universities UK, 2009). 
11 See section 1.2.1 for a detailed overview of the changes in HE funding and student support, and 
section 1.2.2 for the 2006 policy change in particular. 
12 This term is used interchangeably throughout alongside ‘universities’. 
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study, and actual length of study, are used to create an ex-ante population of new 
entrants between the academic years 2003/04 and 2007/08. Using a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach, the causal impact of the increased fees for English 
students is estimated, with a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
approach to allow this estimate to be heterogeneous across different groups of 
students according to the subjects they chose to study and the distance between their 
parental home and their chosen university. 
 
The results show that the policy reform had a significant impact on the participation 
and course choice of those students who were the most likely to suffer the largest 
net increase in tuition fees. These were students who, although classified as from a 
low income background, only received a partial or zero award of a non-repayable 
grant that was provided to offset the increase in tuition fees. The policy led to a 1.72 
percentage point increase in the probability of observing such a student 
participating in HE overall, which suggests that at the aggregate level, the funding 
reforms (including the fee rise) actually increased participation of the students 
experiencing the largest net increases in course costs. When disaggregating the 
policy effect across subject types, the same classification of low income students 
were 1.77 percentage points less likely to study a subject with the highest graduate 
earnings premia, which initially is counter-intuitive.   
 
However, when allowing for heterogeneous effects of the policy across subject 
types and whether a student decided to attend a university in the local area, the 
findings show that the policy led to a 2.87 percentage point increase in observing 
the lower income students most likely to experience the largest increase in course 
costs who are choosing to remain close to home whilst attending university, and 
choosing a subject with the lowest graduate earnings premia. This suggests that 
since the costs of attending university are repaid through income-contingent loans 
under the new scheme, students who do not receive the non-repayable grant to offset 
the fee increase are incentivised to engage in risk-free studying (since the amount a 
student repays is dependent on future earnings) at a local university and studying a 
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subject that does not necessarily provide significant rewards in terms of graduate 
wage premia. These students were also observed to be less likely to attend a 
university far away, especially if the university was not an elite university13, 
whereas low income students who received the offsetting non-repayable grants 
were on average 1.62 percentage points more likely to study at a university far from 
their registered address at the time of university application. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 1.2 gives an overview of 
tuition fees and student support in the UK from 1998 until the 2006 reform and 
outlines the exogenous variation exploited; section 1.3 discusses the features of the 
data as well as the identification strategy; section 1.4.1 outlines the methodological 
approach of the paper with both the technical and empirical aspects, with section 
1.4.2 addressing the implications of estimating a difference-in-difference regression 
with a binary outcome variable, with sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 discussing the DDD 
criteria of distance and subject groupings; section 1.5 presents the results of the 
analysis, with finally policy implications and conclusions in section 1.6. 
 
 
1.2 Institutional Setting 
 
1.2.1 Tuition Fees in the UK 
Tuition fees were introduced in the UK as s response to the Dearing Report in 1997, 
where means-tested tuition fees of up £1,000 were introduced per year of a student’s 
undergraduate degree for all new entrants to HE in September 1998.14 The fees were 
to rise in line with inflation each year, which in practice resulted in yearly £25 
increments for each cohort of new entrants. By 2005, the tuition fee level was 
£1,175. The rationale for means-testing the tuition fees was to try and ensure that 
only those that could afford to contribute to towards the cost of their degree did so, 
                                                          
13 A university is classed as elite (for the purposes of this analysis) if it is listed as being a Russell 
Group university; a group of 24 (as of September 2017) highly prestigious universities in the UK. 
For a full list, see Appendix A, Table A1. 
14 See Table 1.1 for changes in tuition fees by parental income. 
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without providing disincentives to study for students from lower income 
backgrounds. In 2000, around 40% of HE students paid no fees, 20% paid partial 
fees, and 40% paid the full tuition fee (Greenaway & Haynes, 2003).  
 
Table 1.1: Changes in Tuition Fees Levied by Parental Income (1992-2006) 
Parental 
Income (£) 








0 - 10,000 0 0 0 3000 
20,000 0 373 0 3000 
30,000 0 1172 980 3000 
40,000 0 1172 1196 3000 
50,000+ 0 1172 1196 3000 
Source: Dearden et al. (2011) 
 
However, the income from those who paid fees arguably only increased revenue 
for universities marginally, and any policy that attempts to address widening 
participation should look beyond the basic cost of tuition; a common finding in the 
literature is that those from lower income backgrounds or from other under-
represented or disadvantaged student groups have higher perceived costs of 
entering HE (Dunnett et al, 2012; Callender & Jackson, 2008).15 Additionally, the 
1998 reform did not seek to directly improve geographic mobility, as student 
bursaries were removed for students from lower-income backgrounds in 1999.16 
However, this reduction in grants coincided with maintenance loans being made 
available to students on an income-contingent basis in an attempt to leave students 
                                                          
15 Callender & Jackson (2008) also find that not only do students from low income backgrounds 
perceive the costs as greater, they are more likely to see the cost of acquiring HE as a debt, 
whereas students from wealthier backgrounds see it as an investment. 
16 In September 1998, students could take out a maintenance loan to cover their costs of attending 
university (separate from the tuition costs), with lower-income students receiving a maximum 
annual (non-repayable) bursary of £810. In September 1999, the bursary amount was added to the 
maximum loan amount on a means-tested basis. See Table 1.2. 
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no worse off in terms of available support to attend university, but for lower income 
students their costs of attending university increased. Research by the Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data 
found that the 1998 reforms caused a 5.4 percentage point decrease in the 
participation rate amongst students from wealthy backgrounds, however there was 
no significant impact on the participation rate for students from low income 
backgrounds (BIS, 2010a). 
 
1.2.2 The 2006 Reform 
As it became apparent that the 1998 reforms had done little to improve funding for 
universities or access for students, a government report was published in January 
2003 proposing universities could charge a ‘top-up’ fee up to a maximum of £3,000. 
The Higher Education Act received royal assent on 1st July 2004, and the increased 
fees would be active for new entrants in September 2006. This fee would be levied 
universally for all students on a non means-tested basis, however fees would be 
paid through the issuance of a tuition fee loan of the fee charged, which would be 
paid on an income-contingent basis when graduates were earning over £15,000 per 
year. To offset the increase in fees for the poorest students, means-tested 
maintenance grants of £2,700 per year were introduced, with an additional means-
tested bursary of £300 to be provided by the university. Hence, for those students, 
the increase in fees from £0 to £3,000 was completely offset by the increase in 
grants and bursaries. The changes in student funding for England is summarised in 








































Up Front (£) 









2735 3635 3725 3815 3905 4000 4095 4195 4405 4510 4625 4950 4950 
Bursary 
available (£) 
810 0 0 0 0 0 1000 1000 2700 2765 2835 2906 2906 
Maximum 
Loan & Grant 
available (£) 
3545 3635 3725 3815 3905 4000 5095 5195 5905 6045 6200 6405 6405 
Sources:  
SLC, Bolton (2014) 
Notes: 
All figures in nominal £ per academic year. Maximum Loan & Grant available: as household income increases, award of 
maintenance grant is reduced whilst amount of available loan increases to offset. 
 
As seen in Table 1.2, in September 2006 the maximum combined loan and grant 
available for students is £5,905, of which up to £2,700 is available as a non-
repayable bursary. It should also be noted that in September 2004, the Higher 
Education Grant of up to £1,000 was introduced to help support students from low 
income backgrounds. This was means-tested, and students whose household 
income was less than £15,200 received the full £1,000; whereas students whose 
annual household income was between £15,200 and £21,185 received a partial 
award on a decreasing basis.17 However, to evaluate the impact of the funding 
reforms on students from lower income backgrounds, it is necessary to observe the 
                                                          




changes in support by parental income.18 Table 1.3 shows the gains/losses for a 
student from moving from the old funding system to the 2006 system, by parental 
income, which is also used to create Figure 1.1. 
 
Table 1.3: Gains/Losses by Household Income in Transitioning from Old to New 
System 
  Household Income 
  < £22,500 £25,000 £45,000 >£60,000 
Old System 
in 2006 
Fees 1200 1200 1200 1200 
Fee Subsidy 1200 1000 0 0 
HE Grant 1000 0 0 0 




Fees 3000 3000 3000 3000 
Grant 2700 1449 0 0 
Bursary 300 0 0 0 
NET 0 - 1551 - 3000 - 3000 
Change from Old-New - 1000 - 1351 - 1800 - 1800 
Change in Up Front, Non-
Repayable Support 
+ 2000 + 1449 0 0 
Increase in Costs (assuming 
no loan taken out) 
+ 3000 + 2800 + 1800 + 1800 
Source: SLC, Dearden et al. (2008) 
This table shows the difference in moving from the pre-2006 student finance system to the 2006 
funding reform system. The net gain or loss is calculated by parental income groupings. Note that 
Dearden et al. include in their calculations a fee and maintenance loan subsidy, based on the fact 
that the loans taken out are at a zero interest rate. These subsidies are omitted here to clarify the 




                                                          
18 The data used for the analysis in this chapter does not include specific values of parental 
income, however the net gains or losses calculated here are crucial for identifying students who 




Figure 1.1: Gains/Losses by Household Income in Transitioning from Old to New 
System at Representative Intervals 
 
 
Focusing on the definitive aspects alone (i.e. the fees charged and the grants or 
bursaries awarded, and thus assuming that a student does not take out a loan19), 
Table 1.3 shows that the poorest students (parental or household income less than 
£15,000) suffer a financial loss in moving from the old system to the new. Although 
they receive £3,000 in non-repayable grants and bursaries, this only represents a 
£2,000 increase from the old system. At the same time, their tuition fees increase 
by £3,000, albeit not as an up-front cost. Students whose parental or household 
income is between £15,000 and £22,500 suffer less of a financial loss in switching 
systems, and students whose parental income was over £22,500 suffer an increasing 
financial penalty in the new system. 
                                                          
19 This is different to the approach taken by Dearden et al. (2008) who include in their calculation 
















































































































































Furthermore, for students whose parental income was over £17,500, their tuition 
fees are greater than their non-repayable grants and bursaries.20 Hence, for these 
students whose parental income is above the threshold for the award of a full grant 
that offsets the fee increase, but is low enough to still be considered a student from 
a low income background, may be the most likely to be adversely affected in terms 
of an increase in the actual and perceived costs of HE. Conversely, since the fees 
are repaid on an income-contingent basis, the poorest students receive the largest 
increase in up-front non-means tested support despite suffering a negative financial 
penalty in moving from the old funding system to the new. This should allow for 
increased geographic mobility, which is especially important for low income 
students who reside in rural areas or who wish to study specialist subjects at 
university. These are the testable hypotheses that will be examined in the empirical 
analysis. 
 
The majority of the existing research on the effects of the 2006 reform on 
participation finds that it had no effect on either participation overall, or on the 
participation of students from low income backgrounds in particular (Faggian, 
2010; BIS, 2010a; BIS, 2010b; Wakeling & Jefferies, 2013; Universities UK, 
2009). Due to the simultaneous increasing of fees and student grants, most 
approaches are unable to disentangle the opposing effects. Dearden et al (2011) use 
LFS data to separately estimate the effects of the increase in fees from £1200 to 
£3000, and the increase in student grants. Their estimates suggest that a £1000 
increase in fees leads to a 3.9 percentage point decrease in HE participation, whilst 
a £1000 increase in student grants increases HE participation by 2.6 percentage 
points. As most approaches are estimating the effect of these concurrently, it may 
explain why the majority of research finds no significant overall impact of the 
reforms. An alternative approach of evaluating the effect of the reforms on a 
student’s engagement with HE is university attrition (or ‘drop-out’) rates. Bradley 
                                                          
20 For a comprehensive comparison between the old and new funding systems by household 
income, see Appendix 1, Table A2. 
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and Migali (2015) investigate this, and find that the reforms led to a fall in dropout 
rates, especially for the poorest students. However, the existing body of research 
either does not use a counterfactual outcome (Dearden et al, 2011; BIS, 2010a; 
Universities UK, 2009), and those that do use a difference-in-differences approach 
(Faggian, 2010; BIS, 2010b) perform only a simple, descriptive analysis, or use a 
counterfactual that is arguably too dissimilar.21 Finally, none of the existing 
analyses allows for the reform to affect different groups of students heterogeneously 
within a regression difference-in-differences framework. 
 
This research addresses these concerns by using the entire population of 
undergraduate students in England and Wales who began their studies in the 
academic years 2003/04 to 2007/08, which allows a regression DiD approach with 
several time periods. Furthermore, the estimate of the impact of the policy is 
allowed to vary across groups of students who may be substantially different (i.e. 
the funding reforms are not expected to affect students who attend a local university 
to study an arts subject in the same way they affect students who attend a university 
far away from their address at the time of application to study medicine). 
 
  
                                                          
21 Faggian (2010) uses postgraduates as the counterfactual for the effect of the 2006 reforms on 
undergraduates in Northern Ireland. There is a significant argument to be made that postgraduates 
are not influenced in the same way that undergraduates are when choosing to study at university. 
Postgraduates are usually older, are generally not subject to the same financial constraints as school-
leavers, and are overwhelmingly motivated by employment prospects. 
BIS (2010b) uses Scotland as a control group for the impact of the reforms in England. There are 
again, many arguments to be made why students at Scottish universities are not sufficiently 
comparable to be a valid counterfactual for students at English HEIs. Firstly, the underlying 
educational structure differs significantly – in England and Wales, students study for GCSEs and A-
Levels, whereas in Scotland, students study towards Standard Grades, Highers, and Advanced 
Highers. Consequently, undergraduate degree programmes in Scotland are typically four years’ 
long, whereas they are three years’ long in England and Wales. Finally, Scotland operated a graduate 
endowment scheme between the introduction of the fees in 1998 and the 2006 reforms, which 
removes the possibility of analysing a ‘clean’ policy break. As BIS (2010b) shows, the common 
trends assumption is violated. 
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1.2.3 The Experiment 
The Welsh Assembly government was established by the Government of Wales Act 
1998, and it obtained full devolved legislative powers in 2006 with the passing of 
the Government of Wales Act 2006, receiving royal assent on the 25th July 2006. 
Prior to the adoption of the Higher Education Act 2004 in England, the Welsh 
government delayed the adoption of the increased fees by one year – with the new 
fees becoming active in September 2007 instead of September 2006 as in England. 
Furthermore, even though the new fees were not adopted until 2007, the Welsh 
Assembly announced that they would introduce the same student support scheme 
as in England in 2006, in the form of grants and loans.22 Additionally, the Welsh 
government announced in 2006 that when the increased fees were adopted in 
September 2007 (and for the foreseeable future), Welsh-domiciled students23 would 
be given a non-means tested fee grant to fully offset the fee increase that happened 
in England24. Hence, the only difference between the policies in England and Wales 
in 2006 was that in England the fees were higher. The use of undergraduate students 
at Welsh universities as a control for the estimation of the effects of the policy 
change on undergraduate students at English universities is therefore reasonable, 
given the insulation from the fee increase for Welsh students. The use of a valid 
counterfactual in this empirical approach is a significant improvement over the use 
of postgraduate students compared to undergraduate students, which is the approach 
employed by Faggian (2010). 
Normally, differential fees across a small spatial distribution with free movement 
of individuals would not allow a true estimate of the effect of the reform, since 
                                                          
22 The Welsh government had already introduced the Assembly Learning Grant (ALG) for new 
entrants in the 2002/03 academic year, which made a £1,500 means-tested, non-repayable grant 
available for Welsh-domiciled students. When the Higher Education Grant (HEG) was introduced 
by England in 2004/05 for new entrants, the ALG simply topped the £1,000 award up by £500 for 
Welsh-domiciled students. 
23 A Welsh-domiciled student is any student who is a permanent and primary resident in the 
country of Wales at the time of applying to university, and has been for 5 consecutive years prior 
to entry into HE. 
24 This fee grant was payable directly to the university, so students could not use it to supplement 
their maintenance costs of attending university. 
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students could simply migrate from a high fee to a low fee area. However, English 
students (specifically, students from the rest of the UK who were not registered as 
living in Wales for 5 consecutive years previous to HE entry) would be liable to the 
same fee at Welsh HEIs as English HEIs. Conversely, the non-means tested fee 
grant awarded to Welsh-domiciled students from September 2007 onwards was 
valid for Welsh-domiciled students studying anywhere in the UK. Hence, there was 
no incentive for cross-border migration to avoid higher fees or to obtain more 
generous student support. The changes discussed in this section are summarised in 
Table 1.4 below. 












































2735 3635 3725 3815 3905 4000 4095 4195 4405 4510 4625 4745 4745 
Bursary 
available 
810 0 0 0 1500 1500 1500 1500 2700 2765 2835 2906 5000 
Sources:  
SLC, Bolton (2014) 
Notes: 
All figures in nominal £ per academic year. 
Maintenance loan - assuming not living at home, attending university outside London. Figures show maximum possible award. 
Note that this figure is reduced as parental income increases and also varies depending on award of means-tested grant.  
Bursary - In September 2002, the Welsh assembly introduced a means-tested, non-repayable grant of £1,500. When the English 
system introduced maintenance grants in September 2004, the Welsh assembly grant (ALG) simply topped up the £1,000 award 
by £500. 
*Fee of £1,200 only applied to Welsh HEIs, otherwise Welsh-domiciled students studying outside Wales in UK are liable to full 
'English' fees. 






1.3.1 HESA Data 
The data used to analyse the 2006 funding reform comes from the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA), and it is a composite of three groups of student 
populations: the destinations of leavers population25, the qualifiers population26, 
and the student standard registration population.27 The composite population 
therefore contains the record of all students who were registered at a Higher 
Education Institute (HEI) in the UK, and who left between the academic years 
2005/06 and 2009/10. The period for analysis is such that there is a steady period 
before the reform in both the treatment and counterfactual groups, with an 
additional year after the policy’s introduction to capture any re-adjustment 
behaviour. The advantage of using such data is the student population contains all 
students who left a HEI, including students who did not successfully complete their 
studies. Where the latter is true, a reason for an unsuccessful or early termination 
of studies is given. Students who are not included in the dataset are dormant28, 
postdoctoral, visiting, exchange, writing-up students29, or students on sabbatical.30 
 
The dataset contains detailed information for each student observation, including 
course information (subject code, year of study, expected length of study, full or 
part time study, degree classification, level of study, end date, start date), university 
information (institution code, campus identifier, accommodation status), as well as 
student characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, disability status, home postcode, 
                                                          
25 Students who have left HE and responded to a follow-up survey with regards to their work or 
study situation, 6 months after graduation. 
26 All students who obtain any form of HE qualification. 
27 All students who are registered to study at an HEI. 
28 Students who have suspended their studies but are still registered at an HEI. 
29 Students who have completed their expected length of study, but who are registered at an HEI 
solely for writing their final dissertation or thesis – i.e. they are not actively engaged in studying. 
30 The original dataset contains more than 3.61 million student observations, however not all are 
relevant for the analyses in Chapters 1 to 3. Of the original dataset of 3.61 million, approximately 
760,000 observations are retained for potential analysis, however this is before the specific 
identification strategies followed in the relevant chapters. See Appendix A, Table A3 for a detailed 
overview of the data cropping. 
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tariff score on entry, parental higher education indicator, socioeconomic status31, 
new entrant to HE indicator, fee status, funding information). 
 
As each student is recorded in the academic year they leave university for whatever 
reason, it is necessary to transform the population of leavers into a population of 
new entrants, which is easily performed using the student’s start date, expected 
length of study, and actual time spent studying.32 Each student in the population of 
new entrants is further assigned a calculated distance between their home postcode 
(recorded at the time of applying for university) and their eventual university 
attended. This is done by using eastings and northings to generate Euclidean 
distances in kilometres between all possible postcodes in the UK, and assigning the 
correct distance to a student depending on their home and university postcode. 
 
One obvious limitation of this data is that there exists inherently a self-selection 
bias: students in the dataset are demonstrably those who have decided to participate 
in HE. Ideally it would be possible to record the participation decision and then 
subsequently observe students’ choice of subject and university.33 Hence, although 
it is not possible to identify a pure participation effect with the HESA data, it is 
possible to identify how the 2006 reform affected how students participated in HE, 
conditional on them having decided to participate.34 However, one important 
advantage of the graduate data as opposed to applicant data is that it allows an 
overview of an entire student’s engagement with higher education, including 
                                                          
31 This code (1-9, with 1 = highest, 8 = lowest, and 9 = unknown) is derived from the occupation of 
the parent, guardian, or the student themselves (if neither parent nor guardian is applicable) with the 
highest income to the household. 
32 An alternative dataset considered was the population of new entrants, which would ensure 
maximum coverage of the new entrants in each academic year – in the leavers population, those 
students who take longer to complete their studies may not be captured. However, the advantages 
of the HESA data used in this analysis are that the completion status, degree classification, and time 
spent studying on a degree course are included for each student observation. 
33 Studies that have used such longitudinal data to capture the participation decision include 
Dynarski (2003), BIS (2010a) and Dearden et al. (2011). 
34 This participation decision would be captured using UCAS application data, but enquiries to link 
individuals’ UCAS application information with their HESA student record were not fruitful. A 
further benefit of using the UCAS data is that students typically apply to more than one university, 
so in the HESA data this paper uses almost certainly observes students on courses and at universities 
which were the students’ first choice, and which were the students’ second, third or fourth choice. 
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attrition and award outcomes, and eventual length of study. The resulting student 
observation is arguably richer in information with regards to a student’s entire 
engagement with higher education compared to simply observing students at their 
entry point. 
 
1.3.2 Identification Strategy 
Since the 2006 reforms were targeted at new entrants at the undergraduate level, 
only new entrants studying for an undergraduate degree between the academic years 
2003/04 and 2007/08 are selected, both in the treatment group of English HEIs and 
the control group of Welsh HEIs. A more selective form of the treatment and control 
groups would be to only select English-domiciled students at English HEIs, and 
Welsh-domiciled students at Welsh HEIs. If students were able to migrate across 
borders to avoid the higher fees, this would invalidate the assumptions behind the 
difference-in-differences estimation.35 Whilst this is possible using the home 
postcode of the student, it is not necessary for the purposes of this analysis. This is 
not only because the reforms provided no incentive for cross border migration, but 
additionally these migration flows did not change significantly over the period in 
question. This is a result that both Universities UK (2009)36 and Wakeling & 
Jefferies (2013)37 find. However, it is important to also note that the choice of study 
location depends not only on the cost of tuition, but also on the local living cost, the 
quality of the degree programmes and the universities themselves. If these 
migration assumptions are violated, however, it may question the validity of the 
results. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that over a 5-year period there is not 
significant heterogeneous variation that would confound the analysis (especially in 
terms of living costs), however university and subject fixed effects are included in 
the analysis as controls. 
 
                                                          
35 See section 1.4.1 for further discussion. 
36 See Universities UK (2009), Appendix 3: ‘Cross-border flows: data for 2003/04 – 2006/07’. 
37 See Wakeling & Jefferies (2013), Figures 3 & 5. 
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A further distinction is made to select only students who were eligible to pay home 
fees (e.g. £3,000 in England and £1,200 in Wales in 2006), and since the analysis 
requires information on income backgrounds, only students with a valid 
socioeconomic code (SEC) are kept. Similarly, since the information is necessary 
to distinguish between sub-groups of students, only students without a missing or 
unknown home postcode, age, gender and fee eligibility are retained for analysis. 
As each student is given a SEC code (derived from the student’s parental occupation 
that is the main contributor to the household income), it is possible to assign 
students to either a low or high income background. As is commonplace in the 
literature, students with SEC code 1-3 are denoted high income, whilst those with 
SEC code 4-8 are denoted low income. Observations that have SEC code 9 are 
dropped from the dataset, as this corresponds to ‘Unknown’.38 
 
However, given the nature of the reforms, students who are classified as low income 
but whose household income is too high to award the full offsetting meant-tested 
grant (household income equal to or greater than £17,500) are the most likely to be 
adversely affected by the tuition fee increase. Therefore, the low income grouping 
is further subdivided into an upper-low income background (SEC code 4-5) and a 
lower-low income background for those who are most likely to receive a full 
maintenance grant award (SEC code 6-8).39 Since the upper-low income 
background students may be the most affected by the fee increase, it is rational to 
expect that this group of students will place more importance on graduate earnings 
and employability, whilst also the potential for observing some cost-reducing 
behaviour by choosing to live at or near the parental home whilst attending 
university to minimise maintenance costs. Students from the upper-low income 
                                                          
38 A further extension to this analysis could be to investigate the impact of the funding reforms on 
those with an unknown socioeconomic code, however such an approach is not considered here. 
39 Ideally, the data would include information on parental or household income, so that students 
could be perfectly assigned to the upper-low and lower-low income categories, to reflect the lack 
of offsetting maintenance grants where household income is £17,500 or over. As such information 
is not available, the assignment of SEC codes 4-5 to the upper-low income category is checked for 
some robustness using the median earnings through the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) by Standard Occupation Code 2000 (SOC 2000), from which the socioeconomic code is 
derived by HESA. See Appendix A, Table A4. 
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category who are unable or do not wish to stay in the local area to attend university 
will be the most adversely affected in financial terms by the reforms, whilst those 
that can live at home may be insulated from the increased costs. Hence, it is 
plausible that risk-averse behaviour in terms of subject and university choice will 
be observed in the former but not the latter. Nevertheless, although students are now 
assigned to one of three socioeconomic groups, the upper-low and the lower-low 
income categories are demonstrably still low-income. The benefit of splitting the 
low-income category into two is that it allows an identification of potentially 
opposing effects, whereby the upper-low income students are the most likely to bear 
the full increase of the tuition fees, and the lower-low income students are the least 
likely. Therefore, treating both groups as an average may lead to a loss of important 
information on how students responded to the policy change. 
 
In terms of the HEIs, the HESA data contains the details of every student at every 
recognised HEI, which creates significant variation in the quality and academic 
focus of HEIs. To overcome this issue, students are only retained in England and 
Wales who are registered at a HEI that is not strictly vocational, such as arts colleges 
or drama schools. Specifically, the universities included for analysis are the Welsh 
and English universities that are identified by Gibbons and Vignoles (2009) as non-
vocational, to remove HEIs such as arts and drama schools from the estimation.40 
To further classify HEIs, a distinction is made between elite and non-elite 
universities41, by using the classification of the 24 members of the Russell Group.42 
The resulting dataset for analysis is approximately 690,000 observations, after 
                                                          
40 See Gibbons & Vignoles (2009), Table A1; amended to include non-vocational Welsh, Scottish 
and Northern Irish universities as shown in Appendix A, Table A5. 
41 It is arguable that this definition of elite and non-elite universities may not fully capture any 
effects on the study choice behaviour of low income students, since low socioeconomic status 
students and minorities are typically under-represented in such universities. An alternative method 
of controlling for university quality could be to use an indicator for post-1992 institutions, or a 
continuous measure of university quality such as league table rankings. Such approaches are not 
taken in the analysis in these chapters for simplicity, but offer potential future avenues for 
research. 
42 See Appendix A, Table A1. 
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removing all student observations that are not from English or Welsh HEIs 




1.4.1 Difference-in-Differences (DiD) 
As has become increasingly popular in the field of policy evaluation, a difference-
in-differences (DiD) analysis estimates the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATET). To capture the ATET, it is necessary to observe the treatment group before 
and after the treatment, with and without the treatment. In essence, this would be to 
compare the observed outcome of the policy on English students with the 
participation behaviour of English students in the same time period in the absence 
of the policy. To solve this omitted variable problem, a counterfactual outcome is 
obtained from a control group that acts as the treatment group without treatment. It 
is therefore crucial that the common trends assumption holds, such that in the 
absence of treatment, the evolution of the treatment group is the same as the control 
group. In a regression setting (as shown in equation 1), a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) analysis is performed by regressing the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (the 
probability of observing a low income student i in country c at time t), on a country 
dummy, 𝐶𝑐  (that takes the value 1 for the country in which the policy is active), a 
time dummy, 𝑇𝑡 (which in the case of only two time periods takes the value 1 in the 
treatment period, and 0 in the pre-treatment period) and the interaction between the 
two (captured by the coefficient 𝜏). 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜏(𝐺𝑐 ∗ 𝑇𝑡) + 𝑖,𝑐,𝑡   
(1) 
 
This interaction, if the assumptions of OLS hold, correctly identifies the ATET: 
𝜏𝐷𝐼𝐷 = 𝐸[𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡=1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡=0|𝐶𝑐 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡=1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡=0|𝐶𝑐 = 0]  
= 𝐸[𝛻𝑦𝑖,𝑐|𝐶𝑐 = 1] − 𝐸[𝛻𝑦𝑖,𝑐|𝐶𝑐 = 0] 
= (𝛽 + 𝜏) − (𝛽) 
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= 𝜏     (2) 
 
As Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) show, this framework can be extended to 
multiple time periods and can include a full set of individual-specific covariates. As 
the dataset contains five cohorts of students, this will allow the inclusion of four 
time dummies which capture the year effects, assuming that they are country-
invariant. Furthermore, the accounting for student heterogeneity (the term 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 in 
equation 1) allows for a more precise calculation of the standard errors and therefore 
of the significance of the DiD estimates, and to account for any compositional 
changes in terms of the observed heterogeneity across the analysis period. (Imbens 
& Wooldridge, 2008) 
 
A natural extension to this DiD model is the difference in the difference-in-
differences (DDD) model, as shown in equation 3. 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐽𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑇𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝐽𝑗) +
𝛽7(𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐽𝑗) + 𝜏(𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝐽𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑡) + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡   
(3) 
 
Here, the treatment effect is disaggregated for treatment and control groups within 
groups, for example comparing students who study Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Maths (STEM) to those who do not (non-STEM). This is 
performed by creating a sub-group binary indicator, 𝐽𝑗 (where J is equal to 1 if the 
subject studied by the student is classified as STEM and 0 otherwise), and including 
in the regression all pairwise interactions between the time, group and sub-group 
indicators (whose coefficients are 𝛽5, 𝛽6 and 𝛽7), and the triple interaction between 
time, group and sub-group (𝜏). This triple interaction is the DDD estimator. If, 
within a treatment group, there exists a subgroup that are more likely to be affected 
by a policy than others, then the DDD is calculated to show the particular treatment 
effect of the policy on the sub-group. In this analysis, sub-groups of low income 
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students will be identified by subject type (STEM and graduate earnings potential), 
and by whether they chose to study at a local university or not.43 
 
1.4.2 Difference-in-Differences with a Binary Outcome Variable 
In the context of the funding reforms of 2006, to obtain a true causal estimate it is 
necessary to observe students in 2006 at English HEIs with and without the higher 
fees, and calculate the difference in the differences over the period window. 
However, since the HESA data only allows the observation of a student at 
university conditional on them having decided to attend, the question of interest is 
whether the funding reform affected the probability of observing a low income 
student at university. Here, the dependent variable is whether a student is classified 
as being from a low income background, which either takes the value 1 if the student 
has the relevant SEC code, and 0 otherwise. This however means that the DiD 
analysis is performed on a binary outcome variable. 
 
Whilst a nonlinear approach could be used in this instance, nonlinear DiD 
regressions are challenging due to the interpretation and consistency problems of 
interactions in nonlinear models. This is a recurring issue in the policy evaluation 
literature, but was first highlighted by Ai and Norton (2003). The coefficient on the 
interaction term can be of incorrect significance, magnitude or even sign, and the 
recommendation is to calculate the cross difference to obtain the true estimate of 
the treatment effect. Furthermore, as Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012) show, the 
estimate of the ATET of the policy would depend on where in the distribution the 
treatment effect is calculated, and even without an interaction term there can be an 
erroneously significant treatment effect for a nonlinear DiD estimator. 
 
Unlike Dietrich and Gerner (2012) who estimate the DiD on the probability of 
school leavers to enrol at a university using a nonlinear probit, this paper’s approach 
is to use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) to estimate the DiD, as the interaction 
                                                          
43 See section 1.4.3 for full details of the DDD categories. 
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between the group and time variable correctly identifies the DiD estimate. 
However, since the LPM can return probabilities that are outside the [0,1] bound, 
and the error term is inherently heteroscedastic, the LPM estimates are 
supplemented with a nonlinear estimation of all DiD and DDD specifications using 
probit. Despite the concerns raised by Ai and Norton (2003), the coefficient on the 
interaction term in a nonlinear DiD (and DDD) model returns the correct sign and 
significance (Puhani, 2008). Hence, as a robustness check, the sign and significance 
of the nonlinear estimates is found to be consistent with the LPM estimates.44 
 
1.4.3 Distance & Subject Groupings 
Instead of assuming that the treatment effect of the 2006 reform was constant across 
all low income background students, the impact of the increased fees is investigated 
by subject studied45, and by distance between a student’s home and their university 
attended. This allows the policy effect to vary across groups of subjects and students 
with potentially different study motivations. It is reasonable to expect that the 
funding reforms influenced the study behaviour of low income students studying 
subjects with high graduate wage premia and/or higher entrance requirements, as 
opposed to subjects with lower graduate wage premia and/or lower entrance 
requirements. Furthermore, distinguishing between students that do and do not 
attend a local university facilitates an evaluation of whether the policy changes 
affected low income students who attended a local university in a different way than 
those who attended a university far from their home at the time of application. The 
latter of these questions allows a direct test of whether the lower-low income 
students (who were the most likely to receive the full non-repayable maintenance 
grant) experienced greater geographic mobility as a result of the inclusion of the 
increased up-front financial support, and consequently, if this increased geographic 
mobility was heterogeneous across subject types. 
 
                                                          
44 See Appendix A, Table A7. 
45 See Appendix A, Table A6 for subject groupings. 
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Every possible degree subject is assigned to one of 19 broad subject groupings 
(letters A-X) called the Joint Academic Coding System (JACS), and since each 
student observation has a valid JACS code, it is possible to use these subject 
groupings to allow the treatment effect of the policy to differ by classifications. One 
popular class of subject grouping is STEM and is defined as JACS codes A-K46, 
whilst non-STEM subjects are defined as K-X.47 However, in using JACS codes to 
classify STEM and non-STEM subjects, it leads to the inclusion of subjects that 
may not fit the definition of STEM (e.g. sports science with code C600, psychology 
with code C800), hence the classification may not be wholly accurate. Nevertheless, 
since STEM graduates typically have a higher than average graduate wage 
premium, and are less likely to be unemployed (Universities UK, 2010), students 
who are motivated by graduate job prospects may choose STEM subjects rather 
than non-STEM at the margin.48 
 
Since degrees in different subjects offer differing individual rates of return (IRR), 
a more direct measure of grouping subjects by graduate earnings prospects is the 
classification constructed in this paper of High Future Income (HFI) and non-HFI 
subjects. A subject is classified as HFI if the IRR for both males and females is 
above the mean49 IRR for undergraduate degrees, as calculated by BIS (2011),50 
and non-HFI subjects are those whose IRRs are below the average IRR for both 
males and females. This classification is also done using the JACS codes51, hence 
the same issue may arise in classifying a broad group of subjects as all providing 
higher or lower than average IRRs when it is reasonable to expect at least some 
                                                          
46 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldsctech/37/3705.htm 
47 There are two common definitions of STEM: broad and narrow. Unless otherwise specified, 
STEM refers to the broad definition (i.e. including Medicine, Subjects allied to Medicine, 
Architecture, and Agricultural Science). 
48 Universities UK (2010) also note however, that variations of graduate job prospects and 
earnings differ within the broad STEM grouping – further highlighting the imperfect nature of this 
classification. 
49 The graduate wage premium is universally found to vary by gender, for example Education 
carries higher lifetime earnings premium only for women, whereas the opposite is true for Social 
Studies. 
50 BIS (2011), Figure 13: ‘Individual rates of return to undergraduate degrees’. 
51 See Appendix A, Table A6 for a full list of JACS codes by HFI and non-HFI status. 
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variation within the 19 alphabetical groups.52 To reduce the effect of incorrectly 
classifying subjects as either HFI or non-HFI, and to further provide contrast 
between the two groups of subjects, JACS codes whose IRRs were not above or 
below the average IRR for both males and females were omitted from the 
classification. Nevertheless, the same rationale applies for HFI subjects as STEM 
subjects – students who put emphasis on graduate job prospects may choose a HFI 
subject rather than a non-HFI subject at the margin. 
 
The treatment effect is also allowed to vary across types of students according to 
the distance from their parental home at the time of applying to university and their 
eventual HEI attended. This is to identify those students who have a large degree 
of geographic mobility in pursuing their university education, and those students 
who choose to remain close to home whilst attending university. Both 
Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010), and Gibbons and Vignoles (2012) find that 
although distance to a university does not affect the participation decision itself, it 
does affect the choice of subject and the choice of university. Denzler and Wolter 
(2011) also find that this is only true for lower income students, since students from 
the higher income families are not constrained by the costs of moving to a university 
far away in the same way as students from lower socioeconomic groups. 
Furthermore, the fear of debt or an increase in the perceived costs of attending 
university is likely to negatively affect the willingness to attend a university far 
from the parental home for low income students (Callender and Jackson, 2008). For 
the purpose of the analysis, and taking the relatively smaller geographic size of 
Wales into account, a student is classified as having remained in the local area if 
the difference between their parental home and university postcode is less than 
20km in Euclidean space, since it is reasonable to expect that such a distance is 
easily commutable.53 Furthermore, a student is defined as having attended a 
                                                          
52 For example, in the definition that will follow, Economics (code L100) is not classed as an HFI 
subject for the purposes of this analysis. 
53 The 2011 UK Census identifies the average commuter distance – albeit for commuters to full 
and part time work – as being 15.0km in England and Wales, and 13.4km in the previous census 
(2001). The slightly greater distance choice of 20km as being the threshold for a local student 
accounts for the possibility of students not being required to travel every day of the week, nor at 
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university far away if their point-to-point distance between parental and university 
postcode is more than 80km.54 These classifications, in conjunction with a student’s 
accommodation information, allows for even more detailed distinction between 
students who are living at home, and those who are living in university halls or in 
private sector accommodation. Table 1.5a below shows the summary statistics for 
the treatment group (English HEIs) and the control group (Welsh HEIs), both before 
and after the introduction of the policy. Table 1.5b provides a t-test comparison of 
the means of the treatment and control groups in the pre-policy period. As can be 
seen from column 3 of Table 1.5b, students at Welsh HEIs do differ from English 
HEIs in terms of statistical significance before the funding change was enacted. 
This does not invalidate the approach of using Wales as a counterfactual however, 
since the underlying assumption of the difference-in-differences strategy used in 
this analysis is not that the control group is identical to the treatment group, but that 
the evolution over time at Welsh HEIs is provides the counterfactual outcome for 
English HEIs. Hence, although the two groups are statistically different, this 
difference is assumed to be the same in the treatment period, in the absence of 
treatment. As discussed in the proceeding section, the more specific assumption of 






                                                          
peak times, which reduces the financial burden of travel costs. As seen from Table 1.5a and 
Appendix A, Figure A1, around one fifth of the student population in England is classified as 
attending a local student, and slightly less in Wales (due to Wales’ smaller size compared to 
England, and relatively more rural demography). For full details of the commuter distance results 
from the 2011 UK Census, see: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160107181447/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp17177
6_357812.pdf 
54 This is the same classification as used by Frenette (2004).  Alternative specifications that were 
considered included a distance of 50km, as used by Mitze et al. (2013), however this is in the 
context of distance to a fee border given regional variation in study fees; and the approach by 
Denzler and Wolter (2011) to use commuting time instead of distance, however this was 
impractical given the geographic extent of the analysis. 
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Table 1.5a: Summary Statistics of Treatment and Control Groups 





















Low Income =1 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 
(SEC Code 4-8) (0.453) (0.453) (0.459) (0.447) (0.454) (0.459) (0.464) 
Upper-Low 
Income =1 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 
(SEC Code 4-5) (0.322) (0.320) (0.338) (0.318) (0.336) (0.323) (0.341) 
Lower-Low 
Income 
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 
(SEC Code 6-8) (0.377) (0.377) (0.375) (0.369) (0.367) (0.387) (0.385) 
England 0.93 - - - - - - 
 (0.249) - - - - - - 
Wales 0.07 - - - - - - 
 (0.249) - - - - - - 
Age 19.35 19.35 19.34 19.34 19.34 19.37 19.34 
 (3.696) (3.693) (3.748) (3.695) (3.791) (3.690) (3.696) 
Educated Parent 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 
 (0.260) (0.268) (0) (0.0545) (0) (0.377) (0) 
White 0.83 0.82 0.95 0.83 0.95 0.81 0.95 
 (0.376) (0.383) (0.222) (0.378) (0.223) (0.389) (0.222) 
Female 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.58 
 (0.495) (0.496) (0.493) (0.496) (0.492) (0.495) (0.494) 
British 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.99 
 (0.213) (0.212) (0.216) (0.221) (0.266) (0.201) (0.121) 
Disabled 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.281) (0.281) (0.288) (0.278) (0.287) (0.285) (0.289) 
Local 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.20 
 (0.410) (0.411) (0.385) (0.407) (0.374) (0.417) (0.398) 
Live at Home 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.17 
 (0.394) (0.396) (0.364) (0.386) (0.353) (0.408) (0.376) 
STEM 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.18 
 (0.412) (0.413) (0.401) (0.428) (0.412) (0.392) (0.386) 
HFI 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.28 
 (0.464) (0.464) (0.454) (0.470) (0.459) (0.456) (0.447) 
Russell Group 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.39 0.31 0.32 0.27 
 (0.479) (0.481) (0.455) (0.488) (0.464) (0.468) (0.441) 
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N 691470 645535 45935 358185 25240 287355 20695 
Notes: 
Educated Parent is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the student is known to have a parent 
with university level education, and 0 otherwise; White, Female, British and Disabled are dummy 
variables whose values are equal to 1 if the student’s ethnicity, gender, nationality and self-reported 
disability status is that of the relevant category, and 0 otherwise. Local is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the Euclidean distance between the student’s domiciled postcode at the time of 
applying to higher education and the student’s eventual university that they attend is less than 20km. 
Live at Home is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s term time accommodation 
is denoted as living at a parental or family home, and 0 otherwise. STEM and HFI are both dummy 
variables that are equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the student’s subject that they study is classified as 
either STEM or HFI according to the classification discussed in this section (1.4.3) and in Appendix 
A, Table A6. Russell Group is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the university the student 
attends is classified as an elite university, as defined by Appendix A, Table A1. Raw numbers have 






Table 1.5b: Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups Means 







(t-test of means) 
Low Income =1 0.28 0.29 -0.0138*** 
(SEC Code 4-8) (0.447) (0.454)  
Upper-Low Income =1 0.11 0.13 -0.0158*** 
(SEC Code 4-5) (0.318) (0.336)  
Lower-Low Income 0.16 0.16 0.00202 
(SEC Code 6-8) (0.369) (0.367)  
Age 19.34 19.34 0.00376 
 (3.695) (3.791)  
Educated Parent 0.00 0.00 0.00298*** 
 (0.0545) (0)  
White 0.83 0.95 -0.121*** 
 (0.378) (0.223)  
Female 0.57 0.59 -0.0208*** 
 (0.496) (0.492)  
British 0.95 0.92 0.0254*** 
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 (0.221) (0.266)  
Disabled 0.08 0.09 -0.00631*** 
 (0.278) (0.287)  
Local 0.21 0.17 0.0411*** 
 (0.407) (0.374)  
Live at Home 0.18 0.15 0.0354*** 
 (0.386) (0.353)  
STEM 0.24 0.22 0.0252*** 
 (0.428) (0.412)  
HFI 0.33 0.30 0.0540*** 
 (0.470) (0.459)  
Russell Group 0.39 0.31 0.0771*** 
 (0.488) (0.464)  
N 358185 25240  
Notes: 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.5b above are the same as columns (4) and (5) in Table 1.5a. Column 
(3) gives the t-tested difference in the means between the treatment and control groups before the 
funding policy change with the corresponding statistical difference in the two group means being 




1.4.4 Empirical Model 
Given the data and the parameters of the natural experiment, the DiD model is 
estimated using OLS of the following: 
 









+ 𝛿1(𝐷𝑝 ∗ 𝐷𝑐) + 𝑖,𝑐,𝑢,𝑡 
(4) 
 
Where Yi,c,u,t denotes the low income background status of student i in country c at 
university u in time period t, Dc is a country dummy that takes the value of 1 for 
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students in England, and Dt are a full set of year dummies.
55 The DiD estimate is 
the coefficient 𝛿1 on the interaction between the country indicator (𝐷𝑐) and an 
additional period indicator (𝐷𝑝) that takes the value 1 if the policy is active in the 
wave year, and 0 otherwise.56 Furthermore, a number (K) of individual controls 
(Xi,c,u,t) that measure student characteristics are added to take into account of any 
heterogeneity in the trends of the observable student characteristics between 
students at English and Welsh HEIs. These controls are gender, disability status, 
ethnicity, whether a student has a parent with university education, nationality, age, 
mode of study, and whether the student is from the local area (as previously 
defined). Also included are university fixed effects (𝐴𝑢) to capture any 
heterogeneity between English and Welsh universities over time.57 Furthermore, 
since the error term is likely to violate the independent and identically distributed 
(iid) assumption (as errors are likely to be correlated within universities, and as the 
LPM inherently creates heteroscedasticity), the errors ( 𝑖,𝑐,𝑢,𝑡) are clustered at the 
university level. 
 
Since the coefficient on the interaction term δ1 is the coefficient of interest, as it is 
the difference-in-differences estimator which estimates the ATET, it is these 
coefficients that are reported in the following tables. Finally, it should be noted that 
the common trends assumption made in this specification is not that the overall 
trends are common across England and Wales, but the individual year effects are. 
Thus the trend is allowed to vary by year, but across the two countries they are 
assumed common. 
 
                                                          
55 For all estimations, the base year is 2003. 
56 This allows the difference-in-differences to be computed as an average of the post-policy 
periods, or separately for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cohort. See the opening paragraph of section 
1.5 for a full discussion. 
57 As can be seen from Appendix A, Table A7, the inclusion of department fixed effects instead of 
university fixed effects - which would further capture any heterogeneity within universities - does 
not have a significant impact on the estimates. 
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To perform the DDD specifications, the existing interaction term is expanded with 
a third interaction between a sub-group of the treatment group, as shown by the 
following equation: 
 









+ 𝜃𝑗𝐽𝑗 + 𝛿1(𝐷𝑝 ∗ 𝐷𝑐)
+ 𝛿2(𝐷𝑝 ∗ 𝐽𝑗) + 𝛿3(𝐽𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑐) + 𝛿4(𝐷𝑝 ∗ 𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝐽𝑗) + 𝑖,𝑐,𝑢,𝑗,𝑡 
(5) 
 
The original DiD equation (4) is extended to a DDD estimation with the addition of 
a sub-group indicator, 𝐽𝑗 (which is equal to 1 if the student observation is in the sub-
group of interest58 and 0 otherwise), all pairwise interactions of the sub-group, time 
period and country indicators (𝛿1, 𝛿2 and 𝛿3), and the DDD estimator 𝛿4. In this 
analysis, distinctions are made between low income students who study STEM and 
HFI subjects (Table 1.7), and low income students who remained in the local area 
(Table 1.8). This approach is then combined (by estimating the Local DDD 
separately by subject groups) to examine whether there is a significant effect to be 
found when considering the subject choice of those students who can be classified 
as being local, those who are living at home whilst attending university, and those 
who are attending a university far from their registered home address at the time of 
application (Tables 1.8-1.10). The coefficients reported in the DDD tables are 




For each specification of the DiD and DDD analysis, the estimation is performed 
across all universities and across those universities with the Russell Group 
universities excluded, to investigate whether the policy impacted students studying 
                                                          
58 Either subject sub-groups (STEM==1, HFI==1) or distance sub-groups (Local==1, Live at 
Home==1, Live Far Away==1). 
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at non-elite institutions, who tend to have a higher proportion of lower 
socioeconomic status students.59 Furthermore, each DiD and DDD estimation is 
performed across three different treatment periods: the 2006 period (where the 
country dummy is interacted with the 2006 year dummy), the 2007 period (where 
the 2007 year dummy is used in the interaction) and the average treatment period 
(where the country dummy is interacted with a post policy dummy). All the 
coefficients presented in Tables 1.6-1.10 (and their corresponding clustered 
standard errors) are the DiD estimates from a separate DiD regression. 
 
In terms of the 2006 treatment effect, although the students who started in 
September 2006 were the first cohort of students subject to the new funding 
reforms, many would have already committed themselves to the decision to attend 
university by their subject choice at school. As students decide which subjects to 
study two years before they attend university60, the subjects students choose to 
study prior to HE entry can define which subjects a student is eligible to study at 
university through subject-specific entrance requirements61 (e.g. pre-university 
mathematics qualifications are normally required to study an undergraduate 
mathematics degree). Hence in 2006, the effects can be considered a partial 
adjustment to the policy in this regard. The only choice these students may have 
had was which university to study at, given their choice of degree subject is limited 
to their subjects chosen at school or college. In 2007 however, the treatment effect 
can be thought of in terms of full adjustment, as students who started in September 
2007 had a chance to better delay or change any decision to attend university, 
including the decision to change which subjects to study pre-university. Finally, 
each specification of the DiD and DDD is performed across three classifications of 
                                                          
59 See, for example: https://www.suttontrust.com/newsarchive/access-highly-selective-universities-
stalls/ 
60 See Chapter 2, Table 2.1 for a complete timeline of a typical new entrant to HE with regards to 
subject choice; also see the Introduction to this thesis for discussion of the transition from further 
education to higher education in general. 
61 In the UK context, students in England and Wales typically study 3 or 4 A-Level subjects to 
gain entry into undergraduate study (whereas in Scotland, students study Highers or Advanced 
Highers). See the Introduction to this thesis for a detailed explanation. 
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low income students, in accordance with the identification strategy: low income 
students (SEC code 4-8), upper-low income students (SEC code 4-5), and lower-
low income students (SEC code 6-8).  
 
Table 1.6 shows the results from the OLS estimation of equation 4, where each 
coefficient is the difference in differences in the probability of observing a low 
income student. Panel A uses the broader definition of low income students (SEC 
code 4-8), whilst Panels B and C show the DiD estimates in the probability of 
observing an upper-low and lower-low income student respectively. In each panel, 
the DiD is estimated separately for the average of the treatment period, and for the 
partial (the 2006/07 cohort) and full (the 2007/08 cohort) adjustment effects62. 
Columns 1 and 3 uses university fixed effects (dummies for each university) to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity and hence account for omitted bias, whilst 
Columns 2 and 4 use department fixed effects (dummies for each department at 
each university). Comparing the two types of fixed effects, there is no significant 
difference across the type of fixed effects used; hence for computational ease (and 
as shown in equation 4, university fixed effects are used henceforth. 
 
Panel A shows that the increased tuition fees and funding reforms actually increased 
the probability of observing a low income student by 1.66 percentage points, 
conditional on them having applied to university. This represents a 5.98% increase 
in the probability of observing a low income student, relative to the pre-reform 
mean of 27.78%. However, as seen from Panel B, this increase in probability is 
significant only for the upper-low income category of students (SEC code 4-5; the 
most likely to be adversely affected by the increased fees), with an increase in 
probability of 1.72 percentage points which represents an increase of 14.96% 
relative to the pre-reform mean of 11.50%. The implication is that when estimating 
the DiD averaged across all subjects, and not distinguishing between whether a 
student is local to their university, the policy reforms appear to have had a positive 
                                                          
62 For ease, the estimates for students who began their studies in the 2006/07 academic year is 
simply named ‘2006’, and the 2007/08 cohort is named ‘2007’ Tables 1.6-1.10. 
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impact on the probability of observing an upper-low income group student once full 
adjustment took place in September 2007. This is somewhat counter-intuitive, as 
given the structure of the policy introduced, the upper-low income students should 
have been the most adversely affected by the increased fees, hence it would have 
been reasonable to expect the DiD estimate to be negative, especially for non-elite 
universities. Furthermore, the policy reforms appear not to have affected the 
conditional probability of observing a lower-low income student, which supports 
the existing research as outlined in section 1.2.2.
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Table 1.6: DiD Estimate of the 2006 Policy Reform – Baseline 
          All Universities   Non-Elite Universities 
          (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
   
  
       
Panel A                   
SEC Code 4-8          
   Treatment Period Average  0.0117 0.0129 
 
0.00642 0.00626 
      (0.00939) (0.00922) 
 
(0.00647) (0.00632) 
    2006  -0.00251 -0.00235 
 
-0.00371 -0.00442 
      (0.00554) (0.00560) 
 
(0.00497) (0.00480) 
    2007  0.0166** 0.0179** 
 
0.0110* 0.0113* 
          (0.00837) (0.00797)   (0.00627) (0.00596) 
 
  
         
Panel B                   
SEC Code 4-5 Treatment Period Average  0.0103** 0.00986* 
 
0.00859 0.00725 
      (0.00484) (0.00506) 
 
(0.00648) (0.00666) 
    2006  -0.00539 -0.00581 
 
-0.00757 -0.00864 
      (0.00573) (0.00593) 
 
(0.00709) (0.00715) 
    2007  0.0172** 0.0171** 
 
0.0168* 0.0160 
          (0.00715) (0.00717)   (0.0100) (0.0101) 
 
  
         
Panel C                   
SEC Code 6-8 Treatment Period Average  0.00141 0.00301 
 
-0.00217 -0.000990 





    2006  0.00288 0.00346 
 
0.00386 0.00422 
      (0.00334) (0.00348) 
 
(0.00413) (0.00447) 
    2007  -0.000618 0.000865 
 
-0.00584 -0.00470 
          (0.0125) (0.0122)   (0.0147) (0.0145) 
          
Fixed Effects     University Department  University Department 
Controls     yes yes  yes yes 
Obs (SEC Code 4-8)     691,475 691,475 
 
444,395 444,395 
Obs (SEC Code 4-5)     691,475 691,475 
 
444,395 444,395 
Obs (SEC Code 6-8)         691,475 691,475   444,395 444,395 
This table reports the results from the DiD estimation as outlined by equation (4), estimated across all universities (columns 1-2) and then across non-elite universities (columns 3-4). Elite status is 
denoted by membership of the Russell Group of universities, as seen in Appendix A, Table A1. The coefficients reported are the coefficients on the interaction between the treatment group indicator 
(English HEIs) and the treatment period indicator, and show the change in the probability of observing a low income student studying as a result of the 2006 funding reforms. To allow for the 
estimation of the effect of the policy averaged across the post-policy period and to capture the partial and full adjustment effects to the policy change,  the DiD is estimated separately for the 
average of the post-policy cohorts, and for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cohorts. There are therefore three rows of DiD estimates for each column, where each coefficient relates to the specific treatment 
period. There are three panels (A, B and C) to allow an estimation of the DiD across the broad low income background category (Panel A, SEC Code 4-8), and disaggregated across the upper-low 
income background category of students (Panel B, SEC Code 4-5) and the lower-low income background category of students (Panel C, SEC Code 6-8). University fixed effects are included for 
columns 1 and 3, whilst department fixed effects (20 departments per university, as created by the 20 broad JACS codes) are used in columns 2 and 4. Controls are included for observable student 
heterogeneity, which are: gender, ethnicity, age, disability status, and nationality. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding 
Methodology. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the HEI level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7 attempts to investigate this finding by disaggregating the treatment effect 
into subject groupings using the DDD approach by estimating equation number 5. 
Using the triple difference approach by subject grouping, Panel B shows that the 
initial effect identified in Table 1.6 is driven by upper-low income students studying 
non-High Future Income subjects. The implication is therefore that not only are 
students more likely to be observed at university from the upper-low income 
category, the subjects that this effect is found for may not offer the best investment 
in terms of graduate employability. Column 4 shows that there is a decrease of 1.77 
percentage points on the conditional probability of observing an upper-low income 
student studying High Future Income subjects compared to non-HFI subjects, once 
full adjustment has taken place. Furthermore, this effect is larger in magnitude and 
statistical significance at non-Russell Group universities. Once again, the counter-
intuitive nature of the disaggregation of the DiD estimate by subject is that whilst 
students from the upper-low income category are more likely to be studying as a 
result of the policy reforms, they are less likely to be studying subjects that offer 
the highest graduate earnings premia. The story therefore cannot be that students 
from the upper-low income category are more likely to attend university, and as a 
consequence of the increased costs are choosing to study a subject with the highest 
rewards upon graduation in terms of earnings. 
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Table 1.7: DiD Estimate of the 2006 Policy Reform – DDD by Subject 
          All Universities   Non-Elite Universities 
     STEM HFI   STEM HFI 
          (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  
         
Panel A                   
SEC Code 4-8          
   Treatment Period Average  -0.000528 -0.00660 
 
-0.000813 -0.0143 
      (0.00999) (0.0131) 
 
(0.0144) (0.0184) 
    2006  0.00900 0.0184 
 
-0.0220 0.0147 
      (0.0208) (0.0112) 
 
(0.0148) (0.0168) 
    2007  -0.00841 -0.0238** 
 
0.0163 -0.0298** 
          (0.0168) (0.00964)   (0.0145) (0.0120) 
 
  
         
Panel B                   
SEC Code 4-5 Treatment Period Average  -0.00274 -0.000767 
 
-0.0108 -0.00414 
      (0.00646) (0.00623) 
 
(0.00695) (0.0103) 
    2006  0.00348 0.0134* 
 
-0.0161 0.0146 
      (0.0143) (0.00783) 
 
(0.0118) (0.0107) 
    2007  -0.00649 -0.0124* 
 
-0.000520 -0.0177** 
          (0.00815) (0.00637)   (0.00852) (0.00784) 
 
  
         
Panel C                   





      (0.0112) (0.00855) 
 
(0.0149) (0.0120) 
    2006  0.00552 0.00499 
 
-0.00588 0.000121 
      (0.00961) (0.00941) 
 
(0.0107) (0.0133) 
    2007  -0.00191 -0.0113* 
 
0.0168 -0.0122 
          (0.0176) (0.00598)   (0.0204) (0.00791) 
          
Fixed Effects     University University  University University 
Controls     yes yes  yes yes 
Obs (SEC Code 4-8)     691,475 691,475 
 
444,395 444,395 
Obs (SEC Code 4-5)     691,475 691,475 
 
444,395 444,395 
Obs (SEC Code 6-8)         691,475 691,475   444,395 444,395 
This table reports the results from the DDD estimation as outlined by equation (5), estimated across all universities (columns 1-2) and then across non-elite universities (columns 3-4). Elite status is 
denoted by membership of the Russell Group of universities, as seen in Appendix A, Table A1. The coefficients reported are the coefficients on the triple interaction between the treatment group 
indicator (English HEIs), the subject group indicator and the treatment period indicator, and show the change in the probability of observing a low income student studying either a STEM or HFI 
subject compared to non-STEM or non-HFI, as a result of the 2006 funding reforms. Columns 1 and 3 therefore show the impact of the funding reforms on low income students studying STEM 
subjects compared to non-STEM subjects, and columns 2 and 4 show the impact of the funding reforms on low income students studying HFI subjects compared to non-HFI subjects. All relevant 
cross-products were included between the treatment group indicator, treatment period indicator and the subject group indicator, but are not shown here in the interests of concision. To allow for the 
estimation of the effect of the policy averaged across the post-policy period and to capture the partial and full adjustment effects to the policy change,  the DiD is estimated separately for the 
average of the post-policy cohorts, and for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cohorts. There are therefore three rows of DiD estimates for each column, where each coefficient relates to the specific treatment 
period. There are three panels (A, B and C) to allow an estimation of the DiD across the broad low income background category (Panel A, SEC Code 4-8), and disaggregated across the upper-low 
income background category of students (Panel B, SEC Code 4-5) and the lower-low income background category of students (Panel C, SEC Code 6-8). University fixed effects are included for all 
specifications, as are controls for observable student heterogeneity. Namely, these individual controls are: gender, ethnicity, age, disability status, and nationality. Raw numbers have been rounded 
to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the HEI level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To disaggregate the policy effect even further, in Table 1.8 a further distinction is 
made for students who stay in the local area (within 20km), and the DDD is 
estimated as an average across all subjects (columns 1 and 6), and then across 
STEM/non-STEM subjects (columns 2-3, 7-8) and HFI subjects (columns 4-5, 9-
10). Whilst it may have been counter-intuitive so far for the policy to have a positive 
impact on students most likely to be adversely affected, the distinction between 
local and non-local students gives a more logical explanation. Columns 1 and 6 
show that the increase in probability of observing an upper-low income student can 
be attributed to those upper-low income students who remained in the local area, 
although the coefficients are marginally insignificant at the 5% level. However, as 
columns 5 and 10 highlight, when this DDD estimation for local students is allowed 
to be heterogeneous across subject types, the increase in probability of observing 
an upper-low income student appears only to be true for non-HFI subjects. 
Furthermore, as found in Table 1.7, these effects are slightly larger in magnitude 
for non-Russell Group HE institutions. Thus, by not taking into account 
heterogeneous treatment effects between students who chose to stay in the local 
area and those who do not (Tables 1.6-1.7), the results are initially somewhat 
counter-intuitive. However, given that by staying in the local area, the costs 
(excluding tuition fees) of attending university can be reduced through parental 
support and living at home, and given that tuition fees are now repayable through 
earnings above a certain level upon graduation, the decision to attend university if 
staying in the local area has less risk involved than before the policy (where tuition 
fees were paid up front with no loans available). 
 
The disaggregation of treatment effects across subject types also shows which types 
of subjects this increase in local upper-low income students originates. Whilst the 
finding that the increase in upper-low income students studying non-HFI subjects 
appeared surprising at first, by looking at the local DDD results by subject type the 
finding in Table 1.7 is the result of an increase in local upper-low income students 
studying non-HFI subjects. Given the lack of risk involved as a result of the 2006 
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policy changes, students from the upper-low income category who wanted to study 




Table 1.8: DiD Estimate of the 2006 Policy Reform – Local DDD by Subject 
          All Universities   Non-Elite Universities 
     Local  Local 
     All STEM Non-STEM HFI Non-HFI  All STEM Non-STEM HFI Non-HFI 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                
Panel A                               
SEC Code 4-8 Treat Average  -0.00537 -0.00494 -0.00522 0.000129 -0.00793 
 
-0.0103 -0.0140 -0.00891 -0.00951 -0.00778 
   Period   (0.0132) (0.0177) (0.0150) (0.0195) (0.0141) 
 
(0.0184) (0.0258) (0.0197) (0.0262) (0.0180) 
    2006  -0.00694 -0.0209 -0.00212 -0.00452 -0.00975 
 
-0.0125 -0.0426*** -0.00601 -0.0126 -0.0133 
      (0.0117) (0.0186) (0.0159) (0.0180) (0.0114) 
 
(0.0164) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0270) (0.0144) 
    2007  -0.00191 0.0104 -0.00571 0.00342 -0.00285 
 
-0.00289 0.0147 -0.00639 -0.000685 0.000357 
          (0.0103) (0.0175) (0.0106) (0.0188) (0.0132)   (0.0133) (0.0227) (0.0128) (0.0248) (0.0156) 
 
  
               
Panel B                               
SEC Code 4-5 Treat Average  0.00507 0.00791 0.00389 -0.00105 0.00845 
 
0.0101 0.0196 0.00791 -0.000981 0.0158 
   Period   (0.0117) (0.0163) (0.0127) (0.00924) (0.0141) 
 
(0.0137) (0.0203) (0.0146) (0.0113) (0.0153) 
    2006  -0.0170 -0.0164 -0.0175 -0.0140 -0.0203 
 
-0.0129 -0.0100 -0.0142 -0.0164 -0.0131 
      (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0135) 
 
(0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0181) (0.0158) 
    2007  0.0185* 0.0211 0.0177 0.00903 0.0258** 
 
0.0212* 0.0285 0.0198 0.0114 0.0287** 
          (0.0101) (0.0173) (0.0114) (0.00925) (0.0130)   (0.0115) (0.0227) (0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0144) 
 
  
               
Panel C                               
SEC Code 6-8 Treat Average  -0.0104 -0.0128 -0.00911 0.00118 -0.0164 
 
-0.0203 -0.0336* -0.0168 -0.00853 -0.0236 
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   Period   (0.0186) (0.0156) (0.0212) (0.0185) (0.0229) 
 
(0.0235) (0.0197) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0271) 
    2006  0.0100 -0.00445 0.0153 0.00951 0.0106 
 
0.000349 -0.0325 0.00817 0.00386 -0.000174 
      (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0193) 
 
(0.0213) (0.0207) (0.0233) (0.0297) (0.0222) 
    2007  -0.0204* -0.0107 -0.0234* -0.00561 -0.0286 
 
-0.0241 -0.0138 -0.0262 -0.0120 -0.0283 
          (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0183)   (0.0146) (0.0196) (0.0164) (0.0177) (0.0216) 
                
Fixed Effects     University University University University University  University University University University University 
Controls     yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs (SEC Code 4-8)    691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970 
 
444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
Obs (SEC Code 4-5)    691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970 
 
444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
Obs (SEC Code 6-8)       691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970   444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
This table reports the results from the DDD estimation as outlined by equation (5), estimated across all universities (columns 1-5) and then across non-elite universities (columns 6-10). Elite 
status is denoted by membership of the Russell Group of universities, as seen in Appendix A, Table A1. The coefficients reported are the coefficients on the triple interaction between the 
treatment group indicator (English HEIs), the indicator of being a local student and the treatment period indicator, and show the change in the probability of observing a low income student as a 
result of the 2006 funding reforms studying at a local university compared to a non-local university, where local is defined as being within 20km Euclidean distance from the student’s 
domiciled postcode at the time of application to HE. Column 1 shows the DDD impact of the funding reforms for low income students studying at a local university across all subjects, 
compared to non-local universities across all subjects. Column 6 estimates the same as column 1, except the DDD estimation is only performed for non-elite universities. Columns 2 and 3 
perform the same estimation as column 1, but for STEM and non-STEM subjects separately. Columns 7 and 8 also show the DDD for STEM and non-STEM subjects separately, but only at 
non-elite universities. The DDD estimates  in these columns therefore show the impact of the funding reforms on the probability of observing a low income student who attends a local 
university compared to a non-local university who studies a STEM or a non-STEM subject. Columns 4 and 5, and columns 9 and 10 show the results for the same approach for HFI and non-
HFI subjects at elite and non-elite universities respectively. All relevant cross-products were included between the treatment group indicator, treatment period indicator and the local indicator, 
but are not shown here in the interests of concision. To allow for the estimation of the effect of the policy averaged across the post-policy period and to capture the partial and full adjustment 
effects to the policy change, the DiD is estimated separately for the average of the post-policy cohorts, and for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cohorts. There are therefore three rows of DiD estimates 
for each column, where each coefficient relates to the specific treatment period. There are three panels (A, B and C) to allow an estimation of the DiD across the broad low income background 
category (Panel A, SEC Code 4-8), and disaggregated across the upper-low income background category of students (Panel B, SEC Code 4-5) and the lower-low income background category 
of students (Panel C, SEC Code 6-8). University fixed effects are included for all specifications, as are controls for observable student heterogeneity. Namely, these individual controls are: 
gender, ethnicity, age, disability status, and nationality. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the HEI level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.9 shows that by disaggregating the local classification even further into 
those who live at home in the local area and those who live away from home but in 
the local area, similar results to Table 1.8 are found. Those who are living at home 
in the local area are the most likely to insulate themselves from the increase in fees 
(by effectively not requiring a maintenance loan to fund living costs, given they are 
likely to be less eligible for a means-tested maintenance grant), whilst also able to 
repay tuition fees on an income-contingent basis. Hence, such students should 
display the least cautious behaviour in terms of subject choice, as there is even less 
risk involved than a student simply living locally. Columns 1 and 5 confirm this 
hypothesis, with an increase in the probability of 2.85 percentage points across all 
subjects, and an increase of 3.61 percentage points for those students studying non-
HFI subjects. 
 
By looking specifically at students who chose to live at home, it is also possible to 
examine the effect of the policy on geographic mobility of the lower-low income 
students. Since the policy introduced both tuition fee loans and maintenance grants, 
the poorest students who previously only had the option of student loans now have 
greater access to universities further away from home, since maintenance grants 
effectively fund living costs. In column 1 and 6 of Table 1.9, there is a negative and 
significant effect of the policy reform on the conditional probability of observing a 
lower-low income student living at home whilst attending university across all 




Table 1.9: DiD Estimate of the 2006 Policy Reform – Live at Home DDD by Subject 
          All Universities   Non-Elite Universities 
     Live at Home  Live at Home 
     All STEM Non-STEM HFI Non-HFI  All STEM Non-STEM HFI Non-HFI 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                
Panel A                               
SEC Code 4-8 Treat Average  -0.00595 0.00374 -0.00946 0.00789 -0.0129 
 
-0.0110 -0.0277 -0.00756 -0.0102 -0.00839 
   Period   (0.0155) (0.0356) (0.0161) (0.0245) (0.0177) 
 
(0.0191) (0.0450) (0.0186) (0.0258) (0.0185) 
    2006  0.00411 0.00265 0.00413 0.0216 -0.00627 
 
0.00570 0.00320 0.00630 0.0294 -0.00647 
      (0.00941) (0.0275) (0.0132) (0.0160) (0.0105) 
 
(0.0115) (0.0369) (0.0139) (0.0195) (0.0121) 
    2007  -0.0111 0.00228 -0.0155 -0.00833 -0.0112 
 
-0.0182 -0.0364 -0.0145 -0.0352 -0.00542 




              
Panel B                               
SEC Code 4-5 Treat Average  0.00625 0.0103 0.00432 -0.00349 0.0124 
 
0.00663 0.0171 0.00359 -0.00896 0.0153 
   Period   (0.0140) (0.0219) (0.0157) (0.0139) (0.0160) 
 
(0.0157) (0.0290) (0.0167) (0.0127) (0.0175) 
    2006  -0.0268* -0.0262 -0.0277* -0.0292 -0.0255 
 
-0.0235 -0.0248 -0.0240 -0.0372** -0.0174 
      (0.0139) (0.0207) (0.0162) (0.0188) (0.0159) 
 
(0.0162) (0.0248) (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0166) 
    2007  0.0285** 0.0319 0.0272 0.0185 0.0361** 
 
0.0263* 0.0387 0.0232 0.0193 0.0324* 
          (0.0141) (0.0265) (0.0170) (0.0121) (0.0179)   (0.0149) (0.0346) (0.0164) (0.0140) (0.0183) 
 
  
               
Panel C                               
SEC Code 6-8 Treat Average  -0.0122 -0.00657 -0.0138 0.0114 -0.0253 
 
-0.0176 -0.0449 -0.0112 -0.00127 -0.0237 
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   Period   (0.0184) (0.0293) (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0225) 
 
(0.0219) (0.0342) (0.0213) (0.0243) (0.0245) 
    2006  0.0309* 0.0288 0.0318 0.0507** 0.0192 
 
0.0292 0.0280 0.0303 0.0665*** 0.0109 
      (0.0157) (0.0204) (0.0194) (0.0247) (0.0186) 
 
(0.0183) (0.0263) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0205) 
    2007  -0.0396*** -0.0296 -0.0427*** -0.0268 -0.0472* 
 
-0.0445*** -0.0750** -0.0378*** -0.0545** -0.0378 
          (0.0134) (0.0335) (0.0144) (0.0252) (0.0239)   (0.0151) (0.0331) (0.0142) (0.0209) (0.0229) 
Fixed Effects     University University University University University  University University University University University 
Controls     yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs (SEC Code 4-8)    691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970 
 
444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
Obs (SEC Code 4-5)    691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970 
 
444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
Obs (SEC Code 6-8)       691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970   444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
This table reports the results from the DDD estimation as outlined by equation (5), estimated across all universities (columns 1-5) and then across non-elite universities (columns 6-10). Elite status is 
denoted by membership of the Russell Group of universities, as seen in Appendix A, Table A1. The coefficients reported are the coefficients on the triple interaction between the treatment group 
indicator (English HEIs), the indicator of being a student living at home and the treatment period indicator, and show the change in the probability of observing a low income student as a result of the 
2006 funding reforms studying at university whilst living at home compared to students at university not living at home, where living at home is one of the categories of term time accommodation 
status, where alternative categories of term time accommodation are being in private or university rented accommodation. Column 1 shows the DDD impact of the funding reforms for low income 
students studying whilst living at home across all subjects, compared to students not living at home across all subjects. Column 6 estimates the same as column 1, except the DDD estimation is only 
performed for non-elite universities. Columns 2 and 3 perform the same estimation as column 1, but for STEM and non-STEM subjects separately. Columns 7 and 8 also show the DDD for STEM 
and non-STEM subjects separately, but only at non-elite universities. The DDD estimates  in these columns therefore show the impact of the funding reforms on the probability of observing a low 
income student who is living at home whilst attending university compared to not living at home, who studies a STEM or a non-STEM subject. Columns 4 and 5, and columns 9 and 10 show the 
results for the same approach for HFI and non-HFI subjects at elite and non-elite universities respectively. All relevant cross-products were included between the treatment group indicator, treatment 
period indicator and the live at home indicator, but are not shown here in the interests of concision To allow for the estimation of the effect of the policy averaged across the post-policy period and to 
capture the partial and full adjustment effects to the policy change, the DiD is estimated separately for the average of the post-policy cohorts, and for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cohorts. There are 
therefore three rows of DiD estimates for each column, where each coefficient relates to the specific treatment period. There are three panels (A, B and C) to allow an estimation of the DiD across the 
broad low income background category (Panel A, SEC Code 4-8), and disaggregated across the upper-low income background category of students (Panel B, SEC Code 4-5) and the lower-low 
income background category of students (Panel C, SEC Code 6-8). University fixed effects are included for all specifications, as are controls for observable student heterogeneity. Namely, these 
individual controls are: gender, ethnicity, age, disability status, and nationality. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding 
Methodology. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the HEI level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Whilst the upper-low income students who lived at home were more likely to 
experience the least risk in attending university, the upper-low income students who 
moved away for university were likely to experience the most risk. This can be seen 
in Panel B of Table 1.10, where Column 6 shows that there is a decrease of 1.82 
percentage points overall for these students studying at non-Russell Group 
universities. Furthermore, when disaggregating this effect across subject types, the 
only subjects where there is a significant (and negative) effect on the conditional 
probability of observing a student are those subjects that arguably do not offer the 
best investment in terms of graduate employment or earnings. Specifically, the 
negative probability effects for the upper-low income students are for studying non-
HFI subjects (-1.85 percentage points, which is greater for non-Russell Group 
universities at -2.44 percentage points), as well as for non-STEM subjects (-1.80 
percentage points, only at non-Russell Group universities). The implication is that 
for the students who were the most likely to exhibit cautious behaviour in terms of 
subject and university choice (by choosing a subject and/or a university with the 
higher graduate reward) as a result of the 2006 policy, there is evidence of careful 
subject and university choice. However, this is conditional on the student having 




Table 1.10: DiD Estimate of the 2006 Policy Reform – Live Far Away DDD by Subject 
          All Universities   Non-Elite Universities 
     Live Far Away  Live Far Away 
     All STEM Non-STEM HFI Non-HFI  All STEM Non-STEM HFI Non-HFI 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                
Panel A                               
SEC Code 4-8 Treat Average  0.000163 0.00993 -0.00264 -0.00927 0.00467 
 
0.00543 0.0232 0.00150 -0.0155 0.0114 
   Period   (0.00749) (0.0150) (0.00704) (0.0170) (0.00958) 
 
(0.00902) (0.0246) (0.00762) (0.0207) (0.0105) 
    2006  0.00464 0.0520* -0.00919 0.00210 0.00818 
 
0.0189 0.0875** 0.00536 0.0102 0.0234 
      (0.0155) (0.0297) (0.0164) (0.0153) (0.0166) 
 
(0.0187) (0.0345) (0.0187) (0.0227) (0.0179) 
    2007  -0.00241 -0.0300* 0.00565 -0.0121 0.000688 
 
-0.00769 -0.0405* -0.00170 -0.0263 -0.00350 
          (0.00958) (0.0175) (0.0109) (0.0160) (0.0139)   (0.0116) (0.0218) (0.0122) (0.0190) (0.0170) 
 
  
               
Panel B                               
SEC Code 4-5 Treat Average  -0.00686 0.00686 -0.00989 0.00321 -0.0120* 
 
-0.0107 0.00177 -0.0126 -0.00772 -0.0130 
   Period   (0.00764) (0.00842) (0.00816) (0.0141) (0.00714) 
 
(0.00862) (0.00726) (0.00967) (0.0173) (0.00884) 
    2006  0.00451 0.0232* -0.000361 0.00521 0.00610 
 
0.00804 0.0272* 0.00496 0.00160 0.0124 
      (0.00737) (0.0128) (0.00852) (0.0122) (0.00960) 
 
(0.00960) (0.0158) (0.0105) (0.0177) (0.0110) 
    2007  -0.0109 -0.01000 -0.0106 0.000562 -0.0185** 
 
-0.0182*** -0.0181 -0.0180*** -0.00957 -0.0244*** 
          (0.00725) (0.0139) (0.00739) (0.00877) (0.00723)   (0.00600) (0.0167) (0.00676) (0.00820) (0.00687) 
 
  
               
Panel C                               
SEC Code 6-8 Treat Average  0.00702 0.00308 0.00725 -0.0125 0.0167 
 
0.0162* 0.0214 0.0141 -0.00776 0.0244** 
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   Period   (0.00883) (0.0172) (0.00874) (0.0133) (0.0109) 
 
(0.00883) (0.0247) (0.00890) (0.0191) (0.0114) 
    2006  0.000134 0.0288 -0.00883 -0.00310 0.00208 
 
0.0108 0.0603** 0.000399 0.00855 0.0110 
      (0.0104) (0.0230) (0.0106) (0.0133) (0.0113) 
 
(0.0120) (0.0275) (0.0119) (0.0183) (0.0130) 
    2007  0.00851 -0.0200 0.0162 -0.0127 0.0192 
 
0.0105 -0.0224 0.0163 -0.0168 0.0209 
          (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0115) (0.0154)   (0.0129) (0.0211) (0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0181) 
Fixed Effects     University University University University University  University University University University University 
Controls     yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs (SEC Code 4-8)    691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970 
 
444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
Obs (SEC Code 4-5)    691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970 
 
444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
Obs (SEC Code 6-8)       691,475 150,250 541,220 216,505 474,970   444,395 67,640 376,760 130,240 314,155 
This table reports the results from the DDD estimation as outlined by equation (5), estimated across all universities (columns 1-5) and then across non-elite universities (columns 6-10). Elite status is 
denoted by membership of the Russell Group of universities, as seen in Appendix A, Table A1. The coefficients reported are the coefficients on the triple interaction between the treatment group 
indicator (English HEIs), the indicator of being a student attending a university far away and the treatment period indicator, and show the change in the probability of observing a low income student 
as a result of the 2006 funding reforms studying at a university far away compared to a university not defined as far away, where attending a university far away is defined as being in excess of 80km 
Euclidean distance from the student’s domiciled postcode at the time of application to HE. Column 1 shows the DDD impact of the funding reforms for low income students studying at a university 
far away across all subjects, compared to universities not defined as far away across all subjects. Column 6 estimates the same as column 1, except the DDD estimation is only performed for non-elite 
universities. Columns 2 and 3 perform the same estimation as column 1, but for STEM and non-STEM subjects separately. Columns 7 and 8 also show the DDD for STEM and non-STEM subjects 
separately, but only at non-elite universities. The DDD estimates  in these columns therefore show the impact of the funding reforms on the probability of observing a low income student who attends 
a university far away compared to a university not defined as far away, who studies a STEM or a non-STEM subject. Columns 4 and 5, and columns 9 and 10 show the results for the same approach 
for HFI and non-HFI subjects at elite and non-elite universities respectively. All relevant cross-products were included between the treatment group indicator, treatment period indicator and the far 
away group indicator, but are not shown here in the interests of concision To allow for the estimation of the effect of the policy averaged across the post-policy period and to capture the partial and 
full adjustment effects to the policy change, the DiD is estimated separately for the average of the post-policy cohorts, and for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cohorts. There are therefore three rows of DiD 
estimates for each column, where each coefficient relates to the specific treatment period. There are three panels (A, B and C) to allow an estimation of the DiD across the broad low income 
background category (Panel A, SEC Code 4-8), and disaggregated across the upper-low income background category of students (Panel B, SEC Code 4-5) and the lower-low income background 
category of students (Panel C, SEC Code 6-8). University fixed effects are included for all specifications, as are controls for observable student heterogeneity. Namely, these individual controls are: 
gender, ethnicity, age, disability status, and nationality. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses and are clustered at the HEI level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.6 Conclusions & Discussion 
To evaluate whether the introduction of the 2006 tuition fee policy affected the 
participation and behaviour of students in England, a difference-indifferences 
approach was adopted to estimate the average treatment effect of the treatment on 
the treated. Using Wales as a control group, where Welsh-domiciled students were 
exempt from the policy in 2006 and insulated from the policy from 2007 thereafter, 
HESA data was used in a DiD and DDD estimation framework. 
 
The results suggest that the probability of observing an upper-low income student 
(which was the group expected to be the most detrimentally affected by the policy) 
actually increased in the treatment period. However, this can be traced to an 
increase in probability of observing a student in that particular income grouping 
remaining in the local area. Furthermore, when combining this with subject choice, 
it appears that the coupling of the tuition fee loans up front, alongside the guarantee 
that students only start repaying these loans when they can afford to do so, may 
have removed the risk involved in investing in a university degree, leading to an 
increase in the probability of observing an upper-low income student staying in the 
local area who chose a non-High Future Income subject. For those low income 
students for whom a decrease in the probability of observing them attend university, 
the magnitude is similar to the findings in the US and German literature. 
 
In the context of estimating treatment effects, this chapter highlights the importance 
of considering the heterogeneous manner in which a policy may affect certain sub-
groups of individuals. Without the DDD approach, the average DiD findings may 
have been misleading. Additionally, this chapter also highlights the importance of 
considering the policy response lag when estimating treatment effects. The majority 
of the DiD and DDD estimates for the 2006/07 cohort were insignificant, and if the 
policy impact was evaluated only on that basis, the funding reforms would have 
appeared to have little effect on low income student participation behaviour. Given 
the structure of pre-university schooling and the subject-specific pre-requisites for 
some courses, the impact of the policy reforms on the full adjustment cohort 
71 
 
(2007/08) – and the lack of impact on the partial adjustment cohort – is arguably 
rather reasonable to expect.  
 
The use of a valid control group – in this case, Welsh universities – means that the 
estimates of the policy impact were obtained comparing students within the same 
higher educational framework, subject to the same macroeconomic influences and 
who also attended university with an almost identical structure of schooling. Where 
previous studies have estimated the impact of the 2006 funding reforms using 
arguably quite different groups of students, or where no counterfactual outcome 
was used at all, this may be the fundamental reason why the empirical literature 
suggests the reforms had little impact. Once a valid control group is identified, and 
when the research design acknowledges the significant heterogeneity in the student 
population (both in terms of how and where they study), a more representative 












“Conditional on changes in lifetime expected earnings, recessions encourage 
women to enter male-dominated fields, and students of both genders [to] pursue 
more difficult [subjects], such as [Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics] (STEM) fields.” 
(Blom et al., 2015) 
 
“Over a third (37%) of graduates regret going to university…and 49% believe 





As students approach the end of their school education, they must decide whether 
to apply to university and study towards a first degree (or similar higher education 
qualification63), or whether to enter the jobs market and search for non-graduate 
employment.64 The above quotes highlight that if students do enter higher education 
(HE), then the returns on their investment in the form of higher wage premia and 
employment probability are not certain. Moreover, since the returns to the 
investment decision tend to vary by subject studied, students may undertake an 
investment that does not offer them significant advantages in their labour market, 
                                                          
63 Students may elect to obtain vocational or professional qualifications for employment reasons, 
which are not considered here. 
64 There is a third option – namely, to delay the investment decision by taking a ‘gap year’. For the 
purposes of this analysis, students who elect to delay the investment decision are not of interest. 
Moreover, if students do elect to take a gap year, they will either enter the non-graduate jobs 
market, or not be looking for employment. 
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and as such the costs of acquiring the HE will be greater than the benefits. The 
relative importance and magnitude of the benefits of HE may also vary depending 
on the labour market conditions in which the student makes the decision, and the 
conditions in which the student expects to graduate in. This changing of the benefits 
and costs to obtaining a university education depending on the subject studied, 
labour market conditions (and expectations thereof), and whether students are 
responsive to those changes, are the focus of this chapter. 
 
This investment in HE (and schooling, more generally) has been well-researched in 
the context of labour and education economics, most famously by Becker (1964) 
who formalised the acquisition of education as an investment decision. From a 
purely theoretical view, students will decide to undertake HE if the discounted 
present value of the future flow of benefits are greater than the costs of acquisition, 
conditional on the assumptions of perfect information and non-binding credit 
constraints. The benefits to HE are higher earnings, and a lower likelihood of 
unemployment; whilst the costs to acquiring the degree are both pecuniary (tuition 
costs, books, additional living expenses whilst studying, foregone earnings in the 
acquisition period) and non-pecuniary (effort required to study, psychic costs of 
being away from home). 
 
However, the investment decision in practice is made under uncertainty, which may 
mean that students undertake HE when the eventual costs will outweigh the 
benefits, and vice versa. The uncertainty in the benefits originate from the graduate 
wage premium, and the probability of obtaining graduate employment; both of 
which vary by the choice of subject and university.65 If the decision is made by a 
rational, forward-looking individual, the student will choose the subject and 
university that maximises the expected returns to HE, given the subject-specific 
                                                          
65 The uncertainty is further complicated by the individual-specific graduate wage premium is not 
necessarily the average graduate wage premia for each subject, but rather a probabilistic draw from 
a distribution of potential graduate wage premia. 
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likelihood of employment post-graduation and the average subject-specific 
graduate wage premium, conditional on ability. 
 
This chapter seeks to analyse this uncertain investment decision in the context of 
the changing costs and benefits to an undergraduate degree with respect to variation 
in the local labour market conditions. A significant body of research exists which 
estimates the impact of labour markets on participation in HE, but not to any great 
extent in terms of subject choice. For instance, although unemployment has been 
robustly found to be a positive determinant of participation in HE, this aim of this 
research is to evaluate what subjects those students are likely to choose. 
Furthermore, it is plausible that students form expectations of the future labour 
market given its current trends, which implies that choosing a degree subject with 
a higher probability of graduate employment may be relatively more important. 
 
The results show that, contrary to what might be expected in terms of maximising 
the benefits of an investment, students who experience high or rising levels of 
unemployment are less likely to study a subject with the highest returns with respect 
to graduate wage and employment probability premia. This suggests that students 
who experience increasingly challenging local labour markets respond by choosing 
subjects with lower rewards, but with a higher probability of degree success. 
Students may therefore be exhibiting behaviour that points toward a fear of failure 
when the relative importance of obtaining HE. However, the results also show that 
students who are classified as lower socioeconomic status students are more likely 
to choose a subject with the highest graduate premia and the greatest probability of 
employment. The implication is therefore that the students who are the most aware 
of the costs are the most aware of the benefits of HE, especially in the context of 
social mobility. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 2.1.1 provides an 
overview of the human capital investment decision hitherto discussed, with a formal 
presentation of the problem under uncertainty in section 2.1.2. Section 2.1.3 
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discusses how unemployment may affect the decision with reference to the formal 
problem. Section 2.2.1 proposes a summary of the determinants of subject choice, 
since that is the outcome of interest, with discussion on how the labour market may 
influence subject choice in section 2.2.2. Section 2.2.3 thus proposes the research 
hypotheses which are estimated using student and labour market data discussed in 
section 2.3 and using the methodology discussed in section 2.4. The results are 
presented in section 2.5, and conclusions and policy implications are discussed in 
section 2.6. 
 
2.1.1 Human Capital Theory 
At the end of compulsory education, further or higher education is an investment 
decision, and as such the investment should rationally be undertaken if the net 
present value is greater than the net present cost, over the student’s life-cycle. If a 
student decides to acquire HE, they receive the benefit of additional units of human 
capital that allow higher earnings to be obtained.66 The empirical estimates of that 
benefit – the graduate wage premium – vary significantly, from a 17% return to an 
undergraduate degree on average (Blundell et al, 2000), to 8-10% (Harmon et al, 
2000).  
 
Much of the variation in calculating the average return to HE can be explained by 
the numerous dimensions along which the returns are heterogeneous. Ultimately 
the benefit to HE depends on the subject studied67, the university attended68, 
eventual degree class69, the student’s own characteristics (such as gender70, 
ethnicity71), and the occupation in which the graduate eventually works72. 
Nevertheless, in addition to an increase in life-cycle earnings, an investment in HE 
                                                          
66 Much debate surrounds whether the returns to a degree are from increased productivity, from 
signalling of higher quality in an asymmetric information jobs market (Spence, 1979), or a mixture 
of both. See Chevalier et al. (2004) for a synthesis of the debate. 
67 e.g. Chevalier (2011). 
68 e.g. Chevalier (2014); Hussain et al. (2009). 
69 e.g. Di Pietro (2010); Naylor et al. (2015). 
70 e.g. Britton et al. (2016); Sloane & O’Leary (2004). 
71 e.g. Britton et al. (2016). 
72 e.g. for STEM subjects, see Greenwood et al. (2011). 
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also increases the probability of employment73, decreases the probability of spells 
of future unemployment74, and has been shown to have indirect benefits that have 
spill-over effects to the wider society, such as improved health outcomes and a 
reduction in the incidence of crime.75 
 
However in order to acquire the education that attains these benefits, the student 
must incur both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. The most direct of these costs 
is the cost of the tuition itself, which may or may not vary across subjects.76 
Additionally, a student will incur indirect costs whilst attending university, 
including accommodation, study materials, living expenses and travel; although the 
effect of these may be mitigated by students living close to or at home for at least 
part of their degree studies. Furthermore, although not incurred directly as a cost, 
the foregone earnings that the student is not able to earn due to full-time studying 
are the opportunity costs of HE, and can vary depending on the individual student 
and their local labour market characteristics, as well as the length of degree study. 
Non-pecuniary costs of the acquisition of HE are generally psychic costs (the effort 
expended by the student in order to obtain the degree, the potential of not being able 
to see family), which again can vary according to the student’s individual 
characteristics. 
 
Whether the student decides to invest in HE depends on whether the perceived net 
present value of the future flow of benefits over the student’s life-cycle outweigh 
the net present value of all incurred costs. 
 
 
                                                          
73 See Walker & Zhu (2013), Figure 6. 
74 Walker & Zhu (2013). 
75 For an overview of the empirical literature on the social returns to higher education, see for 
example Toutkoushian & Paulsen (2016). 
76 At the graduate level and for part-time students of both undergraduate and postgraduate levels of 
study, it is common for tuition fees to vary by course and university in the UK. At the full-time 
undergraduate level in the UK, the tuition costs vary by university but not by subject. See the 
Introduction of this thesis for a comprehensive overview, and section 1.2 for a history of tuition 
fees in the UK until September 2012. 
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2.1.2 A Model of Human Capital Acquisition 
To formalise this relationship, and to allow the explicit interaction of labour markets 
with the benefits and costs of obtaining a degree77, we can categorise the decision 
as a net present value calculation, similar to Becker (1964) and Koch (1972). It is 
assumed that the student has perfect information of the parameters, time periods are 
denoted by t, and for simplicity the investment duration is 1 period, and if it is 
undertaken it is taken in period 0. For further simplicity, the graduate premium is 
assumed to be homogenous across subjects, but this assumption will be relaxed 
once the model is constructed. Furthermore, all costs and benefits of the human 







− (𝐶0 + 𝐹0)
𝑇





𝐺 = 𝜌𝐺 ∙ 𝑤𝑡
𝐺
𝑊𝑡
𝑁 = 𝜌𝑁 ∙ 𝑤𝑡
𝑁} ∀ 𝑡 ≥ 1 
             𝐹0 = 𝜌
𝑁 ∙ 𝑤0
𝑁} 𝑡 = 0 
(7) 
 
The net present value of the investment in higher education is captured by 𝐻∗. If 
the student decides to acquire higher education in period 0, they are able to earn 
𝑊𝑡
𝐺  in period 1 and thereafter, which is the graduate wage. If the student decides 
not to acquire the degree, the student can only obtain the non-graduate wage, 𝑊𝑡
𝑁 
in all periods. Note that this is the same wage that is foregone in period 0 if the 
                                                          
77 This chapter is an empirical investigation, rather than an empirical test of a theoretical model. 
The model proposed however, is useful in giving a framework to the interaction of perceived 
present and future labour market conditions to the investment decision in higher education. 
78 It has been found that the returns to higher education are heterogeneous across gender, income 
background and other familial characteristics (see section 2.2.1), but for simplicity the actual 
benefits and costs are assumed to be identical to every potential student, independent of student or 
course/university characteristics. This is arguably more realistic with respect to the costs of the 
acquisition of human capital, since tuition fees in the period of study did not vary according to 
university or subject. Nevertheless, it is an oversimplification of the non-course costs, such as 
relocation and costs of living, which are assumed to exhibit significant variation. 
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student does invest in higher education, and this opportunity cost is captured by 𝐹0. 
The student’s direct costs (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) are also incurred in 
just period 079, and are denoted by 𝐶0, and the student discounts the future at rate r. 
 
However, as this is a decision made under uncertainty, there are two measures of 
employment probability included, which are, 𝜌𝑁 (the probability of obtaining 
employment as a non-graduate) and 𝜌𝐺  (the probability of obtaining employment 
as a graduate). By definition, both probabilities are independently within of the 
interval [0,1], and they are assumed to be time-invariant. As it is not guaranteed 
whether the student is in employment irrespective of the investment decision, the 
benefit of acquiring the investment is not only the graduate wage premium (since it 
assumed that 𝑊𝑡
𝐺 > 𝑊𝑡
𝑁 ∀ 𝑡), but also the increased probability of obtaining 
employment (since it is also assumed that 𝜌𝐺 > 𝜌𝑁). Following Universities UK 
(2010), graduates experience an increased probability of obtaining non-graduate 
employment, thus if the investment decision is taken it implies that there may be a 
further diverging in the gap between 𝜌𝐺  and 𝜌𝑁 as a result of the increased difficulty 
for non-graduates to obtain non-graduate employment, especially in the context of 
business cycles. The average probability of obtaining a non-graduate job is 
effectively the inverse of the youth unemployment rate in the student’s local area, 
whilst the average probability of obtaining non-graduate employment in future 
periods may be determined by both local and national labour market trends. 
 
The discount rate is central to the decision of whether or not to invest in HE, as it 
determines the relative value of future benefits to current incurred costs to the 
individual student. Oreopoulos (2006) finds that the discount rate for school-leavers 
is significantly higher, which renders the decision to invest atypical since the 
potential benefits of a degree may not be fully appreciated by the prospective 
student, relative to the costs of doing so. Nevertheless, given a student’s individual 
characteristics (discount rate, psychic costs), labour market characteristics (the 
                                                          
79 This is a possible oversimplification, since the psychic costs may be incurred in the post-
investment period, too. 
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average wage and employment probability premia), and the direct costs of the 
higher education, the student will decide to invest if 𝐻∗ ≥ 0, otherwise the student 
will decide against investing (𝐻∗ < 0). 
 
However, the assumption that the benefits to a degree are constant across subjects 
is a gross oversimplification. The above model does not account for the large and 
significant variation in the graduate wage premium, and the heterogeneity in the 
probability of graduate employment, according to subject studied. As Walker and 
Zhu (2011) show that even when controlling for the net present value of the tuition 
fees paid, students who undertake Law, Business or Economics degrees experience 
a significantly higher lifetime earnings profile than Social Sciences, Arts and 
Humanities.80 This reflects the findings of the variation in the returns to an 
undergraduate degree by subject, as shown by BIS (2011) which can be seen in 
Figure 2.1.  
 
  
                                                          
80 In particular, see Walker & Zhu (2011), Figures 1 & 2, p.6 for a visual representation. 
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Figure 2.1: Returns to Undergraduate Degree by Subject 
 
Source: BIS (2011), Figure 4 
 
The oversimplification of the homogeneity of the benefits of a degree are also not 
likely to be limited to the graduate wage premium, but also the probability of 
graduate employment. Some subjects, such as STEM and Business, may offer a 
higher probability of employment beyond that of school-leavers qualifications, 
compared to Arts and Humanities. This was also documented by BIS (2011) and is 





Figure 2.2: Employment Premia, by Undergraduate Degree Subject 
 
 
Source: BIS (2011), Figure 8 
 
 
Further oversimplifications of the model outlined in this section include the 
possibility of a non-graduate obtaining a graduate wage or a graduate obtaining a 
non-graduate wage – both of which are non-zero events – and the lack of an explicit 
channel for subject choice. The aim of this chapter is empirical rather than 
theoretical, therefore a complete and comprehensive human capital acquisition 
model which accounts for the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of HE is not 
the objective. Nevertheless, the model provides a useful theoretical framework 
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upon which to ask the question: given there are costs and benefits to HE, how would 
the labour market affect the decision? 
 
2.1.3 How Unemployment May Affect Higher Education Decisions 
Perhaps the most direct impact of unemployment on the investment decision is the 
opportunity cost, especially when considering the youth unemployment rate in the 
local area81. If the student does decide to acquire HE, there is a cost of the foregone 
earnings that could have been earned through non-graduate employment after 
schooling.82 However, those foregone earnings are not a certainty, and thus the size 
of the opportunity cost of HE participation is dependent on (1) the probability of 
employment, and (2) the non-graduate wage. If there is higher youth unemployment 
concurrently with the decision, this effectively reduces the size of the opportunity 
costs, since it is less likely the student would be able to obtain the non-graduate 
employment if they decide to not attend university. There may also be a further 
negative impact on the size of the opportunity cost if the youth unemployment is so 
substantial that it puts downward pressure on wages, although that is unlikely given 
the majority of earnings for school-leavers in the UK are at or around the national 
minimum wage.83  
 
Nevertheless, if larger youth unemployment in the local area does reduce the size 
of the opportunity cost of HE, this should mean there is a positive relationship 
between the local youth unemployment rate and the participation rate of HE. Thus, 
the participation rate may be counter-cyclical with respect to the business cycle. 
Bell and Blanchflower (2011) note that increases in participation by young people 
                                                          
81 It is assumed that at least initially, there is a significant degree of geographic immobility for a 
school-leavers. 
82 We also assume that students whilst studying are not engaged in part-time employment, but 
even if this assumption is relaxed, it would likely only reduce the size of the opportunity costs 
rather than remove them altogether – since it is highly unlikely that the part time employment 
would equate the earnings from full-time employment in the counterfactual case. 






in HE in response to an adverse labour market may be due to a lack of other 
alternatives, or in an attempt to be insulated from the inclement conditions. 
Moreover, a significant body of research exists on the impact of unemployment on 
college (US) and university (UK, Europe) participation. Pissarides (1981) was one 
of the first to explicitly include unemployment as a determinant of the destinations 
of school leavers, and found that varying measures of unemployment did have a 
positive relationship with the likelihood of studying beyond the compulsory school-
leaving age. Similar effects were found by Rice (1987), Whitfield and Wilson 
(1991), Bennett et al. (1992). In the US, Betts and McFarland (1995) showed that a 
1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate led to a 4.5% increase in the 
probability of enrolment into college, particularly for full-time students, whilst 
Fredriksson (1997) found similar effects in the Swedish HE sector, and Di Pietro 
(2004) in Italy. 
 
Fernández and Shioji (2000) specifically focused on the effect of unemployment on 
HE incentives, rather than estimating the demands for HE in a more general context. 
They posit two potential effects of unemployment: an investment effect (where 
unemployment lowers the opportunity cost of investing in HE), and a wealth effect 
where higher unemployment may dissuade HE participation through financial 
constraints on the student’s household. They find that both effects are present in 
their study, and the investment effect was also found to be significant by Card and 
Lemieux84 (2001), Dellas and Sakellaris (2003), Dellas and Koubi (2003), Long 
(2004, 2014), Arkes (2010) and Clark (2011). Hillman and Orians (2013) show that 
for community college enrolments in the US, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
US increases enrolment demand by 1-3%. 
 
However, the positive relationship between unemployment and HE participation 
has not been estimated as consistent across all students. Black and Sufi (2002) and 
                                                          
84 The authors also note the importance of the finding by Oreopoulos (2006) that effects of 




Dellas and Sakellaris (2013) both find the effect of unemployment on participation 
to be quantitatively larger for students from higher socioeconomic status students, 
whilst Boffy-Ramirez (2016) finds that the effect of unemployment on participation 
is concentrated to students at the lower end of the ability distribution. Furthermore, 
Johnson (2013) finds that for graduate school students, only females respond to 
unemployment, and Kahn (2010) shows that it is national unemployment rather 
than local unemployment that graduate students respond to. This is likely due to the 
decision to acquire further HE being fundamentally different from acquiring 
college/higher education. Long’s study (2014) of how college enrolment in the US 
was affected by the Great Recession showed that the positive relationship did 
indeed exist, but mainly for part-time enrolment. Thus, since it is likely that the 
opportunity cost of acquiring HE varied by the individual’s labour market 
characteristics, it is unsurprising that the effect of unemployment on the investment 
decision is heterogeneous along the same dimensions. 
 
In addition to affecting the likelihood of participation, labour market trends have 
also been evaluated in terms of their impact on the likelihood of completion, 
conditional on participation. It is likely that if the acquisition period of HE is 
lengthy, then higher unemployment will mean that the opportunity costs of 
remaining in HE are low, compared to lower unemployment. Thus at the margin, 
students may be less likely to drop-out. The effect of unemployment on the rate of 
student attrition has attracted relatively less attention, but Stratton et al (2007) show 
that there is an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and probability 
that a student drops out of HE, but only for full time students. Di Pietro (2006) finds 
the same relationship in Italy, which had the highest drop-out rate in the OECD in 
the 1990s due to the low costs of tuition, and the non-selective admissions policy. 
 
2.2 Undergraduate Degree Subject Choice 
As the returns to an investment in HE vary significantly by subject (Walker & Zhu, 
2010), the choice of subject studied should be a significant factor in determining 
whether or not to participate in HE. If higher unemployment affects the investment 
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decision through a lowering of the costs and, as Fernández and Shioji (2000) 
remark, the expectation of higher future unemployment reduces the benefits of HE, 
then it may also be the case that the choice of subject is affected by labour market 
factors. In order to consider the possible influences on subject choice of the labour 
market, the other determinants of subject choice must be examined. 
 
2.2.1 What Determines Subject Choice 
The first major studies to evaluate what determines subject choice in HE were 
Freeman (1971) and Koch (1972), who formally proposed that the choice depended 
on the utility (Freeman) or the individual rates of return (Koch). Thus, in accordance 
with human capital theory, students choose the subjects that maximise their returns 
to investment in HE; evidence of which is shown by Koch, where subject choice is 
partly determined by changes in the individual rates of return to subjects. In support 
of this argument, in the UK, Pitcher and Purcell (1998) surveyed final-year 
undergraduates and over 50% of students stated that career prospects were one of 
the main reasons behind course choice. In the UK context of ever-increasing tuition 
fees – some of which will exceed £9,000 in September 2017 – employment factors 
will only become more important in the HE investment decision, especially given 
Pitcher and Purcell’s finding when direct tuition costs had not yet been introduced. 
Chevalier (2011) finds that the returns to some subjects in terms of graduate 
earnings compared to others are more than double after controlling for student 
heterogeneity, which given that UK tuition fees are constant across subjects within 
a university, implies significant variation in the rate of return to individual 
investment choices. In addition, the risk of graduate unemployment is also found to 
be significantly heterogeneous across subjects (Universities UK, 2010), although it 
is still found to be lower than non-graduates.85 
 
However, the choice of subject is a multi-faceted decision, and is likely to be made 
from a mixture of socioeconomic factors, ability, preferences and the wider course 
                                                          
85 See for example Smith et al. (2000). 
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characteristics, rather than just the financial benefits to the subject degree. This idea 
of non-monetary factors influencing course choice was estimated by Cebula and 
Lopes (1982), who extend Koch’s analysis to include a larger array of subject 
choice determinants. In addition to the earnings motivation (wage differentials and 
graduate earnings growth were the most important factors for subject choice), the 
authors highlighted the importance of non-monetary influences such as the 
probability of successful attainment and the characteristics of the eventual job. 
Furthermore, as different subjects will have different choice motivations, Skatova 
and Ferguson (2014) identify four major categories of motivations, and attribute the 
choice of engineering to career and employment reasons, whilst the choice of arts 
and humanities subjects were ascribed to a degree of ‘loafing’ – where students 
choose a subject in order to enter HE with greater ease. 
 
Aside from interest in the subject, employment reasons are likely to be the most 
reported factor in course choice (Montmarquette et al., 2002), and one fundamental 
element is that of income expectations. In human capital theory, prospective 
students are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the monetary benefits to the 
investment in HE, but in practice, graduate earnings are estimated with a degree of 
uncertainty. Whilst wage signals have been found to be important for course choice 
(Wales, 2010), the expectations of graduate earnings and employment prospects, 
and hence the returns to individual degree subjects, are not always made using all 
of the information available to the prospective students (Universities UK, 2010). 
Furthermore, even if all of the information is used by the prospective student, the 
size of the income expectations and the benefits in terms of graduate employment 
depends on the manner in which the expectation is formed. 
 
Firstly, the high discount rate for school-leavers estimated by Oreopoulos (2006) 
was found to be even higher for students from low income backgrounds 
(Oosterbeek & Van Ophem, 2000). The implication is that students from poorer 
families may underestimate the potential returns to HE, which is one possible 
explanation why Davies et al (2013) find that lower income students are less likely 
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to choose high wage premia subjects. This supports the earlier finding that income 
expectations can be over, under or well-estimated, and can vary by socioeconomic 
background, as shown by Smith and Powell (1990). The authors find that not having 
a parent with university level education may overestimate the returns to a degree, 
conditional on family income. Delaney et al (2011) estimate that income 
expectations vary significantly by socioeconomic status, even when controlling for 
student characteristics such as ability, demographics and personality, and suggest 
that if students from lower income backgrounds are underestimating the returns, it 
may be capturing some expected wage or hiring discrimination in the labour market. 
This would imply that although the returns to a degree vary by subject, students 
expect that there is additional variation in the returns by their own individual 
socioeconomic factors. 
 
One further finding from Montmarquette et al. (2002) is that students from less 
affluent backgrounds are likely to choose less risky subjects in terms of difficulty 
and drop-out, which may in part explain the finding by Davies et al. (2013) that 
lower income students are less likely to choose high wage premia subjects. If the 
most rewarding subjects in terms of graduate earnings and employment prospects 
are also the most risky in terms of difficulty (both of application and completion), 
then any systematic degree of risk or disappointment aversion from lower 
socioeconomic status students may imply that socioeconomic advantages have 
educational advantages. Anderberg and Cerrone (2016) show there may be 
disappointment aversion for lower ability students, which emphasises the 
supposition by Duru and Mingat (1979) that there is a trade-off between the risk of 
failure and the higher returns to certain degrees. The extent to which students 
choose less risky subjects may also be exacerbated if the students are debt-averse 
(Callender & Jackson, 2008) which may occur even through higher perceived costs 
of obtaining the HE qualification. Furthermore, Pennell and West (2005) note that 
in response to debt aversion or higher perceived costs, students from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to attend university closer to their 
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parental home, which may mean that the range of course choices available to the 
student are limited. 
 
Arguably, one of the groups of subjects with the highest collective reward in terms 
of earnings and employment probability premia is that of Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects, and these subjects have seen some 
of the highest increases in student uptake between 2003-2012.86 Graduates of 
STEM subjects are significantly less likely to be unemployed (Universities UK, 
2010; Harrison, 2012), and earn significantly more87 (Sloane & O’Leary, 2004; 
Mellors-Bourne et al., 2011), compared to other degree subjects. Choice of a STEM 
subject varies by socioeconomic background, and ethnic minorities have been 
shown to be more likely to study a STEM subject, conditional on family 
background and attainment (Codiroli McMaster, 2017). However, despite the 
seemingly large rewards to studying STEM subjects, not all STEM graduates 
choose to work in STEM jobs (approximately 1/3 in 2011 according to Bosworth 
et al. (2013)), and income expectations are not a significant determinant of choosing 
a STEM subject (Mellors-Bourne et al., 2011).  
 
Ultimately, the determinants of subject choice are numerous and vary according to 
the individual subject and student. The relatively consistent finding of risk aversion 
to choosing the most rewarding subjects by the most disadvantaged students 
however, implies that students who could benefit the most from social mobility may 
inherently be less likely to choose the subject that allows it. Nevertheless, there is 
a significant body of evidence to suggest that students do respond to the changing 
benefits and costs of a degree, albeit in a heterogeneous manner. This heterogeneity 
in forming income expectations, responding to wage signals, and the 
socioeconomic differences in choosing degree subjects requires a heterogeneous 
approach to evaluating the impact of the changing of the benefits and costs to 
acquiring HE with respect to the labour market. 
                                                          
86 See Universities UK (2014), Table 3, p.15. 




2.2.2 Labour Markets and Subject Choice 
The outlining of how the labour market may affect the decision to invest in HE was 
under the simplifying assumption that the differences in probability of employment 
and the graduate wage premium were homogenous across subject types. This 
particular question has had limited attention in research output, although 
Universities UK (2010) note that there is some descriptive evidence to suggest that 
the Great Recession had an impact on the subject choice of undergraduates in the 
UK. Sectors that were the most hit during the recession (construction and finance) 
saw a corresponding decline in the demand for and uptake of subjects related to 
those industries.  
 
The report also notes that if students expect higher unemployment in the future, 
students may choose subjects with higher probabilities of employment (for 
example, vocational or public sector orientated subjects), although no evidence of 
such behaviour is presented. One major caveat to re-optimising subject choice in 
the context of increasing unemployment is that it is difficult to switch subjects with 
full flexibility, given that the requirements for entry into some subjects at university 
may be unobtainable for students depending what a student has decided to study at 
school pre-university.88 However, there may still be a degree of flexibility available 
for a student to switch their course choice in response to higher expectations of 
future unemployment amongst subjects of similar subject requirements, or those 
without subject-specific requirements altogether. A further constraint on choosing 
a degree subject that maximises the benefits is if the adverse economic conditions 
incentivise the student to reduce the direct costs of acquiring the degree by living 
                                                          
88 In the UK context, this is determined by the student’s choice of 3-4 A-Level subjects at school 
or college, which are chosen roughly two years prior to university entry. Further information on 
the timeline of the application process in the UK for school-leavers can be found in Table 2.1 and 
the Introduction to this thesis. A further dimension of university entry is that students do not 
require A-Levels or equivalent school/college qualifications, but instead students can be admitted 
on the basis of practical or work experience. However, as the analysis is performed on students 




close to or at home. If this is the case, the set of possible course choices is likely to 
be reduced, suggesting that although living close to or at home minimises the 
potential costs of HE, it may also minimise the potential benefits.89 
 
The only study that attempts to model university subject choice explicitly as a 
function of previous subject choice, student and labour market characteristics is 
Wales (2010), who finds that the youth unemployment rate is a positive determinant 
for the choice of six subjects: mathematics, engineering, history, medicine and 
dentistry, veterinary sciences, and languages. Since four of these are STEM 
subjects, it suggests that higher youth unemployment may influence students to 
choose subjects with higher relative returns, although the magnitude of the effects 
are relatively small. Adult unemployment is found not to be a significant 
determinant of subject choice, although there is evidence that industry-specific 
trends in employment are important for signalling to the student. 
 
2.2.3 Research Hypotheses 
Given the possible labour market effects on the HE decision, two major hypotheses 
are that: 
 
1. Higher local youth unemployment reduces the opportunity cost in the 
investment decision through a lowering of the probability of obtaining non-
graduate employment (the direct effect) and by the potential downward 
pressure on wages (indirect). Hence, at the margin, it is likely that students 
decide to enrol in HE. 
 
a. Students who enrol due to a lowering of the opportunity cost may 
not choose subjects for employment or wage premium reasons. 
 
                                                          
89 Universities UK (2010) finds no evidence of students living close to home in response to 
adverse economic conditions or financial concerns, unlike Pennell and West (2005) and the 
findings in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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2. Positive and significant growth rates of youth and adult unemployment give 
signals to the student about the future condition of the labour market, and 
hence may improve the student’s perception of the benefits (through a 
lowering of the discount rate, or a more accurate estimate of the changes in 
the non-graduate probability of being employed). Hence, at the margin, it is 
likely that more students decide to enrol. 
 
a. Students who enrol due to a lowering of their discount rate or a 
perception of a worsening labour market in the future may choose 
subjects to maximise the returns in graduate wage premia and 
employment probabilities. 
 
If these hypotheses are correctly supposed, the local youth unemployment rate 
should be a positive determinant of students participating in HE, but not necessarily 
for subjects that offer the greatest benefits in the labour market. Additionally, 
significant growth rates of local unemployment (both youth and adult) should be 
positive determinants of participating in HE, but specifically for subjects that offer 
the greatest labour market advantages. Fernández and Shioji’s (2000) wealth effect, 
should not be significant in the UK context, if the funding schemes during the 
period of interest truly render HE accessible, independent of household income. 
Ultimately, it is reasonable to expect that significant current (or expectations of 
future) unemployment at the local level may incentivise students to switch into 
more rewarding degree subjects at the margin. On the contrary, significant or rising 
youth unemployment reduces the opportunity cost of acquiring higher education, 
and students that switch into higher education as a result of the lowering of the 
opportunity cost may choose less rewarding degree subjects if there is a ‘weathering 






To examine the relationship between local labour markets and subject choice, a 
combination of student and labour market data is used.  
 
2.3.1 Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) Data 
The student data used is the 2005/06 to 2009/10 destinations and leavers of 
individuals from higher education compiled by HESA, as outlined in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis (section 1.3.1). The individual-level data allows for the estimation of the 
determinants of subject choice as outlined in section 2.2.1, including socioeconomic 
factors (income background, ethnicity, parental education level), student 
characteristics (age, tariff score, gender) and course characteristics (subject studied, 
mode of attendance, university attended, length of study). Furthermore, since each 
student observation has the postcode within which the student was domiciled at the 
time of applying to university through the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service (UCAS), the mapping of local area characteristics to the students at the time 
of applying is possible. As the outcome of interest is the subject studied by the 
student90, the student’s specific UCAS course code will be used to create groups of 
subjects (see section 2.4.3). 
 
2.3.2 Labour Market Data 
A variety of different labour market variables will be used to capture the various 
possible effects of interest as proposed in sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.2. Firstly, to 
estimate the effect of youth unemployment on the opportunity cost of investing in 
HE, the youth unemployment rate is calculated at the local level using data from 
the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for 1999-2003 and from the Annual 
                                                          
90 This will be estimated with a degree of imprecision, since it is not known whether the student 
changed their subject between entering and leaving higher education. All that is known is the 
eventual subject of the degree awarded. In the case of combined degrees where two or more 
subjects are studied, the subject indicated is that with the highest weighting in the student’s degree 
structure or the subject that appears first in the degree programme (for example, a student studying 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics would be recorded as a Politics student). 
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Population Survey (APS) for 2004-2010.91 In both cases, the youth unemployment 
rate is defined as the ratio of unemployed 16-24 year olds to the population of 16-
24 year olds that are in the labour force, averaged across the 12 month period ending 
in December each year. Additionally, the adult unemployment rate at ‘prime’ age 
(25-49 year olds) is calculated from the same data sources over the same periods, 
to capture any potential effect of the adult unemployment rate on subject choice. 
 
However, it is more likely that whilst the concurrent youth unemployment rate will 
affect the opportunity cost of HE, it is the expectation of the conditions of the labour 
market in the future that will affect the perceived benefits to the investment. To 
attempt to estimate this, the year-on-year growth rate of both the youth and adult 
unemployment rates are calculated using 1 period differences in the local 
observations. 
 
An alternative approach to using local unemployment data would be to use trends 
in graduate employment, graduate earnings, or graduate vacancies. This may be 
considered the most useful if it is believed that students when deciding which 
subject to study for their degree investment are using graduate-level trends. 
However, this is not the approach taken in this analysis for two reasons: firstly, 
since it is reasonable to expect the headline unemployment rate at the local level is 
the most relevant for students to respond to through media and everyday life; and 
secondly, graduate employment data by subject and by time is not widely available.  
 
 
2.3.3 Spatial & Time Matching 
To accurately estimate the impact of local unemployment on HE decisions, the 
unemployment data is matched to the student data using the student’s UK domiciled 
postcode at the time of the application.92 The unemployment data is measured at 
                                                          
91 The annual population survey effectively replaced the local area QLFS in providing labour 
market data at a local level in 2004. 
92 A further avenue of research could be to investigate the possible role of students choosing to 
move to a particular university in preparation of finding employment in the local area. In order to 
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the 2nd level of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS 2, 2010) 
level, which comprises of 37 regional areas of the UK.93 Since the classification 
underwent structural changes within the analysis period (2003, 2006), the NUTS 2 
(2010) regional data is created using the lower level of the hierarchical 
classification which did not change over the time period (NUTS 3, 2010) to ensure 
consistent measures of regional unemployment are collected. Each student is 
assigned to their local NUTS 2 region using their domiciled postcode, and the 
unemployment observations are matched by NUTS 2 region. For each NUTS 2 
region, there are 11 years of observations of the unemployment rate, and 10 years 
of observations of the growth rate of the unemployment rate (due to the raw 
calculation of the year-on-year change). This is a similar approach to Wales (2010), 
except the measures of locality used in that study are much smaller (Local Area 
Districts).94 
 
There is significant variation in the regional differences in the unemployment rates 
and growth rates: Inner London has on average around 20% youth unemployment 
across the period, compared to Surrey, and East and West Sussex with less than 
10% youth unemployment. In addition, some regions show an increasing trend of 
youth and adult unemployment (Derbyshire, Cumbria) whilst others show a decline 
over the period (North Eastern Scotland, Outer London).95 However, the spatial 
dimension alone does not sufficiently match the labour market conditions to the 
investment decision – the time element is also important, as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
                                                          
facilitate such an investigation, it would be necessary to have information on the location of the 
student pre-university, at-university and post-university once in graduate employment. Whilst the 
data used in this analysis contains the two former, it does not contain the latter, and therefore is not 
possible. 
93 See Appendix B, Table B1. 
94 Whilst using this classification of local areas was considered for this analysis, the additional 
cohorts of students included in this dataset require a consistent measure of unemployment from 
2002 to 2006 for students starting 2003/04 to 2007/08. A further source of richness of the data is 
this analysis includes the entire population of students who entered higher education, whereas 
students included in Wales (2010) are those that respond to the Destinations and Leavers of Higher 
Education (DLHE) survey, which is typically performed six months after a student graduates. 
95 See Appendix B, Figures B1-B6. 
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Table 2.1: An Example Timeline of UK Undergraduate Study (of a Student 
Commencing Their Studies in Year ‘t’ 
 
Year Month Event 
t-2 June Student leaves compulsory secondary school; 
decides whether to study A-Levels96, where to study (college / sixth 
form) and which A-Level subjects to study. 
September Student begins 2 year A-Level study. 
t-1 June Finalise A-Level subject choices.97 
September Student begins application process to university through 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS); 
may apply to up to 6 course choices at any UK university.98 
t January Deadline for UCAS application submission; course and university 
choice finalised. 
June Receive and respond to offers of study from university admissions. 
August Receive exam results and confirm attendance on preferred course. 
September Begin degree studies. 
 
 
In the context of the UK higher education system, a student will partially decide to 
go to university by deciding whether to study A-Levels at age 16 at college or sixth 
form, and they will also decide to some extent which subjects they may wish to 
study, since subject-specific A-Levels (or equivalent) are often required for 
university admission. For a student who wishes to start in year t, their application 
to university begins in September t-1, and must be completed by early January in 
year t. Thus, the majority of the decision of whether to and what to study takes place 
nine months previous to entry. Therefore, for a student starting in year t, it is the 
local labour market conditions observed in September-December in year t-1 that 
determine the opportunity cost of HE. In addition, it is the expectations of future 
                                                          
96 As outlined in the Introduction, these are the pre-university qualifications a student will obtain 
by studying at school, college or sixth form in England and Wales. In Scotland, students study for 
similar pre-university qualifications called Highers or Advanced Highers. 
97 Typically, students choose a reduced number of the A-Level subjects they started (AS-Level ) to 
continue on to the full A-Level (A2). The subjects chosen to study in the final year of college or 
sixth form to a large extent will determine the available course choices at university in terms of 
entrance requirements. 
98 Since 2007, this has been reduced to 5. 
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unemployment at that same time that help to determine the expectations of the 
future labour market that they may face either as a graduate or non-graduate. With 
respect to matching student observations to labour market data, a student who is 
observed to have started in year t is matched with the 12 month average local 
unemployment rates ending in year t-1. Whilst this means that students are matched 
with the 12 month average unemployment rate in the previous calendar year – and 
students decide what subjects to study in September t-2, this will be captured by the 
growth in the local unemployment rate from t-2 to t-1. The matching procedure is 
therefore also performed with the growth rates of the local unemployment rates, as 
shown in Table 2.2 below. 
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One final comment on the unemployment data is that of a potential simultaneity 
problem. As Bell and Blanchflower (2011) note, an increase in the participation in 
HE may have two potential effects. Increased participation may increase the youth 
unemployment rate further, since the remaining pool of those aged 16-24 and not 
in further education may become less skilled. Alternatively, since there has been an 
increase in the participation in HE, this across a longer time dimension will make 
those aged 16-24 more skilled, and may therefore reduce the youth unemployment 
rate. The result is that, as Clark (2011) also notes, such simultaneity may cause a 
downward bias in the estimates on the effect of unemployment on HE investments. 
However, since this analysis concentrates on the subject choice effects of labour 
market trends, and that the data ensures that those observed are conditional on 
having decided to participate in HE, such bias should not be as problematic as 
looking at the impact on participation directly. Furthermore, by examining the 
impact of local adult unemployment and expectations of future local adult 
unemployment on subject choice, negates this simultaneity bias. 
 
2.3.4 Identification Strategy 
As the research question focuses on local labour markets in the UK, only students 
with a valid UK postcode are kept from the complete population of leavers, which 
removes students who have entered HE as non-domiciled within the UK from the 
analysis. Further restrictions ensure that only students with a valid (i.e. non-
missing) socioeconomic code are kept99, in order to control for socioeconomic 
factors in the determination of subject choice. Also excluded are any exchange 
students (approximately 2.5% of the student observations), any students who are 
not studying an undergraduate degree for the first time, and any students studying 
at arts, drama or music Higher Education Institutes (HEIs). Students who attended 
a university in Northern Ireland are removed due to significant missing observations 
of labour market data. In a further attempt to only include students who are making 
                                                          
99 Approximately one third of undergraduate students do not have a valid socioeconomic code, but 
this is predominantly those who did not apply to university as a school leaver. 
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the investment as a school-leaver, only students with a valid tariff score100 (similar 
to Wales, 2010), who are eligible to pay home tuition fees101 (explicitly excluding 
foreign students) and those aged 17-18 at the time of entry to university are retained 
in the dataset. Part-time students are also excluded in order to restrict the analysis 





Ideally, to fully estimate on the demand for particular subjects with respect to 
variation in the local labour market, it would be necessary to capture changes in the 
demand for HE through applications data. This would allow the estimation of the 
student, socioeconomic and regional characteristics on the decision not to invest in 
HE, rather than the conditional probabilities we are able to obtain with the 
observations for those who have self-selected into HE. Given that the HESA data 
is ex-post, we only observe the subject that a student studies, conditional on them 
having applied, accepted an offer of study, and subsequently been accepted on the 
basis of pre-university attainment. What we can estimate therefore is a 
compositional effect: given that students have decided to enrol, what is the 
relationship between the local labour market and the subjects they choose? 
 
2.4.1 The Linear Probability Model 
As discussed in detail in the proceeding section, each student’s specific course code 
is grouped into one of three main categories: STEM, LEM and OTHER. Given that 
all the student observations have decided to participate in HE, the relationship of 
                                                          
100 A universal measure of pre-university attainment that is calculated by UCAS’ own application 
structure. See section 3.4.3 for a full description of how UCAS tariff scores are computed. 
101 Note that this does not exclude students who received full or partial tuition fee waivers or 
bursaries, but that the students were eligible to pay the home fees as domiciled within the UK for 
at least 3 years prior to entry. 
102 From the cropped dataset outlined in Appendix A, Table A3, approximately 330,000 
observations are dropped which are students not aged 17-18, and a further 225,000 observations 
are dropped where the student’s tariff score is unknown, missing, or unclassified. The resulting 
dataset is approximately 200,000 students. 
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interest is what determines which subject group a student belongs to, given the 
explanatory variables. Thus, there will be three dependent binary variables for each 
subject category. One approach would be to use a logit or probit model instead of 
OLS, however the coefficients are not immediately quantifiable, especially when 
multiple interactions are included. If OLS is used, and the error term is assumed to 
be distributed normally, the estimation of a limited dependent variable becomes the 
Linear Probability Model (LPM). Although the coefficients are easily interpreted 
as they represent marginal effects directly, the lack of a restrictive condition on the 
error term means that predicted probabilities can exceed the [0, 1] boundary and 
thus cause inherent problems of heteroscedasticity, resulting in potentially biased 
standard errors. 
 
However, in in the interests of comparability with the estimates from the preceding 
chapter, the linear probability model will be used to perform the analysis, with a 
logit specification which re-estimates all the analysis with a non-linear error term 
distribution to as a robustness check to confirm the sign and significance of the 
coefficients reported in the main tables.103 The LPM approach will also allow a 
degree of comparison with Wales’ (2010) study, which is the closest study to this 
analysis. Clustered standard errors will also be used in the LPM estimations to 
address the heteroscedasticity issue, especially since the error term (irrespective of 
regression method) may not be independent across observations due to certain 
groups of students and subjects being more likely to be observed at certain 
universities. 
 
2.4.2 Subject Groupings 
Using each student’s specific 4-digit Joint Academic Coding System (JACS) 
identifier, 20 broad subject areas are defined. These 20 subject areas are then 
assigned to one of three possible subject groupings, to reflect three different sets of 
                                                          
103 A summary of these results are presented in Tables 2.11, 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14, where the average 
marginal effects are also given following a multinomial logit regression. The complete set of 
results are available on request from the author. 
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subjects.104 The first grouping used is STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering 
and Mathematics subjects.105 As noted in section 2.2.1, these subjects have some of 
the highest entry requirements (see Table 2), but they also offer arguably the 
greatest benefits in terms of a high graduate wage premium and a low risk of 
graduate unemployment for those students who are willing and able to obtain a 
STEM degree. For students who are seeking to maximise their return on their 
investment in higher education, an investment in a STEM subject would offer a 
good chance of doing so, despite the lack of employment motivation noted by 
Mellors-Bourne et al. (2011). 
 
However, given that STEM subjects may be prohibitively difficult to obtain offers 
of study for, especially since the timeline of A-Level prerequisite subjects has 
already been decided by the student in advance of observing any changes in the 
labour market, it may be unlikely that students are able to switch into a STEM 
subject easily. As Britton et al. (2016) and Walker and Zhu (2010) also identify, 
there exists a group of subjects that still offer high graduate wage premia, but are 
relatively more accessible to students in terms of prerequisite subjects and grades. 
These subjects are henceforth defined as LEM: Law, Economics and Management. 
Finally, the remainder of the subjects – which are predominantly arts and 
humanities courses – are defined as OTHER. Although not constant across all 
subjects, on average these subjects will offer a lower return on the investment 
decision, especially compared to LEM and STEM subjects in the graduate labour 
market. 
 
The resulting dataset comprises approximately 200,000 students who were 
domiciled in either England, Scotland or Wales prior to the beginning of their 
undergraduate degree studies, which they began between September 2003 and 
                                                          
104 See Appendix B, Table B2. 
105 As noted in Section 1.4.3, the STEM classification is created using the JACS 2-digit code to 




September 2007, of which a summary of the key variables can be found below in 
Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total STEM LEM Other 
     
England 82.66% 80.37% 81.05% 84.15% 
Scotland 10.99% 14.20% 13.17% 8.94% 
Wales 6.35% 5.44% 5.78% 6.91% 
Student Characteristics:     
Russell Group =1 0.40 0.57 0.35 0.34 
 (0.490) (0.495) (0.477) (0.474) 
Oxbridge =1 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 
 (0.199) (0.220) (0.167) (0.198) 
Age 17.96 17.95 17.95 17.97 
 (0.200) (0.228) (0.227) (0.176) 
Tariff Score 341.42 364.34 342.26 333.63 
 (118.0) (126.3) (119.8) (113.4) 
Female =1 0.58 0.42 0.51 0.67 
 (0.494) (0.493) (0.500) (0.470) 
White =1 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.89 
 (0.361) (0.400) (0.431) (0.308) 
Disabled =1 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 
 (0.251) (0.252) (0.222) (0.260) 
British =1 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.97 
 (0.181) (0.189) (0.210) (0.167) 
Low Income =1 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.27 
(SEC Code 4-8) (0.443) (0.436) (0.452) (0.443) 
Educated Parent =1 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 
 (0.250) (0.231) (0.251) (0.258) 
No Educated Parent =1 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 
 (0.252) (0.221) (0.276) (0.255) 
Local =1 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.18 
(<20km) (0.394) (0.398) (0.426) (0.380) 
Live at Home =1 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.19 
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 (0.396) (0.381) (0.428) (0.390) 
Local Labour Market Characteristics: 
Local Youth Unemployment  12.79 12.78 13.14 12.69 
(16-24) (3.487) (3.489) (3.525) (3.468) 
Local Adult Unemployment  3.79 3.82 3.91 3.74 
(25-49) (1.157) (1.161) (1.197) (1.139) 
Youth Unemployment Growth  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
(1 year) (0.161) (0.156) (0.160) (0.164) 
Adult Unemployment Growth  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
(1 year) (0.162) (0.162) (0.159) (0.163) 
Aggregate Unemployment  4.98 5.00 5.13 4.93 
(16-49) (1.442) (1.451) (1.476) (1.423) 
Aggregate Unemployment  0.08 0.05 0.08 0.10 
Growth (1 year) (0.595) (0.590) (0.596) (0.596) 










Mean coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. The table shows the characteristics of the student data, by 
subject classification. For each subject group (and across all subject groups), the summary of student and labour 
market characteristics are shown. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 
HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. 
Low Income is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s socioeconomic code is 4-8. 
Educated Parent is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student declares that they have at least 1 parent 
with university education. No Educated Parent is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student declares 
that neither parent has university education. This variable was not compulsory in all waves of the data, and 
students were given the option of responding ‘Unsure’. 
White is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s ethnicity is coded as being white. Black & 
Asian is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s ethnicity is coded as being either black or Asian. 
Female and British are binary variables that take the value 1 if the student’s gender and nationality are declared 
as female and British respectively. 
Disabled is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student has declared that they have a known disability. 
Local is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student attends a university within 20km in Euclidean 
space from their domiciled postcode where the student resided at the time of making the application through 
UCAS. 
Live at Home is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student is known to be living at home whilst 
undertaking their university study. 
Russell Group is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the university the student attended is classified as a 
Russell Group university, as in Appendix A, Table A1. Furthermore, Oxbridge is a binary variable that takes 










2.4.3 Empirical Model 
The model estimated across the three subject groupings is performed with OLS, and 
in Table 2.4 the determinants of choice for each subject grouping are estimated 
before including any labour market measures. This is done both to establish a 
baseline of subject choice depending on socioeconomic factors, and also to see 
whether the influence of those factors remains when adding local labour market 
trends and any possible interactions. Hence, for STEM, LEM and OTHER subject 
groups, the model estimated initially is: 
 















where 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑢,𝑡 is a binary indicator which equals one if student i from local area j 
studies at university u within academic year t, a subject classified as being in the 
subject group of interest, and 0 otherwise; Τ𝑖 is the student’s tariff score on entry 
which measures the student’s ability before attending university; and 𝑋𝑘 is a set of 
categorical student controls (ethnicity, disability status, gender, low/high 
socioeconomic status, attending a local university within 20km Euclidean distance). 
Also included are a set of time fixed effects (𝐷𝑡), regional fixed effects at the NUTS 
1 (2010) level (𝑁𝑛) and a full set of university fixed effects (𝐴𝑢). Finally, the error 
term ( 𝑖,𝑗,𝑢,𝑡) is clustered at the university level to account for the likely violation 
of the independent error term assumption. 
 
Once the model specification has been performed for all three subject groups, 
measures of unemployment are added to the model for Tables 2.5-2.7.106 Depending 
                                                          
106 One potential consequence of including more than one measure of unemployment in the same 
specification is that of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Although this would 
not bias the OLS estimates, it may result in the standard errors being overestimated. To ensure the 
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on the specification used, these unemployment measures matched with student i 
who begins their studies in time t are either the 12 month average in t-1, or the 
growth in local unemployment from t-2 to t-1. However, given that the benefits and 
costs may vary according to socioeconomic factors (section 2.2.1), the effect of 
unemployment on subject choice is also allowed to be heterogeneous across 
students with different socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, the effect of 
unemployment is allowed to be heterogeneous across gender and socioeconomic 
status.107 To do this, a pairwise interaction between the unemployment measures 
and the categorical socioeconomic variables of female and low income are included 
in Tables 2.8-2.10. The regression model therefore becomes:  
 













+ 𝛿3(𝑋1 ∗ 𝑈𝑖) + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑢,𝑡 
(9) 
 
Where 𝛿2 measures the impact of the local unemployment measure on the 
probability of student studying a particular subject group, and 𝛿3 captures any 
heterogeneity in the effect of 𝛿2 across the socioeconomic characteristics of female 
and low income students. 
 
2.5 Results 
The results from the model specification analysis for the STEM, LEM and OTHER 
subject groupings are shown in Table 2.4, where the determinants of subject choice 
                                                          
unemployment measures did not exhibit collinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was 
computed for all specifications in Tables 2.5 to 2.7, and all of the explanatory variables showed a 
vif significantly less than the accepted threshold value of 10. Only when including aggregate and 
adult unemployment measures in the same specification does the VIF exceed 10, however this 
combination of explanatory variables does not appear in this chapter’s analysis. 
107 An additional source of heterogeneity was that of students who decided to attend a local 
university compared to those who moved further away. There was no significant heterogeneity in 




as suggested by the empirical body of research are included, subject to the data 
used. These initial analyses establish a baseline of subject choice before estimating 
the impact of the labour market variables. Once established, the unemployment 
measures are included in Tables 2.5-2.7, which only show the unemployment 
coefficients. Finally, to see how the effects of unemployment on subject choice may 
differ by socioeconomic factors, Tables 2.8-2.10 show the interaction between 
socioeconomic variables, and with the unemployment rates, to establish any 
apparent heterogeneity. Tables 2.11-2.14 show the average marginal effects from a 
multinomial logit specification to help quantify and compare the aforementioned. 
 
In establishing the determinants of subject choice, the majority of the explanatory 
variables are the expected sign and significance. For STEM subjects, having a 
higher tariff score makes it more likely that a student chooses a STEM subject108, 
however this effect becomes statistically insignificant once controlling for regional, 
time and university fixed effects. What is perhaps surprising is that students from a 
low income background are more likely to be observed studying a STEM subject.109 
Also surprising is that if a student is attending a local university, they are more 
likely to be studying a STEM subject, which casts doubt on the idea of a limited 
geographical radius for university choice negatively impacting on the availability 
of possible courses. There is also a positive effect for disabled students on the 
probability of choosing STEM subjects, where having a self-reported disability 
should not have any significant impact on course choice. Finally in column (3), 
there is an additional negative effect for females who are also from a financially 
poorer background on the probability of choosing STEM subjects, which was also 
found by Codiroli McMaster (2017). Whilst low income was found to increase the 
probability of studying a STEM subject, for females this is significantly negative, 
which does not reduce the magnitude of being female. Females from low income 
backgrounds are therefore approximately 14 percentage points in total less likely to 
                                                          
108 Whilst being female or white makes it less likely. As evidenced in Column (3) of Table 2.11, 
females are 12 percentage points less likely to study a STEM subject. 
109 As seen in Column (3) of Table 2.11, low income background students are 2.01 percentage 
points more likely to be studying a STEM subject. 
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study a STEM subject. This result also increases the magnitude of the positive effect 
for low income on the probability of STEM subjects being studied overall from 
1.06 percentage points to 3.78 percentage points. The other interaction between low 
income and local is also significant, but negative. This suggests that, although local 
students are more likely to study STEM subjects, students who attend a local 
university and who are also low income are less likely to study STEM subjects. 
 
For LEM subjects, students who are female, white or disabled are less likely to be 
studying LEM subjects conditional on participation, and students who are local and 
have a higher tariff score are more likely.110 There is no apparent heterogeneity in 
the effect of income background, and no effect overall of a student’s socioeconomic 
status on the probability of choosing LEM. Finally, for the OTHER subjects, as 
expected, students with a lower tariff score are more likely to be studying a non-
STEM and non-LEM subject. Also as expected, female and white students are more 
likely to be studying what are predominantly arts and humanity degrees.111 
Surprising however, is that low income students are less likely to be studying 
OTHER subjects, which is contrary to the finding of disappointment or loss 
aversion by choosing less risky subjects by Montmarquette et al. (2002). Further 
surprising is that local students are less likely to be studying OTHER subjects, 
which is contrary to the ideas proposed by Callender and Jackson (2008) and 
Pennell and West (2005). Furthermore, as this is in part a compositional analysis, 
the findings for low income and local students in STEM are of the opposite sign but 
of similar magnitude of the coefficients on the same explanatory variables in the 
OTHER subject grouping.
                                                          
110 Only once regional, year and university fixed effects are included in the regression does tariff 
become significant. Also see Column (4) of Table 2.11 for the average marginal effects. 
111 For the average marginal effects from the multinomial logistical specification, see Column (5) 
of Table 2.11. 
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Table 2.4: Baseline Model of Subject Choice 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 STEM STEM STEM LEM LEM LEM OTHER OTHER OTHER 
                    
Tariff 0.00718*** -0.00190* -0.00189* 0.00133 0.00438*** 0.00440*** -0.00852*** -0.00250** -0.00250** 
 (0.00112) (0.000968) (0.000968) (0.00106) (0.000977) (0.00100) (0.00123) (0.00104) (0.00104) 
Female -0.140*** -0.122*** -0.115*** -0.0618*** -0.0626*** -0.0635*** 0.202*** 0.185*** 0.179*** 
 (0.00664) (0.00608) (0.00585) (0.00548) (0.00483) (0.00501) (0.00747) (0.00695) (0.00716) 
White -0.0593*** -0.0427*** -0.0428*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.153*** 0.212*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0153) (0.00857) (0.00854) (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
British -0.0127 0.00925 0.00910 -0.0263** -0.0186 -0.0169 0.0390*** 0.00768 0.00778 
 (0.00934) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0118) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0114) (0.0305) (0.0305) 
Low Income 0.0106*** 0.0196*** 0.0378*** 0.00504* 0.00114 -0.00293 -0.0156*** -0.0206*** -0.0349*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00297) (0.00573) (0.00291) (0.00289) (0.00493) (0.00346) (0.00293) (0.00497) 
Local 0.0189** 0.0162*** 0.0207*** 0.0308*** 0.0302*** 0.0268*** -0.0497*** -0.0461*** -0.0474*** 
 (0.00922) (0.00519) (0.00538) (0.00870) (0.00560) (0.00615) (0.0118) (0.00512) (0.00565) 
Disabled 0.00930* 0.0138*** 0.0139*** -0.0394*** -0.0385*** -0.0383*** 0.0301*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.00483) (0.00410) (0.00411) (0.00381) (0.00416) (0.00418) (0.00525) (0.00513) (0.00513) 
Low Income x Female   -0.0253***   0.00314   0.0222*** 
   (0.00560)   (0.00528)   (0.00571) 
Low Income x Local   -0.0126**   0.00886   0.00377 
   (0.00623)   (0.00644)   (0.00708) 
Constant 0.213*** 0.198*** 0.193*** 0.363*** 0.448*** 0.449*** 0.424*** 0.355*** 0.358*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0274) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0278) (0.0363) (0.0363) 
          
Observations 198,280 198,280 198,280 198,280 198,280 198,280 198,280 198,280 198,280 
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R-squared 0.043 0.106 0.106 0.028 0.061 0.061 0.077 0.122 0.122 
          
Year FE  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
University FE  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010)  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
           
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate 
equation 8. The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM in specifications (1)-(3) and 0 otherwise; 1 for LEM in 
specifications (4)-(6) and 0 otherwise; and 1 for OTHER in specifications (7)-(9) and 0 otherwise. For each subject grouping, the same 3 models are estimated - 
models (1), (4) and (7) include socioeconomic controls, and specifications (2), (5) and 8) include a full set of year, institutional and regional fixed effects. 
Specifications (3), (6) and (9) further allow the effect of low income to be heterogeneous across gender and geographical proximity by including interactions with 
the low income indicator. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** 





Tables 2.5-2.7 show the addition of various measures of unemployment in the 
subject groupings, using specifications 3, 6 and 9 from Table 2.4 for the STEM, 
LEM and OTHER subjects respectively. Tables 2.12-2.14 provide the average 
marginal effects from a multinomial logit specification of  Tables 2.5-2.7 to provide 
robustness and quantifiable comparison.  The effect of local unemployment rate 
amongst young people (16-24) represents changes in the opportunity cost of 
attending university, and for those students at the margin who do enrol into higher 
education, it was hypothesised that choosing a subject with the highest returns in 
graduate wage and employment premia would be less important for those students. 
From Table 2.5, there is no significant effect of local youth unemployment on 
STEM subjects, which may reflect the difficulty in switching into STEM subjects 
with respect to required subjects to be studied at school or college. Since LEM and 
OTHER subjects may be easier to change courses, any changes in the opportunity 
cost may affect these subjects more so than STEM. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show a 
significant impact of local youth unemployment and course choice, but the sign is 
opposite to those which were hypothesised. In column (9) of both tables, once all 
the disaggregated unemployment measures are included, experiencing higher local 
youth unemployment in the previous 12 months has a positive effect on choosing a 
LEM subject, and a negative effect on the probability of choosing an OTHER 
subject. However, the effect is quantitatively small; a 1 percentage point increase 
in the youth unemployment rate increases the probability of a LEM subject being 
studied by 0.442 percentage points, or by 2.4% relative to the mean of the number 
of students studying LEM subjects. This would support a hypothesis to the contrary 
of what was proposed in Section 2.2.3, whereby course choice is actually more 
important for those motivated by changes in the opportunity cost of higher 
education. Although the opportunity cost has fallen for students who experience 
higher local youth unemployment, the worsening outside options in the labour 
market may at the margin as a signal to study a subject with greater labour market 
benefits. This suggests that changes in the opportunity cost are relatively 
insignificant with respect to subject choice, compared to changes in the future 




Changes in the expected benefits to a degree are also partially captured by changes 
in the growth rates of adult and youth unemployment, such that if a student observes 
a worsening youth, or especially adult112, labour market, this may help form 
expectations of the labour market that the student will be faced with upon 
graduation. Thus, if the expectations are for higher unemployment in the future, it 
is reasonable to expect that students will maximise their returns to HE by choosing 
a subject with higher graduate wage and employment premia. However, this is not 
what is observed in the data. In Tables 2.5 and 2.6, there are significantly negative 
coefficients on the growth rates of youth and aggregate unemployment, which 
imply that students who reside in an area of high or rising unemployment are less 
likely to choose STEM or LEM subjects; the subjects with the highest likely 
returns.113  
 
Instead, as seen from Table 2.7, students who reside in areas with positive growth 
rates in youth and aggregate unemployment are more likely to study OTHER 
subjects.114 This may suggest that students are engaging in some degree of loss or 
disappointment aversion; if students are aware that being a graduate carries a lower 
risk of unemployment, they may choose subjects where they are less likely to drop-
out and more likely to obtain a high degree classification. Alternatively, it may be 
that students who select into university due to worsening labour market conditions 
are engaging in ‘weathering the storm’, although this is unlikely given that students’ 
decision to participate is already partially made through the studying of A-Levels 
two years prior to entry. Irrespectively, these findings imply that current labour 
                                                          
112 Since degree study takes typically 3-4 years, and that higher education is expected to benefit 
individuals throughout their working career, the prospective adult labour market should be the 
most pertinent to the student. 
113 Table 2.13, Column (3) shows that a 1 unit increase in the growth rate of local youth 
unemployment suggests that a student is 2.13 percentage points less likely to study a LEM subject. 
114 Table 2.14, Column (6) shows that a 1 unit increase in the growth rate of local aggregate 
unemployment suggests that a student is 0.98 percentage points more likely to be studying a 
subject in the OTHER category. 
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market conditions and the formation of future labour market conditions have 
different mechanisms for students in their subsequent course choice behaviour.
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Table 2.5: STEM Subjects and Local Unemployment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM 
                    
Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr) -0.00109*      -0.000812  -0.00105 
 (0.000635)      (0.000775)  (0.00110) 
Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)  -0.00231      -0.00258 0.000586 
  (0.00167)      (0.00180) (0.00244) 
Growth in Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.00928    -0.00559  -0.00244 
   (0.00624)    (0.00741)  (0.00902) 
Growth in Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)    -0.00879    -0.00530 -0.00922 
    (0.00851)    (0.00886) (0.00962) 
Aggregate Local Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00305**     
     (0.00142)     
Growth in Local Aggregate Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00539**    
      (0.00216)    
          
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 158,720 178,995 158,720 
R-squared 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.105 
          
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. 
The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (3) from Table 
2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the unemployment variables separately, where specifications (7)-(8) include the level of local 
unemployment and the growth in local unemployment respectively. Specification (9) includes all measures of youth and adult local unemployment. The socioeconomic 
controls as included in specification (3) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression 
results including the socioeconomic controls can be found in Appendix B, Table B3. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s 






Table 2.6: LEM Subjects and Local Unemployment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM 
                    
Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr) 0.000220      0.000363  0.00442*** 
 (0.000789)      (0.000979)  (0.00139) 
Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)  -0.00160      -0.00229 -0.0135*** 
  (0.00200)      (0.00235) (0.00307) 
Growth in Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.0216***    -0.0233***  -0.0467*** 
   (0.00679)    (0.00797)  (0.0104) 
Growth in Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)    -0.00421    -0.00112 0.0250** 
    (0.00743)    (0.00854) (0.0107) 
Aggregate Local Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.000436     
     (0.00181)     
Growth in Local Aggregate Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00417**    
      (0.00205)    
          
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 158,720 178,995 158,720 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.063 0.064 
          
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. The 
dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for LEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (6) from Table 2.4 with 
various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the unemployment variables separately, where specifications (7)-(8) include the level of local unemployment 
and the growth in local unemployment respectively. Specification (9) includes all measures of youth and adult local unemployment. The socioeconomic controls as included in 
specification (6) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression results including the 
socioeconomic controls can be found in Appendix B, Table B4. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding 





Table 2.7: OTHER Subjects and Local Unemployment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER 
                    
Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr) 0.000871      0.000448  -0.00337** 
 (0.000650)      (0.000814)  (0.00132) 
Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)  0.00390**      0.00486** 0.0129*** 
  (0.00183)      (0.00212) (0.00337) 
Growth in Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr)   0.0309***    0.0289***  0.0492*** 
   (0.00830)    (0.00934)  (0.0115) 
Growth in Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)    0.0130    0.00641 -0.0157 
    (0.00906)    (0.00976) (0.0122) 
Aggregate Local Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.00262*     
     (0.00148)     
Growth in Local Aggregate Unemployment (16-49yr)      0.00956***    
      (0.00241)    
          
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 158,720 178,995 158,720 
R-squared 0.122 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.122 0.122 0.124 0.124 0.124 
          
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. The 
dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for OTHER and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (9) from Table 2.4 
with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the unemployment variables separately, where specifications (7)-(8) include the level of local 
unemployment and the growth in local unemployment respectively. Specification (9) includes all measures of youth and adult local unemployment. The socioeconomic controls 
as included in specification (9) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression results 
including the socioeconomic controls can be found in Appendix B, Table B5. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard 




These effects of unemployment on course choice however are assuming that the 
effect of unemployment is homogenous across all types of students. Since it has 
been discussed that different students may have different psychic costs, and 
different expectations of the benefits of HE, the effect of unemployment may also 
differ according to the same factors. Tables 2.8-2.10 present the findings of 
unemployment interacted with socioeconomic indicators to investigate whether 
there is any heterogeneity in the labour market influences of course choice. These 
tables use specifications 3, 6 and 9 from Table 2.4 with the inclusion of some 
socioeconomic indicator interactions between income background, gender and 
geographic proximity and the unemployment measures. 
 
When allowing the unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across individuals, 
an added layer of student behaviour is revealed: female students who experience 
significant growth in aggregate unemployment are more likely to study a STEM 
subject, and less likely to study a LEM subject. This finding opposes the lower 
likelihood of a female studying a STEM subject by Codiroli McMaster (2017) and 
the result from Table 2.4. Moreover, the coefficient on female remains highly 
significant and negative, as does the interaction between female and low income on 
the probability of studying a STEM subject, even when the interaction between 
female and the growth in local aggregate unemployment is included in columns (8) 
and (9) in Table 2.5. Further to this, the quantitative effect of growth in local 
aggregate unemployment becomes greater, such that a 1 percentage point increase 
in the growth of local unemployment reduces the probability of a STEM subject 
being studied by 1.34 percentage points (a fall of 5.7% relative to the mean of 
STEM subjects studied), compared to 0.534 percentage points without the 
interactions included. This suggests that although females are less likely to study 
STEM subjects, and disadvantaged females are even less likely to study STEM 
subjects, significant growth in adult unemployment in the student’s local area may 
incentivise females particularly to study STEM subjects as they offer some of the 
highest graduate wage and employment premia. Furthermore, as this is a 
compositional story, the effects for females studying STEM in response to changes 
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in the growth of local aggregate unemployment is the opposite of what is observed 
in columns (8) and (9) of Table 2.9. This implies that the females who do study 
STEM in response to changes in aggregate local unemployment are switching from 
LEM subjects, rather than arts and humanities. 
 
There are no apparent heterogeneous effects of unemployment on OTHER subjects, 
although, similar to the effect for females discussed above, students who are from 
a low income background and who experience higher aggregate unemployment in 
the local area are more likely to study a STEM subject. The coefficients on the 
interaction term in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.8 are significant and positive, 
however the effect of being from a low income background overall becomes 
marginally statistically insignificant. This implies that the positive effect of poorer 
students choosing STEM subjects is driven by those students who experience higher 
aggregate unemployment in the local area. Similar to the effect for females, the 
results suggest that students that are the most disadvantaged in the labour market 
and who experience worsening local labour market conditions are more likely to 
choose to study a subject with higher graduate wage and employment benefits.
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Table 2.8: STEM Subjects and Unemployment (Socioeconomic Heterogeneity) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM 
          
Female -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.132*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.118*** 
 (0.00581) (0.00581) (0.0129) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.0127) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00599) 
Low Income 0.0363*** 0.0169 0.0176 0.0376*** 0.0172* 0.0181* 0.0374*** 0.0374*** 0.0372*** 
 (0.00562) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.00562) (0.00999) (0.00994) (0.00562) (0.00562) (0.00561) 
          
Low Income x Female -0.0256*** -0.0257*** -0.0262*** -0.0258*** -0.0259*** -0.0266*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0257*** 
 (0.00567) (0.00567) (0.00557) (0.00554) (0.00554) (0.00545) (0.00553) (0.00553) (0.00553) 
          
Local Youth Unemployment (16-
24yr) -0.00108* -0.00153** -0.00212**       
 (0.000632) (0.000596) (0.000845)       
Low Income x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)  0.00152* 0.00149*       
  (0.000871) (0.000872)       
Female x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   0.00102       
   (0.000849)       
          
Aggregate Local Unemployment 
(16-49yr)    -0.00302** -0.00424*** -0.00624***    
    (0.00142) (0.00137) (0.00192)    
Low Income x Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.00414** 0.00402**    
     (0.00184) (0.00184)    
Female x Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      0.00341*    
      (0.00202)    
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Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)       -0.00534** -0.00541** -0.0134*** 
       (0.00216) (0.00223) (0.00330) 
Low Income x Growth in 
Aggregate Local  Unemployment 
(16-49yr)        0.000235 -0.0000732 
        (0.00368) (0.00366) 
Female x Growth in Aggregate 
Local Unemployment (16-49yr)         0.0137*** 
         (0.00395) 
          
Observations 181,090 181,090 181,090 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.107 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. The 
dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (3) from Table 2.4 with 
various indicators of unemployment, and various interactions of the unemployment measures with the socioeconomic controls. Specifications (1)-(3) estimate the effect of local 
youth unemployment on the probability of a STEM subject being studied, whilst specifications (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) estimate the effect of aggregate and the growth of aggregate 
local unemployment respectively. Interactions are included between the unemployment variable and the socioeconomic indicators of low income and female, to allow the 
unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across these binary categories. The socioeconomic controls as included in specification (3) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results 
are supressed here (except those controls that are being interacted with the unemployment measures) to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression 
results including the socioeconomic controls can be found in Appendix B, Table B6. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s 
Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
122 
 
Table 2.9: LEM Subjects and Unemployment (Socioeconomic Heterogeneity) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM 
          
Female -0.0653*** -0.0653*** -0.0580*** -0.0637*** -0.0637*** -0.0571*** -0.0637*** -0.0637*** -0.0615*** 
 (0.00512) (0.00512) (0.0105) (0.00501) (0.00501) (0.00941) (0.00500) (0.00500) (0.00516) 
Low Income -0.000734 0.0131 0.0127 -0.00197 0.00998 0.00960 -0.00199 -0.00193 -0.00184 
 (0.00529) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00497) (0.00922) (0.00927) (0.00497) (0.00502) (0.00500) 
          
Low Income x Female 0.00293 0.00298 0.00326 0.00285 0.00290 0.00316 0.00289 0.00289 0.00274 
 (0.00539) (0.00538) (0.00532) (0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00528) (0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00533)           
Local Youth Unemployment 
(16-24yr) 0.000216 0.000534 0.000868       
 (0.000788) (0.000795) (0.000829)       
Low Income x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)  -0.00109 -0.00107       
  (0.000746) (0.000748)       
Female x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.000570       
   (0.000691)       
          
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)    0.000420 0.00114 0.00191    
    (0.00181) (0.00190) (0.00196)    
Low Income x Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00242 -0.00238    
     (0.00170) (0.00171)    
Female x Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00131    
      (0.00158)    
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Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)       -0.00418** -0.00410* 0.00237 
       (0.00205) (0.00207) (0.00326) 
Low Income x Growth in 
Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)        -0.000295 -0.0000474 
        (0.00356) (0.00354) 
Female x Growth in Aggregate 
Local Unemployment (16-49yr)         -0.0110*** 
         (0.00408) 
          
Observations 181,090 181,090 181,090 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. 
The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for LEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (6) from Table 
2.4 with various indicators of unemployment, and various interactions of the unemployment measures with the socioeconomic controls. Specifications (1)-(3) estimate the 
effect of local youth unemployment on the probability of a LEM subject being studied, whilst specifications (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) estimate the effect of aggregate and the 
growth of aggregate local unemployment respectively. Interactions are included between the unemployment variable and the socioeconomic indicators of low income and 
female, to allow the unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across these binary categories. The socioeconomic controls as included in specification (6) of Table 2.4 are 
included, but the results are supressed here (except those controls that are being interacted with the unemployment measures) to focus on the effect of the unemployment 
variables. The regression results including the socioeconomic controls can be found in Appendix B, Table B7. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 




Table 2.10: OTHER Subjects and Unemployment (Socioeconomic Heterogeneity) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER 
          
Female 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.189*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
 (0.00686) (0.00686) (0.0143) (0.00712) (0.00712) (0.0142) (0.00712) (0.00711) (0.00725) 
Low Income -0.0355*** -0.0300** -0.0303** -0.0356*** -0.0271** -0.0277** -0.0354*** -0.0354*** -0.0354*** 
 (0.00525) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.00501) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.00501) (0.00506) (0.00506) 
          
Low Income x Female 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 0.0229*** 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 0.0234*** 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.00595) (0.00595) (0.00591) (0.00575) (0.00575) (0.00570) (0.00575) (0.00575) (0.00575) 
          
Local Youth Unemployment 
(16-24yr) 0.000863 0.000991 0.00125       
 (0.000651) (0.000763) (0.000975)       
Low Income x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)  -0.000437 -0.000423       
  (0.000892) (0.000892)       
Female x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.000451       
   (0.000914)       
          
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)    0.00260* 0.00310* 0.00433*    
    (0.00148) (0.00175) (0.00225)    
Low Income x Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00172 -0.00165    
     (0.00201) (0.00201)    
Female x Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00209    
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      (0.00209)    
          
Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)       0.00952*** 0.00951*** 0.0111*** 
       (0.00241) (0.00253) (0.00367) 
Low Income x Growth in 
Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)        0.0000604 0.000121 
        (0.00460) (0.00460) 
Female x Growth in Aggregate 
Local Unemployment (16-49yr)         -0.00268 
         (0.00444)           
Observations 181,090 181,090 181,090 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. 
The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for OTHER and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (9) from 
Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment, and various interactions of the unemployment measures with the socioeconomic controls. Specifications (1)-(3) 
estimate the effect of local youth unemployment on the probability of an OTHER subject being studied, whilst specifications (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) estimate the effect of 
aggregate and the growth of aggregate local unemployment respectively. Interactions are included between the unemployment variable and the socioeconomic indicators 
of low income and female, to allow the unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across these binary categories. The socioeconomic controls as included in specification 
(9) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here (except those controls that are being interacted with the unemployment measures) to focus on the effect of 
the unemployment variables. The regression results including the socioeconomic controls can be found in Appendix B, Table B8. Raw numbers have been rounded to the 
nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.11:  Baseline Model of Subject Choice (Multinomial Logit & 
Marginal Effects) 
 
  Log-odds Average Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 STEM LEM STEM LEM OTHER 
         
Tariff -0.00706 0.0285*** -0.00215** 0.00454*** -0.00240** 
 (0.00686) (0.00655) (0.000953) (0.000964) (0.00107) 
Female -1.010*** -0.685*** -0.120*** -0.0633*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0348) (0.00476) (0.00487) (0.00617) 
White -0.659*** -1.070*** -0.0422*** -0.153*** 0.195*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0523) (0.00812) (0.00788) (0.0113) 
British 0.0284 -0.0874 0.00755 -0.0145 0.00700 
 (0.152) (0.131) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0293) 
Low Income 0.154*** 0.0476*** 0.0201*** 0.000774 -0.0209*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0179) (0.00277) (0.00269) (0.00294) 
Local 0.192*** 0.248*** 0.0169*** 0.0302*** -0.0471*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0317) (0.00526) (0.00518) (0.00525) 
Disabled 0.0290 -0.276*** 0.0147*** -0.0397*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0315) (0.00423) (0.00394) (0.00496) 
Constant -1.118*** 0.396**    
 (0.214) (0.164) 
   
   
   
Observations 198,280 198,280    
R-squared 0.106 0.061    
   
   
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
   
   
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level. Raw numbers have 
been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. 
Columns (1) to (5) from the output of one single regression estimation, which is the multinomial logit 
specification of the OLS model estimated in Table 2.4. Specifically, the dependent variable is the 
categorical subject choice indicator (Y=1(STEM), =2(LEM), =3(OTHER)) and as such the estimates 
presented in Table 2.11 are equivalent to the model estimated in Table 2.4, Columns (2), (5) and (8) 
where the interactions are not included between the socioeconomic indicator explanatory variables, 
but do include a full set of year, institutional and regional fixed effects.  Columns (1) and (2) report 
the log odds where the base category is OTHER, whilst columns (3) to (5) report the average 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that the subject category is equal to 




Table 2.12: STEM Subjects and Local Unemployment (Marginal Effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM 
              
Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr) -0.00116*      
 (0.000595)      
Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)  -0.00235     
  (0.00159)     
Growth in Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.0100    
   (0.00674)    
Growth in Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)    -0.00915   
    (0.00841)   
Aggregate Local Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00305**  
     (0.00131)  
Growth in Local Aggregate Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00571*** 
      (0.00210) 
       
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 
       
       
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 6 specifications. All regressions are performed using a multinomial 
logit specification to estimate equation 9. The dependent variable is the categorical subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM, 2 for LEM 
and 3 for OTHER. All 6 specifications are estimating column (2) from Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the 
unemployment variables separately, and correspond to columns (1)-(6) of Table 2.5. The coefficients shown are the average marginal effects of the 
unemployment measures on the probability of the categorical subject outcome variable being equal to STEM. The socioeconomic controls as included in 
specification (2) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression results 
including the socioeconomic controls are available on request from the author. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 





Table 2.13: LEM Subjects and Local Unemployment (Marginal Effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM 
              
Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr) 0.000199      
 (0.000741)      
Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)  -0.00150     
  (0.00187)     
Growth in Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.0213***    
   (0.00700)    
Growth in Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)    -0.00449   
    (0.00767)   
Aggregate Local Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.000428  
     (0.00167)  
Growth in Local Aggregate Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00412** 
      (0.00204) 
       
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 
       
       
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 6 specifications. All regressions are performed using a multinomial 
logit specification to estimate equation 9. The dependent variable is the categorical subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM, 2 for LEM 
and 3 for OTHER. All 6 specifications are estimating column (5) from Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the 
unemployment variables separately, and correspond to columns (1)-(6) of Table 2.6. The coefficients shown are the average marginal effects of the 
unemployment measures on the probability of the categorical subject outcome variable being equal to LEM. The socioeconomic controls as included in 
specification (5) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression results 
including the socioeconomic controls are available on request from the author. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 





Table 2.14: OTHER Subjects and Local Unemployment (Marginal Effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER 
              
Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr) 0.000965      
 (0.000626)      
Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)  0.00386**     
  (0.00179)     
Growth in Local Youth Unemployment (16-24yr)   0.0313***    
   (0.00843)    
Growth in Local Adult Unemployment (25-49yr)    0.0136   
    (0.00913)   
Aggregate Local Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.00263*  
     (0.00143)  
Growth in Local Aggregate Unemployment (16-49yr)      0.00982*** 
      (0.00238) 
       
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 
       
       
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 6 specifications. All regressions are performed using a multinomial 
logit specification to estimate equation 9. The dependent variable is the categorical subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM, 2 for LEM 
and 3 for OTHER. All 6 specifications are estimating column (8) from Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the 
unemployment variables separately, and correspond to columns (1)-(6) of Table 2.5. The coefficients shown are the average marginal effects of the 
unemployment measures on the probability of the categorical subject outcome variable being equal to OTHER. The socioeconomic controls as included in 
specification (8) of Table 2.4 are included, but the results are supressed here to focus on the effect of the unemployment variables. The regression results 
including the socioeconomic controls are available on request from the author. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 






2.6 Conclusions & Discussion 
This chapter has attempted to establish whether labour market influences have any 
effect on the subject choice of school-leavers in the UK. A linear estimation 
approach was adopted for comparative and computational ease over non-linear 
models, and specifications of subject choice were created for three main subject 
groups, both with and without the effect of unemployment. The effect of 
unemployment was then allowed to be heterogeneous across different types of 
students. The results show that unemployment is an important factor for 
establishing how students decide what subject to study at university, and this 
excludes the impact on the demand for a subject which is not possible to estimate 
with the data used. Two channels were identified for affecting the decision of which 
subject to study: the changing of the opportunity costs of HE, and the changing of 
the expected benefits. These were hypothesised to be the contemporaneous local 
youth unemployment rate averaged over the 12 month period prior to the student’s 
starting date, and the growth in local unemployment rates respectively. 
 
Whilst both of these effects were present in the data and significant in affecting the 
probability of observing a student studying a particular subject type, the sign of 
these effects was of the opposite direction than that was hypothesised. The higher 
was the youth unemployment rate in the local area, the higher the probability of 
observing a student studying a LEM subject, which implies that students who 
experience a lowering of the opportunity cost of studying are more likely to choose 
a subject with higher potential rewards in terms of wages and employment 
probability. This contradicted the original hypothesis, however it implies that 
students may engage in more forward-looking investment behaviour than originally 
proposed.  
 
Furthermore, students who were either female or the most likely to be 
socioeconomically disadvantaged were both more likely to choose STEM subjects, 
conditional on having decided to participate in HE. This further proposes evidence 
that certain students may be aware of their future disadvantages in the labour market 
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(as Delaney et al. (2011) propose), and that this may be an attempt to compensate 
for future labour market disadvantages, especially in the context of rising 
unemployment. Given that low income students may be the most aware of the costs 
of education, they may also be the most aware of the benefits of choosing a degree 
subject with larger graduate wage and employment premia relative to their peers. 
 
However, this analysis is performed under the simplifying assumption that it is the 
average local unemployment rate that students respond to, and signals from either 
the average local unemployment rate for low-skilled workers or high-skilled 
workers do not have an additional, heterogeneous effect. This simplifying 
assumption may be somewhat problematic if it is the case that students from low-
skilled backgrounds respond more to the low-skilled labour market trends rather 
than the average, as it would imply that study choices are motivated by the skill-
heterogeneity in the local unemployment rate. Whilst it is not the focus of this 
chapter, the local labour market signals that university entrants from low-skilled, 
low-income backgrounds respond to in terms of study choices presents an important 
avenue for further research. The findings are also conditional on the student having 
participated in higher education, since the analysis is performed on graduate data. 
 
Nevertheless, the results suggest that some students – particularly those who 
experience significantly high growth in aggregate unemployment and who are not 
from a disadvantaged background – are more likely to study a subject with lower 
graduate employment and wage premia, but that may have a higher chance of 
success and higher degree attainment. This points towards a potential of students 
engaging in risk aversion: an attempt to increase the certainty of obtaining a degree 
but with less rewards. Thus, what is observed is arguably evidence in support of the 
hypothesis of Callender and Jackson (2008). The findings of this research also 
represent an important contribution to the empirical literature, with a longer time 
period of analysis than Wales (2010), and the strategy of comparing subject types 
which allows the impact of local unemployment to be directly comparable between  





‘Disadvantaged’ Students and University Academic Performance 
 
 
“Young people from the top socio-economic quintile group remain … 3.7 
percentage points more likely to graduate with a first or a 2:1 than young people 
from the bottom socio-economic quintile group.” 
(Crawford, 2014a: 20) 
 
 
“In other words, those students from private schools…were much less likely to 
achieve at least a 2:1 compared to equivalently qualified state school pupils, all 
else equal.” 
(Lasselle et al., 2014: 308) 
 
 
3.1       Introduction 
These seemingly contradictory quotes serve to highlight the complex processes that 
determine a student’s undergraduate academic performance at university. Whilst 
Crawford (2014a) highlights the penalty incurred by lower socioeconomic status 
(SES) students in terms of degree attainment, Lasselle et al. (2014) suggest that 
students from private schools115 are less likely to graduate with a 2:1 or above. 
Although 33% of private school students received some means-tested assistance 
                                                          
115 In the UK, primary (aged 4-11) and secondary education (aged 11-18) is provided free by the 
state, or parents may elect to enrol their child in an independent (also known as a private) school 
where parents must pay a tuition fee per school term (there are normally 2 terms to each academic 
year). Private schools in 2011 accounted for roughly 6.5% of the UK school-age population, 
approximately 625,000 pupils (Independent School Council Annual Census 2011). Some students 
are eligible for discounted or free tuition at private schools through means-tested family income 
and/or child performance on entrance examinations. In 2017, the average term tuition fee for 
secondary education was approximately £4,800, and for primary education the per term tuition 
cost was approximately £4,200. If the private schools are boarding schools where pupils reside at 
the school during term time, the average costs are considerably higher - £11,000 and £8,000 per 
term respectively. (Independent School Council Annual Census 2017). 
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with school fees116, the majority of students who attend private school are inherently 
more likely to be from a family of higher socioeconomic status and income 
background. The aim of this chapter is to empirically test whether students with 
socioeconomic disadvantages are more, less or no more likely to obtain the best 
degree outcomes, all other things being equal. 
 
Whilst access to university study is crucial for social mobility, the extent of success 
of a student’s engagement with higher education (HE) is not solely determined by 
participation alone. Previous research has found that, 1) students from poorer 
backgrounds are inherently less-inclined to participate in undergraduate study117, 
and 2) even if they do participate, risk aversion may lead to sub-optimal course 
choices at university118, and 3) moreover students from poorer backgrounds are 
more likely to drop-out of university study119; however there is little attention paid 
to the effects of student’s socioeconomic backgrounds on university performance. 
The work of Lasselle et al. (2014) is arguably the closest to the aims of this research, 
as they investigate whether overall school performance is useful for predicting a 
student’s university attainment. In researching this question, they employ a non-
linear regression model with a binary dependent variable of degree success, 
explained by pre-university attainment, and socioeconomic controls. This research 
significantly improves upon the existing literature by using a much more 
comprehensive research design and by using a rich dataset for analysis.  
 
One of the major improvements over the work of Lasselle et al. (2014) is that this 
analysis will be performed for using data containing the entire population of 
students who started their undergraduate studies during the academic years 2003/04 
and 2007/08. Consequently, not only does this offer two additional cohorts of data 
compared to Lasselle et al (2014), but the effects of socioeconomic disadvantage 
on university academic attainment are estimated across all Higher Education 
                                                          
116 Independent Schools Council Annual Report 2017, Figures 26 & 28. 
117 e.g. Chowdry et al. (2013). 
118 See section 2.2.1 of this thesis for further discussion. 
119 e.g. Powdthavee & Vignoles (2009); Johnes & McNabb (2004). 
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Institutions (HEIs) throughout the United Kingdom (UK). This is opposed to the 
work of Lasselle et al. (2014) who focus only on three cohorts totalling 1,300 
students from one institution – the University of St. Andrews. Furthermore, the data 
that is used in this analysis contains detailed socioeconomic indicators such as 
disability status, gender, age, ethnicity, whether the student has a parent or guardian 
with university education. The only socioeconomic data used in Lasselle et al. 
(2014) are age and gender. Finally, this research design controls for significant 
variation in degree attainment by subject by using subject fixed effects with 20 
subject categories, whereas Lasselle et al. (2014) only control for faculty fixed 
effects with 3 categories. 
 
The results show that students that experience socioeconomic disadvantages before 
entering HE are less likely to obtain a good degree at university, controlling for 
observable determinants of degree success and conditional on attainment pre-
university. The results further show that this is predominantly the case, and larger 
in magnitude for students who enter HE with the lowest levels of pre-university 
attainment. Furthermore, students with the most significant socioeconomic 
disadvantages are found to outperform their peers in terms of university attainment. 
This suggests that for those students who are the most disadvantaged, their level of 
pre-university attainment is an imperfect indicator of true ability at university. The 
results of this research therefore find evidence strongly in favour of the use of 
contextual admissions to HE, where the decision to offer a prospective student entry 
onto a course depends on their school grades as well as their socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.1 outlines the determinants of degree 
outcomes, as well as presenting hypotheses for why disadvantaged may affect a 
student’s university attainment; section 3.2 discusses the institutional aspects of 
measuring widening participation and to what extent degree outcomes matter for 
social mobility; section 3.3 presents an overview of the data and identification 
strategy; section 3.4 outlines the methodological considerations and approaches; 
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section 3.5 presents the results, and section 3.6 concludes with some discussion of 
the results in the context of policy implications. 
 
3.1.1  Factors Affecting Degree Outcomes 
Before presenting an overview of how socioeconomic factors may affect academic 
performance at university, it is useful to consider perhaps the more obvious factors 
that may affect degree attainment. It is a relatively robust finding that academic 
performance at school or college is a significant predictor of academic performance 
at university. It therefore follows, that all things being equal, students with higher 
pre-university attainment should be expected to obtain better degree outcomes. A 
range of studies have either researched the effect of pre-university attainment on 
degree outcomes directly, or as part of an investigation of other determinants of 
degree success. In particular, Smith and Naylor (2001a) use UK data from the 1993 
cohort of university leavers and find that a 1-grade increase in the A-Level120 grade 
of a student increases the probability of obtaining a ‘good’121 degree (2:1 or above) 
by 9 percentage points. Similarly positive effects of pre-university scores on degree 
outcomes are found in a descriptive study by HEFCE (2014), where 80% of 
students who obtain AAB122 at A-Level obtain a 2:1 or above, compared to only 
50% who enter university with CCC or below.  
 
In addition to this finding being confirmed in studies estimating the determinants 
of degree outcomes (Ardila, 2001; Naylor and Smith, 2004; Koh & Koh, 1999), 
both McNabb et al. (2002) and Barrow et al. (2009) find pre-university education 
scores as a positive determinant of higher degree outcomes. Naylor and Smith 
(2004) in particular find that for Economics graduates in the UK who commenced 
                                                          
120 An outline of the UK higher education system and entrance qualifications can be found in the 
Introduction to this thesis. In this chapter, see also section 3.2. 
121 A ‘good’ degree is widely acknowledged as being an upper second class honours or first. See 
section 3.2 of this chapter. 
122 During the period of analysis, A-Level grades ranged from A to E, where A=80% or above, 
B=70%, C=60%, D=50%, E=40%. For international comparisons, the A-Level is similar to the 
International Baccalaureate (IB) and Advanced Placement (AP) in the United States. As 
previously outlined, students in England and Wales typically apply to university having completed 
3 full A-Level qualifications, hence the three letter grade reporting (e.g. AAB, CCC). 
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their study between 1984/85 and 1992/93, a 1 unit grade increase in a student’s A-
Level results increases the probability of obtaining a good degree by 2 percentage 
points, approximately a 4% increase relative to the mean.123 A similar finding is 
reported by Powdthavee and Vignoles (2009) in estimating the effect of 
socioeconomic background on university attrition rates. However, despite this 
seemingly robust finding, there is some evidence (Boyle et al., 2002; Gist et al., 
1996; Bartlett et al., 1993) to suggest that at the individual subject and course level, 
pre-university attainment in certain school or college subjects does not significantly 
influence the degree outcome in a particular subject. 
 
Gender is also robustly found as a determinant of degree outcomes, where females 
are more likely to obtain a 2:1 or above (Barrow et al., 2009; Smith & Naylor, 
2001a; HEFCE, 2014). However, McNabb et al. (2002) find that whilst females are 
more likely to obtain a 2:1 or above, females are less likely than their male 
counterparts to receive a 1st class degree. Gender may influence degree outcomes 
through the choice of subjects, gender-specific differences in other determinants of 
degree outcomes, or through biological differences. The latter is explored by 
Mellanby et al. (2000) who suggest the gender gap in degree outcomes may be 
explained by biological differences in educational and emotional intelligence. 
However, this may be further confounded by socioeconomic differences if female 
students are expected to be interested in certain subjects, and this expectation 
becomes self-fulfilling. 
 
Age and ethnicity are also found to be significant in modelling degree outcomes. It 
is consistently found that ethnic minorities perform worse than ‘White British’ 
students ceteris paribus (Connor et al., 2004; Barrow et al., 2009; HEFCE, 2010; 
2015b), even when allowing for the lower pre-university attainment of ethnic 
minorities (Broecke & Nicholls, 2007). Age, however, has mixed evidence in the 
                                                          
123 As will be discussed in section 3.4.3, although this analysis uses tariff scores to measure pre-
university attainment, they will be rescaled such that a 1 unit increase in the tariff score is equal to 
a 1 grade change at A-Level. 
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empirical literature. Whilst some research identifies older students as being more 
likely to obtain better degree outcomes (HEFCE, 2015b; Smithers & Griffin, 1986; 
Osborne et al., 1997), other studies show that – similar to the effect of pre-university 
attainment – there may be heterogeneous effects of age. Both Bartlett et al. (1993) 
and Koh and Koh (1999) for example find that older students are less likely to 
obtain a 2:1 or above for accountancy degrees, which gives additional evidence to 
the existence of subject-specific differences in the determinants of degree 
outcomes.  
 
Two further factors that have been found to affect degree outcomes are income 
background and school quality. HEFCE (2014; 2015a) show that, conditional on 
pre-university attainment, students from lower income backgrounds or from regions 
with the lowest HE participation obtain significantly poorer degree outcomes.124 
This effect is also found based on parental occupation (Blundell et al., 2000; 
McNabb et al., 2002), where in particular Smith and Naylor (2001a) estimate that 
‘poorer’ students are 13-15 percentage points less likely to obtain a 2:1 or above. 
Income background is potentially correlated with school quality, and almost 
certainly correlated with whether a student attends an independent or private school. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence of school quality and type on degree outcomes 
(Eide & Showalter, 1998; Dearden et al., 2002) and conditional on students’ pre-
university attainment, students from independent and private schools are in fact less 
likely to obtain a 2:1 or above compared to state school students (HEFCE, 2014; 
Crawford, 2014b). As Smith and Naylor (2001a) note after finding the same effect, 
two students who have the same pre-university attainment but from state and private 
schools are likely to be drawn from different ability distributions. 
 
Finally, considerations should also be paid to modes of study (part time students 
are less likely to get a 2:1 or above (HEFCE, 2015b)), disability status (disabled 
students are less likely to get a 2:1 or above (HEFCE, 2013; 2015b)), and the choice 
                                                          
124 See Murphy et al. (2017) for a historical overview of this relationship in England. 
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of subjects and universities (Crawford, 2014a) which may all have a deterministic 
impact on a student’s degree outcome. Ultimately the determinants of degree 
outcomes contain a significant amount of overlap, which has implications for 
empirical estimation. 
 
3.1.2  Why a Disadvantaged Background May (Not) Affect Degree Outcomes 
Two students, A and B, are about to enter higher education in the same year and 
have the same level of pre-university attainment,125 who choose to go to the same 
university to study the same degree course, and are the same age, gender, ethnicity 
and nationality. The research question of interest is: if student A has a 
disadvantaged background relative to student B, does this have a zero, a positive, 
or a negative effect on student A’s degree outcome, all else being equal? A student 
from a potentially disadvantaged background will be hereafter classed as a student 
from the lower end of the socioeconomic classification126, whilst an additional 
indicator for being potentially disadvantaged that will be used is a student who does 
not have a parent or guardian with university-level education.127 
 
It is inherently assumed that coming from a disadvantaged background should not 
have a further penalty on, or benefit for, degree outcomes. However this may not 
be the case, especially if students from disadvantaged backgrounds do not have the 
same access to high quality institutions as higher SES students.128 Nevertheless, 
whilst students who come from disadvantaged backgrounds tend to have a higher 
concentration of the characteristics outlined in the previous section that have a 
negative impact on university attainment, if these compounded effects are taken 
                                                          
125 Ideally we would like to be able to say the exact same grades in the same subject using the 
same pre-university qualification, however this is not possible in the data. 
126 See section 3.3.2 for a full identification. 
127 Parental education level is a widely-used measure of socioeconomic status, due to the 
correlation between education level and household income (see for example, the effect of 
schooling on earnings; Devereux and Hart, 2010), and due to the intergenerational transmission of 
human capital (e.g. Chevalier, 2003; Delaney et al., 2011). Thus a student who is both classed as 
being low SES and is known to not have a parent with university level education is potentially the 
most socioeconomically disadvantaged. 
128 In particular, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have been criticised for failing to admit 
sufficient students from the poorest households. (See Adams (2017) for an example). 
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into account, simply coming from a poorer household in income terms should not 
have any deterministic effect on that student’s degree classification, all else being 
equal. If this is not the case, then the returns to a university degree not only depend 
on the subject, the university, and the classification, but also on the social and 
familial characteristics of the student who obtains the degree. University would not 
therefore be a ‘levelling of the playing field’129 with respect to the potential for 
academic achievement, conditional on ability. 
 
Alternatively, it may be the case that – using the two exemplar students above – 
student A has attained the same pre-school qualifications and grades, and is 
attending the same university degree course, having overcome more barriers to 
study than student B due to the disadvantaged background of the student. Such 
barriers may include financial hardship and lower historical rates of HE 
participation (both familial and spatially). The students that do overcome those 
barriers may be more likely to succeed in their degree studies, conditional on 
attainment, since the value of the returns to the degree relative to their familial 
socioeconomic characteristics may elicit more effort and a determination to 
succeed. This may especially be the case if for those students, degree success is 
perceived to be fundamental to social mobility. Ultimately, for a low SES student 
to achieve a better degree outcome as a high SES student conditional on the same 
pre-university attainment, they need to be either: 1) of higher ability such that 
previous attainment is not a true reflection of ability and thus is a poor predictor of 
future attainment; or 2) the low SES student must have worked harder for the same 
grade, such that ability may be comparable, but unobserved components related to 
ability such as motivation and determination are higher for the low SES student.  
 
If there is a positive effect between socioeconomic background alone and degree 
outcomes, we should expect students from poorer backgrounds to be more likely to 
                                                          
129 If universities provide sufficient support, student funding schemes are such that poorer students 
are not financially constrained in attending university, and students are proactive in seeking 
support where necessary, university attainment should be a reflection on ability and effort, rather 
than socioeconomic disadvantage. 
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attain a 2:1 or 1st in the degree studies, after controlling for all other determinants 
of degree classification. This scenario would support the finding that students from 
worse-performing schools are more likely to graduate with a good degree than those 
from better-performing schools, conditional on attainment130; which may reflect 
that students from disadvantaged backgrounds hold more potential than students 
from better-performing or private/independent schools (Crawford, 2014b). This 
also alludes to the effect of coming from a private school compared to a state school 
in Smith and Naylor (2001a). If disadvantaged students are more likely to obtain a 
2:1 or above conditional on attainment and controlling for other factors, this would 
add weight to the argument in favour of contextual admissions policies131 as noted 
by Crawford (2014b), and as used in practice as of September 2017 by the 
Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, St. Andrews, Southampton, Manchester, 
Edinburgh, Strathclyde, Newcastle, Sheffield and Warwick.132 
 
The final scenario is that those barriers experienced by students pre-university 
continue to affect the student whilst studying for their degree. In the case of 
financial hardship, this may present a barrier to the student in practical terms, by 
making the purchase of course materials such as textbooks or paying for university 
accommodation more difficult, which may impact on university attainment. 
Furthermore, since students who are from the lower socioeconomic distribution are 
more likely to be financially constrained or affected by poor financial well-being 
whilst at university (Pennell & West, 2005; Callender, 2003), students may engage 
                                                          
130 This finding by Crawford (2014a), which was also confirmed in HEFCE (2014), is further 
supported by the finding by both authors show evidence of students from worse-performing 
schools are less likely to drop out than better-performing schools. 
131 A contextual admissions policy is whereby a student’s application to a university depends on 
prior academic achievement, a personal statement, as well as socioeconomic factors, school 
characteristics and regional indicators. A university’s admissions service may use this contextual 
information to offer a place of study with lower academic entry requirements, to target students 
who would benefit from university as part of widening access. For more information, see: 
https://www.ucas.com/advisers/guides-and-resources/adviser-news/news/contextualised-
admissions-and-what-it-means-your-students 
132 It is unclear precisely which universities operate a contextual admissions policy and to what 
extent, but the practice is becoming more common. With the exception of Imperial College 
London and Lancaster University, all of the top ten universities (as ranked by The Guardian 
University Guide 2018) declare the use of contextual admissions. 
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in part time work whilst at university which although may relieve financial pressure 
may constrain the amount of time or effort available for studying towards 
assessments. This may be further exacerbated by the extent of any risk aversion to 
engaging in student loans, since students from poorer backgrounds are more likely 
to be more averse to debt (Pennell & West, 2005). However, the potentially negative 
effect of coming from a disadvantaged background on degree outcomes is not 
necessarily limited to financial causes. As HEFCE (2015a) remarks, the issues and 
challenges that university students face are complex and varied, thus any degree 
attainment must require some amount of coping skills, both academically and 
practically. If students from disadvantaged backgrounds have fewer of these coping 
skills133, then this may inhibit the potential for degree success. De Vries and 
Rentfrow (2016) find that across various personality measures, ‘better’134 
personality traits are more likely to be found in students from the higher 
socioeconomic groups. Furthermore, since ‘better’ personality traits are linked to 
better degree outcomes (Parker et al., 2003; Lenton, 2014), this indicates that 
students from lower socioeconomic groups may be inhibited in their studies relative 
to higher socioeconomic groups, due to personality traits. This finding is also shown 
by Poropat (2009) who finds that especially conscientiousness has a positive effect 
on educational outcomes. If such a student encounters difficulties in their studies, 
this may compound the likelihood for degree success, since students from the higher 
socioeconomic distribution are relatively more likely to seek help and advice from 
academic staff (McNabb et al., 2002). 
 
 
3.1.3 Other Confounding Issues 
Whilst socioeconomic factors may affect degree outcomes, it is unlikely that it is 
the sole causal effect on a student’s engagement with HE. One significant 
                                                          
133 An alternative hypothesis is that students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds may possess 
equally good or even greater coping skills than their higher socioeconomic background peers 
through greater determination and work ethic, given that lower SES students may have 
encountered more obstacles to overcome in obtaining the necessary grades for university entry. 
This would therefore mitigate the effect of socioeconomic disadvantage on degree outcomes. 
134 These were found to be extroversion, conscientiousness and openness. 
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relationship is that between socioeconomic background and student attrition. 
Powdthavee and Vignoles (2009) find that the drop-out rate is significantly higher 
for students from lower income backgrounds, even when controlling for other 
possible influences on the rate of attrition. Johnes and McNabb (2004) also find this 
effect on the likelihood of drop out, which is strictly monotonic throughout the 
socioeconomic distribution. Although Crawford (2014a) also finds this effect, it is 
suggested that this effect may be somewhat explained by differences in human 
capital. Nevertheless, controlling for the rate of attrition is necessary in the 
identification of the effect of interest, especially since Smith and Naylor (2001a) 
propose that this link between socioeconomic background and drop out explains at 
least in part their finding of socioeconomic background negatively affecting degree 
classification135. 
 
Controlling for student attrition is relatively simple, but controlling for the effect of 
socioeconomic background on the probability of applying to university is more 
complex. It is a robust finding that students from poorer or otherwise disadvantaged 
backgrounds are significantly less likely to go to university (Blanden & MacMillan, 
2014; Galindo-Rueda et al., 2004; Gayle et al., 2002); with the poorest quintile of 
students approximately 45 percentage points less likely to attend university than the 
richest quintile (Chowdry et al., 2013). Further to this, there is also a wide body of 
evidence to show a significant link between socioeconomic status and subject 
choice, both at the pre-university and degree subject level (Davies et al., 2008; 
Anders, 2012; Codiroli McMaster, 2017). Hence it is important to consider that any 
investigation into the impact of socioeconomic background on degree outcomes 




                                                          
135 As the outcome variable is a student’s final degree classification, and the only degree 




3.2       Institutional Setting 
Traditional entry into undergraduate university study in the UK occurs at age 18 
where school-leavers (from colleges, schools or ‘sixth form136’) apply through the 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) system in January to up to 
five different courses at any university they wish. Universities receive these 
applications and decide, based on obtained and projected grades as well as 
references and a personal statement, whether to offer a place of study in September 
of the same year. Once attending a university, students will spend between 3-4 years 
typically to complete their studies, the latter 2 years being counted towards the 
student’s overall degree classification. Whilst each individual university may use a 
slightly different metric or algorithm for calculating overall degree classification, 
at the undergraduate level a score of 70% overall is a 1st class degree, 60-69% a 2:1, 
50-59% is a 2:2, and 40-49% is a 3rd class.  
 
3.2.1  The Importance of Degree Class 
As a higher degree class reflects better academic achievement, it is signal of a 
quality of graduate, and thus positively correlated with graduate earnings as 
expected (eg. Naylor et al., 2007). Moreover, obtaining a 1st class degree increases 
the probability of working in a high wage job by 13 percentage points (Feng & 
Graetz, 2013), as well as carrying a 9-13% increase in earnings compared to a 2:1 








                                                          
136 Sixth form refers to the final stages of secondary education which is most commonly takes 
place in a traditional schooling structure and lasts two years. It is also known as Years 12 and 13 
or Lower and Upper Sixth (in England, Northern Ireland and Wales). In Scotland, Sixth Form is 
usually known as Sixth Year, or S6, which only lasts one year. 
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As seen from Figure 3.1137, there has been a continual and consistent increased in 
the proportion of ‘good ‘degrees being awarded, especially driven by the increase 
in 1st class degrees. As a result of the increasing proportion of good degrees 
awarded, and a significant increase in HE participation, in 2012 over 75% of 
graduate vacancies required at least a 2:1, compared to 52% in 2004.138 
 
3.2.2  Widening Participation 
Whilst overall participation in HE has steadily increased, this increase must also be 
the case for disadvantaged students to allow social mobility. Figure 3.2 shows that 
participation by students from the lowest quintile of participation areas (POLAR 
                                                          
137 Note that the percentage of 1st degrees awarded is a subset of the percentage of 2:1 or above, 
hence the sum of all three categories do not sum to 100%.  
138 See the Introduction to this thesis for further discussion on the trends of the participation in 

















Qualifications Obtained, By Starting Cohort
% 2:2 or below % 2:1 or above % 1st class
148 
 
Q1139) has increased from around 17% to over 25%, which compared to the 
relatively stable participation rate for the most advantaged students (Q5), indicates 
the participation gap is reducing. Specifically the gap has reduced from 40 
percentage points to 35 percentage points, which is a 17.5% decrease in 7 years. 
 
Figure 3.2: Participation Rate in Higher Education (England), by Cohort & POLAR 
Quintile 
 
Source: BIS, UCAS 
 
                                                          
139 POLAR is a classification metric for determining whether a student lives in an advantaged area 
(where there is high rates of participation in higher education) or a disadvantaged area (where 
participation in higher education is low). The classification is performed at the student’s local area 
or ward, and each ward is designated a number ranging from the lowest quintile of participation 
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Figure 3.3: Participation Rate in Higher Education (England), by Cohort & Quintile 
for Higher Tariff Institutions140 
 
 
However, as already noted, the returns to a degree will also depend on the subject 
studied and the university attended, and as seen from Figure 3.3, there has been no 
significant increase in the participation rate for students from the most 
disadvantaged quintile who are attending the more elite universities – here denoted 
by institutions with a higher than average entry requirement (in terms of pre-
university schooling grades) across all subjects. This suggests that although the 
participation gap may be closing, it may not be reflected in terms of returns to a 
degree and hence social mobility. Finally, as HEFCE (2014) show in Figure 3.4, 
even when students are participating in HE, conditional on pre-university entry 
grades, students from the more disadvantaged areas do consistently worse than the 
                                                          
140 These are the institutions as having an average tariff entry requirement greater than the average. 
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most advantaged quintile in terms of degree success, apart from those at the lowest 
part of the entry grades distribution. It is therefore of significant interest to estimate 
the impact of a disadvantaged background on degree success, conditional on other 
factors that may determine degree outcomes, to evaluate whether the effect in 
Figure 3.4 exists with an econometric specification of degree attainment. 
 
Figure 3.4: Qualifications Obtained, by IDACI141 Quintile (2007/08 Cohort) 
 




                                                          
141 The Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) is a measure of socioeconomic 
depravity at the local level. This measure is not specifically targeted at applications to higher 
education, unlike POLAR. The IDACI score reflects the proportion of children aged 15 or below 
who are income deprived, and a score is assigned in the [0,1] interval. The upper quintile (Q5) is 
the least income deprived, and the lower quintile (Q1) is the most income deprived. However, 




3.3.1  HESA Data 
The data used is the 2005/06 to 2009/10 destinations and leavers HESA dataset that 
is outlined previously in Chapter 1. The same definitions of low income according 
to socioeconomic codes created from parental occupation classification are used 
here, as well as the set of student characteristics that can be used to control for the 
determinants of degree outcomes outlined in section 3.1.1. In addition, where a UK 
domiciled student applied via UCAS for their first undergraduate degree, their tariff 
score is known and is used to control for students with similar levels of pre-
university academic attainment. The classification of a student’s socioeconomic 
status and whether a student is known to not have a parent with university 
education142, will be used as measures of a disadvantaged background. A student’s 
degree classification is also known, and will be used to create either an ordered or 
binary indicator of degree success. 
 
3.3.2 Identification Strategy 
The original dataset has over 3.6 million observations, but those include 
postgraduate and part-time students, and student engagements with missing 
observations for key variables. Since observations for tariff score are only for those 
students who apply through UCAS for their first degree, only students who are 
studying for their first undergraduate degree, with a known tariff score at a non-
vocational143 university are selected. As the outcome variable is degree 
classification, only those students with a pass grade are selected. In practice, this is 
                                                          
142 An alternative strategy that could be used is to capture additional socioeconomic disadvantage 
using a student’s ethnicity, and thus compare students classified as higher SES and whose 
ethnicity is White, with students classified as lower SES and whose ethnicity is Black or Asian 
(potentially the most disadvantaged). This approach would lead to a significantly increased sample 
size (N= approximately 285,000), however the mechanisms for ethnicity affecting degree 
outcomes are potentially much more complex and confounded compared to using parental 
education as an indicator of potential socioeconomic disadvantage. Nevertheless, similar effects 
are found when using ethnicity as an additional SES measure as those reported here using parental 
education. Results are available on request. 
143 This is the same specification of universities as used in Chapter 1, in accordance with the 




dropping all observations with an unclassified or a ‘Further Education’ 
classification to their university award.144 Furthermore, since socioeconomic status 
is required, only students with a known socioeconomic code are kept for analysis, 
and additionally only students who study full time are retained. Whilst the variable 
‘Educated Parent’ – to denote whether a student has a parent with previous 
university education – exists for all students, it is self-reported by the student on 
application to UCAS, and hence is subject to missing or unknown observations for 
some students. Therefore, two indicator variables are created, to denote whether a 
student either is known to have a parent with university education, or is known to 
not have a parent with university education. Finally, to concentrate the analysis on 
UK-domiciled school leavers who began their studies between September 2002 and 
September 2007, no exchange student observations are kept, and only students who 
are aged between 17 and 19 are kept.145 The final dataset contains almost 70,000146 
students, and Table 3.1 below presents the summary statistics for the total sample 
created by the identification strategy outlined above, and by measures of a 
disadvantaged background. As expected, the mean tariff score is significantly 
higher amongst those students from either higher socioeconomic backgrounds, or 
with parental university education. Additionally, both the ordered degree class 
variable and the degree success indicator show that the most advantaged students 
tend to perform better in terms of overall university attainment. 
 
  
                                                          
144 Although medical degrees are traditionally unclassified, they are excluded from the analysis in 
the interest of consistency of identifying degree attainment within the normal academic degree 
classification structure. 
145 From the cropped dataset outlined in Appendix A, Table A3, approximately 430,000 
observations are dropped due to missing, unknown or unclassified tariff scores. In addition, 
approximately 50,000 observations are further removed due to the student’s degree classification 
being below a 3rd or unclassified, and a further 25,000 students are removed if they are aged 20 or 
above at the beginning of their degree studies. Finally, since the student’s educated parent status is 
required for the analysis, only students known to either have or known to either not have a parent 
or guardian with higher educations are kept – approximately 190,000 students are removed from 
the analysis. 
146 Whilst the size of the dataset is not as large as it would have been without the missing 
observations for the parental education variable, the 70,000 student observations used in this 
analysis is still a significant improvement over the 1,200 students used by Lasselle et al. (2014). 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 












Ordered Degree Class 2.81 2.73 2.84 2.76 2.86 
 (0.693) (0.705) (0.686) (0.695) (0.688) 
Degree Success = 1 0.71 0.66 0.73 0.68 0.74 
 (0.452) (0.474) (0.442) (0.466) (0.437) 
Tariff Score 349.79 316.30 361.69 330.28 366.61 
 (118.5) (114.7) (117.6) (115.7) (118.4) 
Age 18.30 18.29 18.30 18.28 18.32 
 (0.475) (0.473) (0.476) (0.465) (0.484) 
Low Income = 1 0.26 - - 0.42 0.13 
 (0.440) - - (0.494) (0.332) 
Educated Parent = 1 0.54 0.26 0.64 - - 
 (0.499) (0.438) (0.481) - - 
No Educated Parent = 1 0.46 0.74 0.36 - - 
 (0.499) (0.438) (0.481) - - 
White = 1 0.83 0.75 0.86 0.82 0.83 
 (0.376) (0.433) (0.349) (0.380) (0.372) 
Female = 1 0.59 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.57 
 (0.492) (0.484) (0.494) (0.488) (0.495) 
British = 1 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 (0.173) (0.193) (0.165) (0.161) (0.183) 
Disabled = 1 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 
 (0.270) (0.253) (0.276) (0.251) (0.285) 
Local = 1 0.16 0.25 0.13 0.21 0.12 
 (0.368) (0.433) (0.337) (0.406) (0.327) 
Live at Home = 1 0.20 0.31 0.17 0.26 0.16 
 (0.404) (0.464) (0.372) (0.439) (0.363) 
STEM = 1 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 
 (0.384) (0.379) (0.386) (0.374) (0.392) 
Russell Group = 1 0.41 0.27 0.46 0.33 0.48 
 (0.491) (0.446) (0.498) (0.469) (0.500) 
Oxbridge = 1 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 
 (0.163) (0.104) (0.179) (0.0945) (0.203) 
N 67045 17580 49465 31050 35995 
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Mean coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 
5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. 
Ordered Degree Class is ordered such that higher values correspond to better outcomes. Hence, 1=3rd, 2=2:2, 
3=2:1, and 4=1st. Degree Success is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s degree classification 
was either 2:1 or 1st. 
Low Income is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s socioeconomic code is 4-8. 
Educated Parent is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student declares that they have at least 1 parent 
with university education. No Educated Parent is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student declares 
that neither parent has university education. 
White is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s ethnicity is coded as being white. 
Female and British are binary variables that take the value 1 if the student’s gender and nationality are declared 
as female and British respectively. 
Disabled is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student has declared that they have a known disability. 
Local is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student attends a university within 20km in Euclidean 
space from their domiciled postcode where the student resided at the time of making the application through 
UCAS. 
Live at Home is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the student is known to be living at home whilst 
undertaking their university study. 
STEM is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subject studied is classified as being a STEM subject in 
accordance with the classification table in Appendix B, Table B2. 
Russell Group is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the university the student attended is classified as a 
Russell Group university (see Appendix A, Table A1). Furthermore, Oxbridge is a binary variable that takes 






3.4  Methodology 
As the outcome variable is discrete, a combination of nonlinear estimation 
strategies are considered, including ordered and binary models. Since a student’s 
degree classification has a potential of four, ordered outcomes147, it is ordered 
nonlinear estimation that is first considered. A binary method however, is 
computationally simpler and allows for a direct comparison between ‘success/fail’ 
scenarios, thus the approach and the justification for its adoption and appropriate 
use is also outlined. 
 
Irrespective of whether degree outcomes are examined from a success/fail 
approach, or whether they are examined in their original ordered classifications, we 
are interested in estimating the probability that the observed outcome (𝑦𝑖) takes a 
particular discrete value, given a vector of explanatory variables: 
                                                          
147 Specifically the analysis considers only the degree outcomes of: 1st, 2:1, 2:2, and 3rd class. 









𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}  in the case of ordered degree outcomes, or: 
𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}  in the case of using the success/fail approach 
 
This could be calculated using OLS, which with a binary dependent variable 
becomes the linear probability model (LPM): 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽   (11) 
which is the case as: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽   (12) 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝑥𝑖) = 1 − (𝑥𝑖





′𝛽   (14) 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖] + (𝑦 − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖]) = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 +   (15) 
 
However, the LPM does not constrain the predicted probabilities (𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) to the 













Thus, to correctly estimate either the binary or the ordered model where the 
predicted probabilities are constrained to the [0,1] interval, (following Greene, 
2003) we can instead assume that: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)   (18) 
 
where F is some nonlinear function that satisfies the boundary condition. If F is 
specifically assumed to be the logistic cumulative density function (Λ), then we 








′𝛽)   (19) 
 
where the log likelihood of the logit model is: 
 
ℓ(𝛽) = ∑ ln𝑦𝑖=1 Λ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) + ∑ ln𝑦𝑖=0 (1 − Λ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽))  (20) 
 
Alternatively, if we assumed a normal distribution of the error term instead of the 
logistic, and hence use the normal cumulative density function then we obtain the 
probit model: 
 





′𝛽)  (21) 
 
where the log likelihood of the probit model is: 
 
ℓ(𝛽) = ∑ ln𝑦𝑖=1 Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) + ∑ ln𝑦𝑖=0 (1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽))  (22) 
 
In either case, the globally concave log likelihood function is maximised using 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation, which sets the score function of the log 
likelihood function equal to zero, and iteratively converges on the estimate of β, ?̂? 
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that makes the observations in the data the most likely to be observed. The process 
of maximising the likelihood is akin to that of minimising the residual sum of 
squares in OLS. 
 
Moreover, whilst we observe the discrete outcomes in either the binary or ordered 
case, it is likely that these outcomes are themselves a function of some underlying, 
continuous, but unobservable regression. The dependent variable can therefore be 
split into an observed (𝑦𝑖) and a latent, unobserved variable (𝑦𝑖*) that determines 




′𝛽 +   we observe:        𝑦𝑖 = {
1  𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 





3.4.1 Ordered Logit 
If the discrete outcomes are not dichotomous, estimation of logit or probit is usually 
extended into multinomial regression design, but as the degree outcomes are ordinal 
there is a relationship between the dependent variable’s categories. Such ordinal 
information would not be taken into account by a multinomial model (i.e. a 2:2 vs 
2:1 outcome comparison would be treated the same as a 2:2 vs 1st outcome), hence 
an ordered model must be used. We assume that there is still a latent outcome 








  0  𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼1            
1  𝑖𝑓 𝛼1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼2
2  𝑖𝑓 𝛼2 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼3
⋮
 𝐽  𝑖𝑓  𝛼𝐽−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗       
   (24) 
 








  3𝑟𝑑  𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼1            
 2: 2  𝑖𝑓  𝛼1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼2
 2: 1  𝑖𝑓  𝛼2 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼3
 1𝑠𝑡  𝑖𝑓  𝛼3 < 𝑦𝑖
∗            
  (25) 
 
where the J-1 threshold parameters (α) are estimated using ML in conjunction with 
obtaining ?̂?. Assuming the logit form of the cumulative probability density 
function, following Wooldridge (2011) we can estimate each of the probabilities 
that the degree classification will take one of the possible categories: 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 3𝑟𝑑|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼1|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + ≤ 𝛼1|𝑥𝑖) = Λ(𝛼1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 2: 2|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝛼1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼2|𝑥𝑖) = Λ(𝛼2 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) − Λ(𝛼1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)      
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 2: 1|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝛼2 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼3|𝑥𝑖) = Λ(𝛼3 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) − Λ(𝛼2 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)      
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 1𝑠𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖
∗ > 𝛼3|𝑥𝑖) = 1 − Λ(𝛼3 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)                                       
(26) 
 
As there are four possible categories of the dependent variable, there are 3 threshold 
parameters to be estimated. In the binary case considered in section 3.4.2, J=1 and 
hence we arrive back at the binary logit model. The ordered model is estimated 
using the ML method, where the log likelihood function to be maximised is:  
 
ℓ(𝛼, 𝛽) = 1[𝑦𝑖 = 3𝑟𝑑 ]𝑙𝑜𝑔[Λ(𝛼1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)]
+ 1[𝑦𝑖 = 2: 2 ]𝑙𝑜𝑔[Λ(𝛼2 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) − Λ(𝛼1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)]
+ 1[𝑦𝑖 = 2: 1 ]𝑙𝑜𝑔[Λ(𝛼3 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) − Λ(𝛼2 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)]




which is similar to the approach used by Barrow et al. (2009). However, just like 
the binary model considered in the proceeding section, although the assumption of 
a particular probability distribution of the error term negates the boundary 
assumption violation, the coefficients reported by any logit or probit model 
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(whether binary, multinomial or ordered) are not readily interpretive. Initially, the 
coefficients estimated by the ordered logit model are not marginal effects, but 
ordered log-odds. Whilst the sign and significance of the coefficient can be 
interpreted, a positive significant coefficient only indicates that the explanatory 
variable has a significant and positive effect on the dependent variable, averaged 
across all possible outcome categories in an ordinal fashion. Thus, the actual 
marginal effect of 𝑥𝑖 on 𝑦𝑖 is not only non-constant across the distribution of 
individual observations (unlike OLS), but it also non-constant across the ordered 
outcomes. Where there are 4 ordered categories of the outcome variable, there will 
be a marginal effect for each category. Hence, the marginal effect of 𝑥𝑖 on 𝑦𝑖 where 




= {𝐹′(𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) − 𝐹′(𝛼𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)}𝛽  (28) 
 
Where marginal effects are reported for each outcome category, they are the 
average marginal effects (AMEs), where the marginal effect is computed as above 
for all individuals within an outcome category, and averaged. Alternatives to using 
AMEs are the marginal effects at a representative value (MERs) and marginal 
effects at the mean (MEMs). Arguably AMEs may be more representative of the 
population of observations within a category however, since MEMs and MERs do 
not take into account each individual’s marginal effects across the entire 
distribution. 
 
3.4.2 Binary Estimation of an Ordered Variable 
The ordered model outlined in the previous section may be converted into a binary 
logit model if only 1 threshold parameter is required – i.e. the discrete dependent 
variable is binary. This may be useful if the outcome variable itself is at least to 
some extent inherently dichotomous, which may be the case given that graduate 
employment vacancies and schemes regularly require at least a 2:1 at degree level. 
Dichotomisation of a continuous variable however generally leads to a loss of 
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statistical inference and allows for the possibility of missed effects in the 
aggregation process (Royston et al, 2006). Nevertheless, there may be some 
situations where it is applicable due to the nature of the research design, and 
especially when the dependent variable is discontinuous. In the case of degree 
outcomes, it has already been outlined that the 4 ordered discrete outcomes are 
considered, so any process of dichotomisation would be to collapse 4 categories 
into 2 (success/fail). In addition to the contextual arguments for considering a 
degree success as 2:1 or above, and a fail as 2:2 and below, it is common to consider 
degree outcomes in such a fashion (e.g. Lasselle et al, 2014; Crawford, 2014a; 
Smith and Naylor, 2001a). 
 
Whilst there is some loss of inference by classifying 2:1 and 1st as the same 
category, there is already a degree of lost inference and imprecision in the ordered 
outcomes themselves. As a generalised example, if Student A receives 69% as their 
overall degree score they are awarded a 2:1 classification, and if Student B receives 
71% they are awarded a 1st class degree. However, since the classification is known 
and the overall score is not, the difference between students A and B with respect 
to their degree outcomes are the same as Student C who receives 61% and Student 
D who receives 95% respectively. If the exact degree scores were known (and 
continuous), it would be possible in theory to implement a regression discontinuity 
design at the degree classification thresholds. The design would need to be fuzzy to 
allow discretionary borderline cases, but such a design was used by Feng and Graetz 
(2013) using university-specific data on degree classifications and scores at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science.  
 
Finally, a binary approach to the outcome variable is employed since, not only is it 
computationally simpler, it would create more direct comparisons of the marginal 
effects between the explanatory variables of interest across the tariff score 
groupings. However, the ordered model will be conducted as a first stage to check 
whether the initial marginal effects from the ordered logit are seemingly 
dichotomous. If that is the case, then we should expect to see the sign, significance 
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and magnitude to be consistent across the two ordered categories within both the 
success and the fail collapsed categories. 
 
As with the ordered model, estimation output of the logit model returns the log-
odds as coefficients. Since in the binary model it is the marginal effect of 𝑥𝑖 on 𝑦𝑖 






′𝛽)]𝛽  (29) 
 




= 𝑃𝑟[𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥(𝑑), 𝑑 = 1] − 𝑃𝑟[𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥(𝑑), 𝑑 = 0] 
(30) 
 
where 𝑥(𝑑) are the means of all other variables included in the model, since the 
marginal effects with respect to a small change with a continuous regressor cannot 
be used with a binary indicator such as gender. 
 
3.4.3 Subject & Tariff Groupings 
Since the effect of interest is that of students’ socioeconomic background on degree 
outcomes conditional on pre-university attainment, students’ tariff scores are used 
to group students together into groups of similar pre-university academic 
achievement. Any student applying to university through the UCAS has their pre-
university academic qualifications and grades converted into a tariff score. 
Although subject to recent revisions, during the period of analysis a student’s tariff 
score was calculated as follows148: 
                                                          
148 In the interests of concision, only AS and A-Levels are listed here. A comprehensive guide to 
calculating a tariff score from other pre-university qualifications (such as BTECs, International 
Baccalaureates) can be found in Appendix 3, Table C1. 
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A  A  120 
B  B  100 
C  C  80 
  D A 72 
D A  B 60 
 B   50 
   C 48 
   D 42 
E C   40 
 D   30 
 E   20 
 
 
So a student who applies to university with 3 A-Levels (AAB) and 1 AS-Level (D) 
would have a total tariff score of 370. However, a student may also attain the same 
tariff score by applying to university with 3 A-Levels (AAC) and 1 AS-Level (B). 
Thus, since the exact grades are unknown within the dataset, the measure of pre-
university attainment is to some degree imperfect. Further complications of using a 
student’s tariff score is that the subjects studied (in addition to the exact 
qualifications and grades) are unknown. Nevertheless, within certain bandwidths of 
tariff score, it is reasonable to expect pre-university attainment to be relatively 
comparable. One further aspect of using tariff scores is, due to the nature of the 
calculation, only students who have applied to university through UCAS have a 
valid tariff score observation. However since the research question is aimed at the 
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performance of school-leavers, and all school-leavers must apply through UCAS 
for undergraduate study, observations with missing tariff scores are not relevant. 
 
The specific 10 tariff score groupings are created by taking the decile frequencies 
of the tariff score across all subjects, as seen in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Histogram and Kernel Density of Tariff Score with Variable Bin Widths 
 
 
As the tariff scores are not perfectly continuous (individual grade scores are 
predominantly multiples of 10), the decile groups do not contain an equal number 
of observations, which is also seen by the discontinuous kernel density plot. This 
method of creating sub-populations of students conditional on similar levels of pre-
university attainment has been used extensively by the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE), in various forms. Where the exact grades of the 
students’ qualifications were unknown, students were split into 6 tariff score groups 
(HEFCE, 2013; 2015b) and where students’ grades were known, students were split 
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into 10 tariff groups (HEFCE, 2014). The latter of these approaches however, is not 
directly comparable to this grouping design, since the tariff scores used in this 
dataset are calculated from all of the student’s applicable qualifications, as opposed 
to the best 3 A-Levels. The result is that the tariff score bandwidths used in this 
design are slightly inflated due to the incorporation of all of the students’ grades. 
Nevertheless, across the tariff score groupings there is almost a perfectly monotonic 
increase in the proportion of high income students moving from the lowest tariff 
score group to the highest (Table 3.3), as well as a similarly monotonic increase in 
the proportion of students obtaining a higher degree class (Table 3.4). Lower 
socioeconomic status students are therefore under-represented in the higher 
bandwidths of pre-university attainment compared to lower pre-university 
attainment, and from a descriptive standpoint students with lower tariff scores are 
less likely to obtain a good degree. Table 3.4 also shows a further potential benefit 
of considering a binary indicator of degree success, in that as students enter HE 
with particularly higher levels of pre-university attainment (e.g. a tariff scores in 
excess of 440), the proportion of students in the highest bandwidths obtaining a 2:1 
falls, simply as the highest achieving students are more likely to obtain a 1st class 
degree. By dichotomising the dependent variable, the marginal effects calculated 
will be consistently estimated between two distinct outcomes, rather than across 



































































































Table 3.4: Tariff Score, by Ordered Degree Outcomes (All Subjects) 
Tariff Score 3rd 2:2 2:1 1st Total 

























































































































Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard 
Rounding Methodology. 
                                                          
149 The further benefit of dichotomising the ordered degree outcomes variable is that it negates the 
small number of observations at the top and bottom of the distribution of good and bad outcomes. 
The relatively small number of observations for those who obtained a 1st class degree but whose 
tariff score was less than 199 (N=267) is significantly smaller than those who obtained a good 
degree within the same tariff band (N=2,615). This will be particularly important for STEM 




Whilst the effect of student background on degree outcomes is estimated 
conditional on pre-university attainment for all subjects, it is further allowed to be 
heterogeneous across different subjects. Using the student’s subject code (as 
classified by the Joint Academic Coding System, JACS), students are grouped into 
either STEM or non-STEM subjects.150 This is a similar approach to the six subject 
groups identified by Smith and Naylor (2001a), however by using only STEM and 
non-STEM, the subjects that are arguably the most rewarding in terms of rates of 
return (and have the higher tariff entry requirements on average) can be directly 
compared with the subjects that are arguably the least rewarding.151 Therefore the 
effect of coming from a disadvantaged background on degree outcomes is allowed 
to be heterogeneous between students who choose to study high and low reward 
subjects, which have the higher and lower entry requirements on average 
respectively. 
 
Finally, although the raw tariff score is retained and used to assign students to 
bandwidths, the tariff score when included in an estimation as an explanatory 
variable will be rescaled by a factor of 20. This is so that, given how the tariff scores 
are constructed, a 1 unit change in the rescaled tariff score is equal to a 1 grade 
change in a student’s A-Level subject result or equivalent.152 
 
3.4.4 Empirical Models 
The model to be estimated in the first instance is the ordered logit model, to 
establish model specification and to evaluate whether a binary success/fail approach 
is plausible. Hence, Table 3.5 reports the ordered log-odds from the following 
ordered logit model: 
 
                                                          
150 The same considerations that were highlighted in section 1.4.3 are applicable here in creating a 
STEM indicator using JACS codes. 
151 e.g. Greenwood et al. (2011). 
152 As seen from Table 3.2 and Table C1 in Appendix C, a grade B at A-Level is worth 100 tariff 
points, whereas a grade A is worth 120 tariff points. Thus, the rescaled tariff score would reflect a 
change in the tariff points from 5 to 6. 
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where 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑢,𝑡 is one of 4 possible degree outcomes
153 for student i who studies 
subject j at university u in a given academic year (t); Τ𝑖 is the tariff score associated 
with individual i’s pre-university academic attainment, 𝑆𝑖 is a dummy indicator 
denoting whether the student is classified as low income from their socioeconomic 
code, and 𝑃𝑖 is also a dummy indicator denoting whether the student is known to 
not have a parent or guardian with university education. An interaction between the 
low income indicator and this parental education indicator is used to capture any 
additional effect of a student being classified as both from a lower income 
background and who is known to not have a parent or guardian with university 
education, which is captured by the coefficient 𝛿4 . Also included are a set of binary 
student controls (𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑢,𝑡; gender, nationality, disability status and whether the 
student is attending a local university to their domiciled address)154, a complete set 
of time dummies (𝐷𝑡) to capture year effects, as well as university fixed effects (𝐴𝑢) 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity across universities. Finally, to capture the 
heterogeneity in degree outcomes across subjects due to differences in difficulty 
and material, subject fixed effects are included at the JACS 1 digit level. This 
approach addresses all the possible determinants of degree outcomes listed in 
section 3.1.1, given the limitations of the data. This strategy is also an improvement 
on the specification of Lasselle et al. (2014), since subject and year fixed effects are 
used, rather than just faculty fixed effects; in addition to the significantly larger 
number of observations due to the estimation being performed across all 
                                                          
153 The convention is for the outcome variable is ordered such that ‘1’ relates to the ‘worst’ 
outcome, and higher categories relate to better outcomes. As such, the ordered degree variable is 
coded such that 1=3rd class, 2=2:2, 3=2:1 and 4=1st class. 
154 Specifically, British==1, Female==1, White==1, Disabled==1 and Local==1; or 0 otherwise. 
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universities in the UK. As such, the error term ( 𝑖,𝑡) is clustered at the institutional 
level, to account for the likely violation of independence of the errors between 
student observations.  
 
Following on from the baseline model, the tariff variable (Τ𝑖) is then omitted from 
the empirical estimation, and instead the model that is now estimated is: 
 















which is performed using the constructed sample of all students (i), who studies a 
particular subject (j) at a university (u) across all  cohorts of students by academic 
year (t), within a tariff bandwidth group (m) across all subjects. Instead of 
controlling for pre-university attainment, this approach allows the estimates to be 
conditional on the pre-university attainment being relatively similar. The estimates 
from these tables are presented in Tables 3.7a (coefficients are log odds) and 3.7b 
(coefficients are marginal effects), after the evaluation of the marginal effects from 
the ordered model and thus whether the ordered approach can be dichotomised 
(Table 3.6). Irrespectively, the tariff bandwidth model in Table 3.7 is performed in 
the same manner for two further sub-populations of students: students studying 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics155 (STEM) subjects (Table 
3.8a and Table 2.8b) and non-STEM subjects (Table 3.9a and Table 3.9b). Table 
3.10 shows the predicted probabilities of attaining degree success within each 
bandwidth and across the subject groupings, with the explanatory variables set at 
                                                          




their mean values. This can be used to give context to the marginal effects found in 




Table 3.5 presents the model specification and the additive effects of the student 
controls on ordered degree outcomes. As expected from the empirical body of 
research, students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to obtain 
good degree, however this effect is only statistically significant when accounting 
for subject, year and university fixed effects, and allowing for the additional effect 
for students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and not having a parent with 
university education. Students who do not have a parent with university education 
and students who declare themselves as being disabled also have a significantly 
lower probability of obtaining higher degree outcomes, and in both cases these 
effects are larger in magnitude and statistical significance when controlling for 
fixed effects. Conversely, and still in line with empirical findings, students who are 
white, British, and female are all significantly more likely to obtain higher degree 
outcomes. Moreover, the significantly positive effect of tariff score on the 
probability of obtaining a higher degree outcome is robust even when controlling 
for subject, year and university fixed effects, and the full set of student control 
characteristics, which in this analysis conclusively finds that pre-university 
attainment is a significant determinant of degree attainment. 
 
Furthermore, one of the indicators of socioeconomic disadvantage – not having a 
parent with university education – is also robust to controlling for student 
heterogeneity, which suggests that disadvantaged students are less likely to do well 
in their university studies, when controlling for pre-university attainment and other 
student characteristics. Finally, although a disadvantaged background appears to 
reduce the probability of degree success on average, students who are the most 
disadvantaged (who are from a low income background and who do not have a 
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parent with university education) are significantly more likely to obtain a better 
degree outcome. This interaction coefficient, in ordered log odds, gives the 
difference between the log-odds ratio comparing students from low and high 
income backgrounds, with and without a parent with university education. This may 
suggest that those students who encounter the most obstacles in attending university 
may have higher potential to succeed compared to their counterparts, ceteris 
paribus.156
                                                          
156 As discussed in section 3.1.3, any estimate of the effect of a disadvantaged background on 
degree outcomes using data that has a self-selection bias (since we only observe those students 
who do participate in university education) must also be set in the context that such obstacles may 
prevent students from participating, and hence being observed in the data. 
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Degree Success (Ordered Logit Regression) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
              
Tariff 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.00562) (0.00537) (0.00535) (0.00534) (0.00523) (0.00523) 
Low Income =1  -0.0158 -0.0172 -0.0179 -0.0260 -0.109*** 
  (0.0270) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0419) 
No Educated Parent =1  -0.0982*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.0798*** -0.109*** 
  (0.0279) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0294) 
White =1  0.354*** 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.494*** 0.495*** 
  (0.0387) (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0413) (0.0413) 
Female =1  0.211*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 
  (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
British =1  0.193*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 
  (0.0638) (0.0651) (0.0649) (0.0617) (0.0618) 
Local =1   0.0713 0.0704 -0.0187 -0.0194 
   (0.0520) (0.0519) (0.0444) (0.0444) 
Disabled =1    -0.0791** -0.0946*** -0.0950*** 
    (0.0326) (0.0341) (0.0341) 
Low Income * No Edc Parent      0.127*** 
      (0.0437) 
       
Observations 67,045 67,045 66,480 66,480 66,480 66,480 
              
Subject FE  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE     ✓ ✓ 
Cluster SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
              
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 6 specifications. All 
regressions are performed using ordered logit to estimate equation 31. The dependent variable is the ordered 
degree outcome, where 1=3rd class degree, 2=2:2, 3=2:1 and 4=1st. Coefficients reported are ordered log odds 
and therefore report the effect of the explanatory variable averaged across the 4 possible outcomes of degree 
classification. The number of observations from model specification (3) is lower due to some missing 
observations of a valid UK postcode which makes the Local binary indicator neither 1 nor zero. Specifications 
(2)-(6) include subject fixed effects at the JACS 1 digit code level, specifications (3)-(6) include year effects, 
and specifications (5) and (6) include university fixed effects. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest 
multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 shows the average marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the 
ordered outcomes using the final model specification (column 6) from Table 3.5, 
with four AMEs for each degree classification. Firstly, there is a clear case for 
dichotomising the outcome variable, since the predictors that are positive and 
significant for predicting a student obtaining a 2:1 or 1st are negative and significant 
for predicting a student obtaining a 2:2 or 3rd. Whilst there is some variation in the 
magnitude of the AMEs between the outcomes, the sign and significance are 
consistent within the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes. Hence, the analysis can be 
converted into a binary estimation method, as outlined in section 3.4.2. Before 
moving to the bandwidth results, the marginal effects in Table 3.6 give quantifiable 
effects on the predicted probabilities of the outcome variable categories. If a 
student’s tariff score is increased by 1 unit (i.e. by 1 A-Level grade or 20 tariff 
points), they are 0.369 percentage points less likely to obtain a 3rd class degree, 
whilst they are 0.912 percentage points and 1.27 percentage points more likely to 
obtain a good degree (2:1 and 1st respectively). Similarly, a student coming from a 
low income background means they are 0.343 percentage points more likely to get 
a 3rd class degree, and 1.66 percentage points more likely to get a 2:2, and 1.13 
percentage points less likely to get a 1st class degree. These effects are now 
evaluated for students with similar pre-university attainment, instead of controlling 
for it across all students, by assigning students to one of the ten tariff bandwidths 
outlined in  section 3.4.3 and omitting the tariff variable from the empirical model 
as shown in equation 32.
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Table 3.6:  Average Marginal Effects for Ordered Degree Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Degree Class: 3 Degree Class: 2:2 Degree Class: 2:1 Degree Class: 1 
          
Tariff -0.00369*** -0.0181*** 0.00912*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.000271) (0.000831) (0.000332) (0.000640) 
Low Income =1 0.00343** 0.0166*** -0.00872** -0.0113*** 
 (0.00141) (0.00639) (0.00347) (0.00432) 
No Educated Parent =1 0.00335*** 0.0165*** -0.00837*** -0.0114*** 
 (0.000921) (0.00445) (0.00233) (0.00302) 
White =1 -0.0174*** -0.0778*** 0.0486*** 0.0466*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00648) (0.00487) (0.00341) 
Female =1 -0.00639*** -0.0311*** 0.0161*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.000816) (0.00299) (0.00167) (0.00205) 
British =1 -0.00869*** -0.0393*** 0.0233*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00962) (0.00650) (0.00561) 
Local =1 0.000600 0.00293 -0.00149 -0.00204 
 (0.00138) (0.00671) (0.00346) (0.00464) 
Disabled =1 0.00303*** 0.0145*** -0.00772*** -0.00976*** 
 (0.00114) (0.00525) (0.00296) (0.00342) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent -0.00380*** -0.0189*** 0.00891*** 0.0137*** 
 (0.00134) (0.00640) (0.00281) (0.00491) 
     
Observations 66,480 66,480 66,480 66,480 
The coefficients reported are the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the effect of the explanatory variable for 
each ordered outcome. The AMEs are calculated after estimating specification (6) from Table 3.5, which 
estimates equation 31 using an ordered logit regression. The AMEs show (for example) the additive effect of a 1 
unit increase in the tariff score in the probability of obtaining a 2:1 of 0.912 percentage points (in the case of 
continuous explanatory variables); and that being female compared to being male increases the probability of 
obtaining a 1st class degree by 2.13 percentage points (in the case of indicator explanatory variables), holding all 
other things constant. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s 
Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7a gives the binary logit results across the tariff bandwidths as outlined in 
section 3.4.3, averaged across all subjects. The coefficients are log-odds, and 
average marginal effects for the variables of interest (income background and 
parental income) on degree success are presented in Table 3.7b. First considering 
the control variables in Table 3.7a, the positive effect of being female on degree 
success is statistically significant across all levels of pre-university attainment, and 
as students enter HE with higher pre-university grades, the effect on degree success 
of being female increases in magnitude. Furthermore, whilst the effects of being 
female or white are significant, the effect of being disabled or British are now 
statistically insignificant in determining degree success, conditional on similar 
levels of pre-university attainment. 
 
Having controlled for other student characteristics, Table 3.7b shows that the 
average marginal effect of being from a low income background has a negative 
impact on the probability of obtaining a good degree, particularly for those with 
higher or lower than average levels of pre-university attainment. For students who 
entered HE with the lowest pre-university attainment (the least likely to obtain 
degree success, as seen from Table 3.4), being classified as lower socioeconomic 
status has an additional negative effect on the probability of obtaining a good 
degree. The average marginal negative effect of low socioeconomic status on the 
probability of degree success across all subjects is 13.8 percentage points, which is 
a 31.4% decrease in the probability of degree success associated with being from a 
low income background, relative to the mean probability of degree success of 44% 
(for the lowest tariff bandwidth) as shown in Table 3.10. Even for students with 
pre-university attainment towards the middle of the distribution of tariff scores, 
entering HE as a student from a lower income background has a negative impact on 
the probability of obtaining a good degree. For students who obtained between 240-
279 tariff points, the probability of degree success is 11.3 percentage points lower 
for low socioeconomic status students across all subjects, which is a 19.5% decrease 




For students who attained higher than average pre-university grades, if they were 
known to not have a parent with university education, this carried a similar penalty 
of entering HE as a socioeconomically disadvantaged student. However, the 
magnitude of this effect is not as large as the effect of lower socioeconomic status, 
such as students in the highest tariff bandwidth experiencing on average a 4.73 
percentage point decrease in the probability of degree success for students without 
a parent with university education, although this is only a 6.6% decrease relative to 
the mean probability of degree success of 74.5%. The effect of being classified as 
a lower socioeconomic status student however is also decreasing in magnitude as 
the level of pre-university attainment is increasing. Students who scored between 
440-499 tariff points are still less likely to obtain a good degree (conditional on 
completion) due to coming from a low income background, however this fall of 
5.56 percentage points represents only a 6.3% decrease in the probability of degree 
success, relative to the mean of 87.9%. The magnitude of the effect decreasing as 
pre-university attainment increases may indicate that disadvantaged students with 
higher tariff scores are more able to cope with university study.  
 
Surprisingly though, students who are both from a low income background and who 
are known to not have a parent with university education are more likely to obtain 
a good degree, both at higher and lower than average tariff bands. Students who 
have the lowest level of pre-university attainment (less than 200 tariff points) and 
are from both low income backgrounds and who don’t have a university-level 
educated parent are 10.7 percentage points more likely to attain degree success. 
Given the predicted probability of success within this tariff bandwidth across all 
subjects is 44% (Table 3.10), this is a 24.3% increase in the probability of degree 
success. Similar effects are also found for the 240-279 tariff bandwidth, and the 
second highest tariff bandwidth, albeit but with quantitatively lower effect. This 
may mean that although disadvantaged students are less likely to succeed in 
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obtaining a good degree, students that are the most disadvantaged – who potentially 
have entered HE by overcoming the most obstacles – are more likely to succeed. 
 
An argument contrary to this story however is the result from tariff bandwidth 6 
(which is centred on the median tariff score of 350), which shows that for students 
whose pre-university attainment is in the middle of the distribution, to have one 
indicator of socioeconomic disadvantage has a positive effect on degree success, 
and the most disadvantaged students are less likely to graduate from university with 
a good degree. However, since Tables 3.7a and 3.7b are estimating the marginal 
effects of a disadvantaged background across all subjects, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 
estimate the same model of degree success as Table 3.6, but for STEM and non-
STEM subjects respectively. It may be that the effect of a disadvantaged 
background in column 6 of Table 3.6 may be confined to students who study some 




Table 3.7a: Logit Model, by Tariff Score Bandwidth (All Subjects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ 
                      
Disabled =1 -0.0857 -0.202 0.0670 -0.0158 -0.182 0.00129 0.0497 0.0214 -0.0570 -0.0945 
 (0.109) (0.148) (0.107) (0.105) (0.133) (0.0977) (0.127) (0.139) (0.172) (0.213) 
White =1 0.536*** 0.346*** 0.417*** 0.603*** 0.524*** 0.461*** 0.496*** 0.598*** 0.522*** 0.490*** 
 (0.111) (0.0985) (0.106) (0.117) (0.114) (0.109) (0.127) (0.107) (0.178) (0.172) 
Female =1 0.193*** 0.195** 0.212*** 0.190*** 0.345*** 0.399*** 0.353*** 0.539*** 0.493*** 0.571*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0760) (0.0630) (0.0711) (0.0679) (0.0731) (0.0820) (0.0891) (0.0802) (0.112) 
British =1 0.139 0.238 0.280* 0.203 0.0670 0.253 0.00676 0.315* 0.465* 0.0393 
 (0.140) (0.225) (0.148) (0.206) (0.179) (0.192) (0.231) (0.187) (0.254) (0.290) 
Local =1 -0.0728 0.0263 -0.100 0.0866 0.0523 -0.0406 -0.116 -0.218 -0.0226 0.110 
 (0.0940) (0.104) (0.0777) (0.107) (0.108) (0.0847) (0.151) (0.134) (0.162) (0.288) 
Low Income =1 -0.623*** -0.144 -0.489*** 0.0823 0.229* 0.302*** -0.0714 -0.190 -0.445*** -0.0417 
 (0.134) (0.150) (0.121) (0.128) (0.131) (0.114) (0.121) (0.150) (0.154) (0.161) 
No Educated Parent =1 -0.0430 0.0593 -0.217*** 0.116 -0.107 -0.0147 -0.244*** -0.0656 -0.290*** -0.490*** 
 (0.0876) (0.0833) (0.0697) (0.0815) (0.0812) (0.0740) (0.0842) (0.100) (0.0853) (0.154) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent 0.482*** 0.141 0.721*** -0.156 -0.173 -0.425*** 0.280* 0.00734 0.679*** 0.271 
 (0.149) (0.176) (0.141) (0.177) (0.173) (0.160) (0.168) (0.201) (0.203) (0.249) 
Constant -0.730*** -0.517** 0.0786 0.318 0.874*** 0.554 -0.140 1.097 -0.0862 1.227*** 
 (0.281) (0.241) (2.248) (0.542) (0.319) (0.589) (0.413) (0.938) (0.677) (0.344) 
           
Observations 5,790 4,855 6,750 6,580 5,730 7,300 6,120 7,795 7,975 6,875 
                      
Subject FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 10 bandwidths. All regressions are performed using logit to estimate equation 32 
across all subjects, which is the same as model specification 6 in Table 3.5 but without the inclusion of tariff scores. The unscaled tariff score is used to assign students to 
groups of similar pre-university attainment. The dependent variable is the binary degree success outcome, which takes the value 1 if the student obtained a 2:1 or 1st. The 
coefficients reported are the log odds of the effect of the explanatory variables on the probability of degree success, conditional on a similar level of pre-university attainment 
(within a particular tariff score bandwidth), and not marginal effects. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard 
Rounding Methodology.  ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 3.7b: Average Marginal Effects from Logit Model, by Tariff Score Bandwidth (All Subjects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ 
                      
Low Income =1 -0.138*** -0.0338 -0.113*** 0.0178 0.0459* 0.0515*** -0.0114 -0.0245 -0.0556*** -0.00387 
 (0.0288) (0.0350) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0257) (0.0185) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0210) (0.0151) 
No Educated Parent =1 -0.00967 0.0139 -0.0501*** 0.0251 -0.0219 -0.00261 -0.0388*** -0.00819 -0.0339*** -0.0473*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0166) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0126) (0.0100) (0.0154) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent 0.107*** 0.0331 0.159*** -0.0342 -0.0358 -0.0799** 0.0420* 0.000911 0.0669*** 0.0232 
 (0.0321) (0.0412) (0.0285) (0.0391) (0.0364) (0.0314) (0.0238) (0.0249) (0.0170) (0.0198) 
           
Observations 5,790 4,855 6,750 6,580 5,730 7,300 6,120 7,795 7,975 6,875 
Standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients reported are the average marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability that the dependent variable 
(Degree Success) is equal to 1, conditional on similar pre-university attainment (within a given tariff score bandwidth). The marginal effects are calculated following 
the estimation of specification 6 from Table 3.5. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding 
Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 3.8a once again shows that the effect of being white or female is consistently 
positive and significant across almost157 all tariff bandwidths for students studying 
STEM subjects. The impact of being disabled on the probability of degree success 
is now significant for STEM subjects (where previously it was insignificant across 
all subjects), but only for students with lower pre-university attainment. Therefore, 
for students entering higher education to study a STEM subject with the lowest pre-
university grades, to be disabled carries a statistically significant negative penalty 
in the probability of degree success compared to non-disabled students, conditional 
on similar pre-university attainment. It is also the case that students who are in the 
lowest tariff bandwidth and who study a STEM subject at a local university, are 
less likely to graduate with a good degree compared to those who attend a university 
further away. 
 
Table 3.8b shows that, although there is evidence that a student from a 
disadvantaged background (using low income) within a higher tariff bandwidth are 
less likely to obtain degree success, and that the most disadvantaged are more likely 
to obtain degree success, the results averaged across all subjects within the lower 
tariff bandwidths are statistically insignificant. This may reflect that STEM degree 
courses are more difficult to secure places for in terms of entry requirements – both 
the higher tariff score needed, and the complexity of the A-Level subjects. This, 
coupled with the fact that students from lower socioeconomic groups tend to be 
under-represented in STEM subjects158 may explain the lack of significant findings 
for the effect of disadvantaged backgrounds on degree success for STEM degrees. 
This therefore may be evidence that students either cannot gain significant access 
to studying STEM subjects due to the higher grade entrance requirements, or that 
students (assuming they could study STEM subjects) are self-selecting out of this 
                                                          
157 The smaller sample size for STEM subjects compared to Non-STEM subjects may cause a lack 
of statistical power and an increase in the standard error. Therefore, it may be statistical power that 
is masking any effect for students studying STEM, especially when the distribution of pre-
university attainment for STEM students has significantly fewer observations in the tails of the 
tariff distribution. 
158 See Codiroli Mcmaster (2017). 
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subject group. However, similar to the marginal effects calculated across all 
subjects, once again there is the finding  that students whose tariff scores is at or 
near the middle of the distribution of pre-university attainment are more likely to 
succeed in terms of their degree classification if they come from a low income 
background (column 5). 
 
Nevertheless, students who are studying a STEM subject who are the most 
disadvantaged and who have higher-than average pre-university attainment are 
more likely to obtain a good STEM degree compared to students from the higher 
socioeconomic status categories and/or who have a parent with university 
education. Conditional on pre-university attainment, the most disadvantaged 
students are 13.4 and 16.4 percentage points more likely to obtain a 2:1 or above in 
their degree classification in tariff bandwidths 370-399 and 440-499 respectively. 




Table 3.8a: Logit Model, by Tariff Score Bandwidth (STEM Subjects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ 
                      
Disabled =1 -0.544** -0.648** -0.0150 0.170 0.110 -0.512* -0.0534 -0.0663 -0.184 -0.234 
 (0.232) (0.316) (0.279) (0.296) (0.267) (0.306) (0.347) (0.333) (0.213) (0.332) 
White =1 0.805*** 0.360 1.191*** 0.649** 0.783*** 0.569** 0.750*** 0.867*** 0.314 0.295 
 (0.310) (0.271) (0.240) (0.256) (0.259) (0.224) (0.238) (0.199) (0.276) (0.218) 
Female =1 0.616*** 0.526** 0.349* 0.262 0.438** 0.380** 0.470*** 0.506*** 0.512*** 0.495*** 
 (0.153) (0.242) (0.181) (0.195) (0.190) (0.163) (0.166) (0.145) (0.137) (0.150) 
British =1 0.320 -0.725 -0.116 -0.332 0.254 0.536 0.224 1.069** 0.393 -0.0684 
 (0.286) (0.451) (0.314) (0.427) (0.356) (0.350) (0.501) (0.434) (0.440) (0.417) 
Local =1 -0.464** -0.0712 -0.120 0.375 -0.129 0.141 -0.177 -0.362 -0.106 0.341 
 (0.189) (0.216) (0.178) (0.273) (0.262) (0.227) (0.243) (0.245) (0.174) (0.283) 
Low Income =1 -0.487* 0.238 -0.456 0.0270 0.670*** 0.355 -0.208 -0.123 -0.890*** -0.0746 
 (0.271) (0.424) (0.291) (0.320) (0.237) (0.281) (0.311) (0.293) (0.274) (0.299) 
No Educated Parent =1 -0.0219 0.251 -0.0701 -0.0777 -0.305 0.0462 -0.266 0.257 -0.225 -0.580** 
 (0.252) (0.285) (0.177) (0.172) (0.243) (0.204) (0.185) (0.159) (0.173) (0.238) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent 0.361 -0.469 0.880** 0.333 -0.152 -0.276 0.761* 0.0271 1.154*** 0.345 
 (0.342) (0.537) (0.374) (0.409) (0.390) (0.350) (0.399) (0.309) (0.371) (0.514) 
Constant -0.826* 0.548 -0.749 0.845 -1.070** 0.786 -0.710 0.102 -1.701 1.957*** 
 (0.471) (0.615) (1.734) (0.832) (0.507) (1.245) (0.670) (1.817) (1.549) (0.476) 
           
Observations 780 670 980 945 875 1,190 1,050 1,420 1,695 1,755 
                      
Subject FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 10 bandwidths. All regressions are performed using logit to estimate 
equation 32 across STEM subjects, which is the same as model specification 6 in Table 3.5 but without the inclusion of tariff scores. The unscaled tariff score is 
used to assign students to groups of similar pre-university attainment. The dependent variable is the binary degree success outcome, which takes the value 1 if the 
student obtained a 2:1 or 1st. The coefficients reported are the log odds of the effect of the explanatory variables on the probability of degree success, conditional 
on a similar level of pre-university attainment (within a particular tariff score bandwidth), and not marginal effects. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest 
multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.8b: Average Marginal Effects from Logit Model, by Tariff Score Bandwidth (STEM Subjects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ 
                      
Low Income =1 -0.105* 0.0505 -0.0962 0.00561 0.130*** 0.0699 -0.0405 -0.0223 -0.168*** -0.0118 
 (0.0572) (0.0890) (0.0597) (0.0665) (0.0437) (0.0534) (0.0611) (0.0537) (0.0546) (0.0478) 
No Educated Parent =1 -0.00472 0.0534 -0.0149 -0.0162 -0.0611 0.00933 -0.0513 0.0454 -0.0392 -0.0938** 
 (0.0545) (0.0602) (0.0375) (0.0358) (0.0483) (0.0412) (0.0357) (0.0280) (0.0305) (0.0394) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent 0.0771 -0.0993 0.180** 0.0680 -0.0306 -0.0569 0.134** 0.00482 0.164*** 0.0504 
 (0.0717) (0.112) (0.0702) (0.0814) (0.0789) (0.0730) (0.0625) (0.0549) (0.0411) (0.0695) 
           
Observations 780 670 980 945 875 1,190 1,050 1,420 1,695 1,755 
Standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients reported are the average marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability that the dependent 
variable (Degree Success) is equal to 1 for STEM subjects, conditional on similar pre-university attainment (within a given tariff score bandwidth). The 
marginal effects are calculated following the estimation of specification 6 from Table 3.5. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to 
comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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If the majority of the findings averaged across all subjects do not originate from 
students taking STEM subjects, then it must be the case that they originate from 
students taking non-STEM subjects. Tables 3.9a and 3.9b present the bandwidth 
results from the non-STEM subpopulation of students, and once again being white 
or female is a significantly positive predictor of degree success across most tariff 
bandwidths. 
 
In evaluating the marginal effects, the same pattern exhibited in Table 3.7b is 
evident. Students from a low income background or who are known to not have a 
parent with university education are significantly less likely to obtain degree 
success conditional on pre-university attainment, at the both the upper and lower 
end of the tariff distribution. The finding that students who are from the most 
disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to obtain a 2:1 or above, conditional on 
pre-university attainment is evident for non-STEM subjects, especially for students 
whose pre-university attainment was relatively low. The marginal effects for 
columns 1 and 3 are almost identical when estimated across all subjects (Table 3.7b) 
and across non-STEM subjects (Table 3.9b). This suggests that students from the 
lower tariff bandwidths who study STEM subject do not incur the same penalty of 
a disadvantaged background, possibly due to self-selection out of studying STEM 
subjects, or because students who have decided (and are able) to study a STEM 
subject with a lower tariff score are more able and more determined to succeed in 
their degree studies. Furthermore, the results suggests that for students studying 
non-STEM subjects with higher tariff scores, coming from a low income 
background is not significant in determining degree success; but the effect of not 
having a parent with university education is significant. Additionally, the positive 
effect of potentially being the most socioeconomically disadvantaged only applies 




Ultimately, the results lend weight to the argument that tariff scores are an imperfect 
predictor of ability for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, such that true 
ability is higher than indicated ability. This may especially be true for students who 
experience the most socioeconomic disadvantages, such as being from a low 
income household and where neither parent has a university level education. In that 
case, it is reasonable to expect that students who are disadvantaged are less likely 
to obtain a good degree conditional on pre-university attainment, especially at lower 
levels of indicated ability. However, where a student experiences significant 
disadvantage, the indicated tariff score may be such a poor predictor for university 
attainment and true ability that the most disadvantaged students outperform their 
peers, holding all things constant. This may especially be true of non-STEM 
subjects, where disadvantaged students with lower tariff scores are both less likely 
and less able to study them. This is the pattern that is observed in Tables 3.7-3.9. 
 
For students whose pre-university attainment lies in the middle of the distribution 
in terms of tariff score, both Tables 3.8b and 3.9b show that coming from a lower 
income background has a positive effect on the probability of degree success. This 
may be the case if the tariff score is a good predictor of ability for these students, 
such that the underperformance relative to ability for the lower tariff score students 
does not apply. Thus, conditional on pre-university attainment, students who obtain 
average grades and are from a low income background may be more determined to 
succeed than their peers. Students who are the most disadvantaged though, and 
whose tariff score may be a good predictor or ability, may be less likely to succeed 
due to financial constraints or the lack of coping skills. 
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Table 3.9a: Logit Model, by Tariff Score Bandwidth (Non-STEM Subjects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ 
                      
Disabled =1 -0.0434 -0.173 0.0640 -0.0411 -0.283* 0.122 0.0450 0.0633 -0.0406 0.00458 
 (0.130) (0.163) (0.128) (0.109) (0.150) (0.101) (0.143) (0.156) (0.220) (0.256) 
White =1 0.525*** 0.343*** 0.281*** 0.594*** 0.496*** 0.453*** 0.415*** 0.469*** 0.617*** 0.675*** 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.122) (0.118) (0.117) (0.140) (0.129) (0.166) (0.194) 
Female =1 0.148* 0.145* 0.201*** 0.187** 0.348*** 0.399*** 0.322*** 0.505*** 0.454*** 0.592*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0783) (0.0696) (0.0731) (0.0722) (0.0809) (0.101) (0.117) (0.0966) (0.156) 
British =1 0.125 0.445** 0.363** 0.386* -0.0243 0.226 -0.0445 0.0450 0.565* 0.404 
 (0.182) (0.218) (0.167) (0.228) (0.236) (0.255) (0.274) (0.297) (0.331) (0.391) 
Local =1 0.00794 0.0450 -0.0877 0.0616 0.111 -0.0778 -0.110 -0.105 0.0201 -0.0841 
 (0.101) (0.125) (0.0820) (0.104) (0.118) (0.0892) (0.167) (0.144) (0.210) (0.362) 
Low Income =1 -0.629*** -0.179 -0.501*** 0.0857 0.182 0.289** 0.0129 -0.234 -0.218 0.000248 
 (0.153) (0.155) (0.127) (0.139) (0.148) (0.131) (0.160) (0.176) (0.238) (0.218) 
No Educated Parent =1 -0.0467 0.0532 -0.243*** 0.131 -0.0891 -0.0293 -0.248** -0.187 -0.292*** -0.458** 
 (0.0839) (0.0923) (0.0738) (0.0844) (0.0933) (0.0812) (0.0990) (0.126) (0.0861) (0.192) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent 0.499*** 0.207 0.711*** -0.205 -0.178 -0.433** 0.121 0.0341 0.461* 0.172 
 (0.170) (0.179) (0.146) (0.183) (0.193) (0.173) (0.198) (0.237) (0.275) (0.255) 
Constant -0.766** -0.710*** -0.810 -0.513 0.402 -0.722* -0.176 0.529 0.0753 0.637 
 (0.359) (0.274) (1.173) (0.546) (0.337) (0.399) (0.497) (0.556) (0.488) (0.454) 
           
Observations 4,970 4,160 5,750 5,585 4,815 6,035 5,010 6,300 6,160 5,060 
                      
Subject FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 10 bandwidths. All regressions are performed using logit to estimate 
equation 32 across non-STEM subjects, which is the same as model specification 6 in Table 3.5 but without the inclusion of tariff scores. The unscaled tariff 
score is used to assign students to groups of similar pre-university attainment. The dependent variable is the binary degree success outcome, which takes the 
value 1 if the student obtained a 2:1 or 1st. The coefficients reported are the log odds of the effect of the explanatory variables on the probability of degree 
success, conditional on a similar level of pre-university attainment (within a particular tariff score bandwidth), and not marginal effects. Raw numbers have 
been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.9b: Average Marginal Effects from Logit Model, by Tariff Score Bandwidth (Non-STEM Subjects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ 
                      
Low Income =1 -0.138*** -0.0416 -0.115*** 0.0183 0.0357 0.0471** 0.00190 -0.0267 -0.0222 1.69e-05 
 (0.0325) (0.0359) (0.0287) (0.0296) (0.0285) (0.0205) (0.0236) (0.0209) (0.0255) (0.0149) 
No Educated Parent =1 -0.0104 0.0124 -0.0561*** 0.0283 -0.0178 -0.00498 -0.0371** -0.0207 -0.0290*** -0.0331** 
 (0.0187) (0.0216) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0140) (0.00870) (0.0145) 
Low Income * No Educated Parent 0.110*** 0.0482 0.156*** -0.0447 -0.0362 -0.0784** 0.0174 0.00369 0.0400* 0.0112 
 (0.0364) (0.0414) (0.0294) (0.0403) (0.0399) (0.0330) (0.0279) (0.0255) (0.0211) (0.0157)            
Observations 4,970 4,160 5,750 5,585 4,815 6,035 5,010 6,300 6,160 5,060 
Standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients reported are the average marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability that the dependent 
variable (Degree Success) is equal to 1 for non-STEM subjects, conditional on similar pre-university attainment (within a given tariff score bandwidth). The 
marginal effects are calculated following the estimation of specification 6 from Table 3.5. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to 
comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 3.10: Predicted Probabilities of Degree Success, by Tariff Bandwidth & Subject Group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Tariff Score 0-199 200-239 240-279 280-309 310-339 340-369 370-399 400-439 440-499 500+ ALL 
                        
All 0.440*** 0.492*** 0.579*** 0.657*** 0.696*** 0.765*** 0.803*** 0.863*** 0.879*** 0.915*** 0.745*** 
 (0.000322) (0.000858) (0.000322) (0.000887) (0.000858) (0.00107) (0.00185) (0.00258) (0.00224) (0.00310) (0.000880) 
STEM 0.461*** 0.509*** 0.524*** 0.634*** 0.631*** 0.672*** 0.704*** 0.748*** 0.768*** 0.814*** 0.691*** 
 (0.00197) (0.00114) (0.00258) (0.00208) (0.00197) (0.00246) (0.00310) (0.00408) (0.00290) (0.00513) (0.00143) 
Non-STEM 0.432*** 0.489*** 0.582*** 0.662*** 0.710*** 0.780*** 0.822*** 0.885*** 0.900*** 0.941*** 0.761*** 
 (0.000466) (0.000130) (0.000378) (0.000910) (0.000960) (0.00101) (0.00157) (0.00198) (0.00195) (0.00258) (0.000837) 
            
N (All) 5,745 4,830 6,420 6,525 5,690 7,225 6,060 7,720 7,860 6,815 64,895 
N (STEM) 780 670 670 945 875 1,190 1,050 1,420 1,695 1,755 11,050 
N (Non-STEM) 4,970 4,160 5,750 5,585 4,815 6,035 5,010 6,300 6,160 5,060 53,845 
Standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients reported are the base probabilities that the dependent variable (Degree Success) is equal to one, when all explanatory 
variables are set at their mean values within each tariff bandwidth and subject group. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 






3.6 Conclusions & Discussion 
This chapter has evaluated whether coming from a disadvantaged background, after 
controlling for other factors, has any effect on degree outcomes. A mixture of 
ordered and binary nonlinear models were used to measure the determinants of 
degree success, including differing measures of a disadvantaged student. The 
research design and the data used are a significant improvement on the existing 
studies estimating the impact of socioeconomic disadvantage on the probability of 
obtaining a good degree. In particular, the estimation of a model of degree success 
using data rich with socioeconomic indicators, the use of individual subject fixed 
effects, the estimation of the model separately for different subject groupings, and 
by using student data from every university in the UK, all help contribute to a 
significant addition to the empirical literature. 
 
Ultimately, whilst coming from a lower income background or not having a parent 
with prior university experience has a significantly negative impact on the 
probability of degree success, this is mainly true for students with low levels of pre-
university attainment, and predominantly for non-STEM subjects. However, 
students that are the most disadvantaged are, on the contrary, more likely to obtain 
degree success, across all subject groupings, especially for higher and lower than 
average levels of pre-academic attainment. 
 
This may suggest that students who are the most disadvantaged are not able to fulfil 
their potential at school or college, but when studying at university that potential 
for higher attainment is shown in the higher probability of degree success. 
Alternatively, it may be that students who are the most disadvantaged, conditional 
on attainment, place a higher value on the degree and its returns, and therefore are 
more determined to succeed than their counterparts who have not had to overcome 
such disadvantages. In both scenarios but particularly the former, this would 
support the growing utilisation of contextual admissions policies since pre-
university attainment for the most disadvantaged pupils may not be a true reflection 
of true academic ability at the HE level. The implication is therefore, although pre-
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university attainment is an important and positive determinant in a student’s  
university performance, prior attainment  can also be a reflection of disadvantage, 
rather than a true predictor of ability. 
 
What cannot be argued, however, is that university study is not a level playing field: 
the extent to which a student is considered socioeconomically disadvantaged has a 
statistically and quantitatively significant impact on their likelihood of obtaining a 
degree success. To refer back to the example in section 3.1.2, student A (the 
disadvantaged) may outperform student B, or he/she may underperform; it depends 
both on the extent to which they are disadvantaged, and whether their tariff scores 
are likely to be a good or poor predictor of true ability. Given that the findings of 
this chapter are also conditional on the student having decided to participate in 
higher education, it may also be that these findings underestimate the true potential 
in the most socioeconomically disadvantaged students, as these are the students 







This thesis has presented three empirical analyses that address two central questions 
in higher education (HE), namely: what factors affect student participation 
behaviour, and whether a student’s socioeconomic background affects a student’s 
chances of academic success at university. What is clear from all three analyses is 
that students who participate in HE are extremely diverse in their backgrounds, their 
motivations and their choices. If policy-makers and researchers do not acknowledge 
the extent of heterogeneity that exists, and design policies and empirical strategies 
accordingly, there may be unintended consequences.  
 
At an empirical level, if policies are evaluated at an aggregate level across all 
subjects and all students (BIS 2010a; BIS 2010b; Universities UK, 2009), the 
impact may be insignificant. Even if empirical strategies do acknowledge 
heterogeneity, a control group may not be used (Dearden et al., 2011; BIS, 2010a) 
which makes the estimation of the impact of the policy difficult to interpret, given 
there is no counterfactual outcome. Furthermore, if a natural experiment setting is 
used, the treatment and control groups may not be sufficiently comparable (e.g. 
Faggian, 2010) thus potentially affecting the validity of the estimates of the impact 
of a policy. When a comprehensive acknowledgement of student heterogeneity is 
made, along with allowing a policy to impact different groups of students in 
different ways across different subjects and different modes of study, the singular 
estimate of a policy introduction is disaggregated. 
 
Even when there is no policy evaluation, the diversity of the student population 
must be taken into account, as Chapters 2 and 3 show. For example, although 
students who are disadvantaged may have lower academic attainment in terms of 
degree classification (HEFCE, 2014, 2015a; Blundell et al., 2000; McNabb et al., 
2002; Smith & Naylor, 2001a) there may be a different effect for those students that 
experience the most significant socioeconomic disadvantages. Furthermore, 
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although it was found in Chapter 2 that students who experience high or rising levels 
of local unemployment were more likely to choose a subject with the lowest 
graduate wage and employment premia, the opposite effect was found for students 
from the lower socioeconomic classifications. Thus, local unemployment does not 
affect subject choice homogenously across student backgrounds and arguably 
therefore across differing perceptions of the relative costs and benefits to a 
university degree. 
 
From a policy perspective, the results from these empirical studies show that student 
heterogeneity is significant and unless addressed, a policy change may have 
negative impacts on the most disadvantaged students. When the funding reforms of 
2006 were introduced, the increase in the means-tested, non-repayable maintenance 
grant allowed students from the lowest socioeconomic distribution to experience 
greater geographic mobility. The result is that the poorest students are no longer 
confined through financial concerns to attend university in the local area, which 
may have significantly impacted the range of suitable courses and universities. 
When the tuition fees were increased to £9,000 per year in 2012, and when the 
means-tested, non-repayable maintenance grants were removed in favour of 
maintenance loans (which would further add to student debt) in 2016, this has 
almost certainly had a detrimental impact on geographic mobility. Chapter 1’s 
finding that students who experienced the largest increase in costs but still classified 
as low income were more likely to attend a local university and live at home should 
be a cautionary note. If the fear of debt does constrain students’ choices, as 
Callender and Jackson (2008) propose, then increasing those fears through higher 
tuition fees and taking out loans to fund geographic mobility may lead to students 
from low income families choosing subjects that do not represent an optimal 
investment, or not participating in HE at all. This is echoed in the finding in Chapter 
2, where students with higher local unemployment are more likely to study subjects 
with lower graduate returns. The policy implication here, is that some students 
living in areas of high or worsening unemployment may benefit from additional 
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support in choosing degree subjects that offer the best investment, rather than 
choosing subjects that are the least likeliest to fail. 
 
A further policy perspective can also be presented in the context of student 
attainment. The findings of the Chapter 3 strongly support the existing empirical 
literature (HEFCE, 2014, 2015a; Blundell et al., 2000; McNabb et al., 2002; Smith 
& Naylor, 2001a) that, conditional on pre-university attainment and student 
characteristics, some students perform worse in their degree outcomes if they are 
from a disadvantaged background. Thus, students from low HE participation areas, 
low income families, or those who are the first to enter HE from their immediate 
family should be offered additional support in adjusting to university life and study. 
However, there is also strong evidence in support of contextual admission policies, 
since students who are the most socioeconomically disadvantaged outperform their 
peers in terms of degree classification, all else being equal. Since this conditional 
pre-university attainment is assigned by an index of school grades (the UCAS tariff 
score), it may be the case that for students with low levels of pre-university 
attainment, the measure of ability is significantly underestimating true ability for 
the most disadvantaged students. Additionally, the most disadvantaged students 
who have high levels of pre-university attainment may, holding all else equal, 
outperform their peers due to a greater ability and desire to succeed at university 
since they have potentially had to overcome socioeconomic obstacles.  
 
One final note that should be made is that the results presented in these chapters 
have attempted to focus on specific research questions, and in doing so the empirical 
approach has been to control for all possible, observable confounding factors. Some 
of these controls – such as university quality and subject-specific effects – may 
indeed be outcomes, particularly in chapters 1 and 2. It therefore offers further 
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 1 
 
Table A1: HEI Members of the Russell Group 
 
University Year Joined Russell Group 
Imperial College London 1994 
London School of Economics 1994 
University of Birmingham 1994 
University of Bristol 1994 
University of Cambridge 1994 
University of Edinburgh 1994 
University of Glasgow 1994 
University of Leeds 1994 
University of Liverpool 1994 
University of Manchester 1994 
University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne 1994 
University of Nottingham 1994 
University of Oxford 1994 
University of Sheffield 1994 
University of Southampton 1994 
University College London 1994 
University of Warwick 1994 
Cardiff University 1998 
King’s College, London 1998 
Queen’s University Belfast 2006 
Durham University 2012 
Queen Mary University of London 2012 
University of Exeter 2012 





Table A2: A Comparison of the Old and New Funding Systems by Household Income 
























0 -1200 1200 1000 1000 0 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
2500 -1200 1200 1000 1000 2500 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
5000 -1200 1200 1000 1000 5000 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
7500 -1200 1200 1000 1000 7500 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
10000 -1200 1200 1000 1000 10000 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
12500 -1200 1200 1000 1000 12500 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
15000 -1200 1200 1000 1000 15000 -3000 2700 300 0 -1000 
17500 -1200 1200 616 616 17500 -3000 2700 300 0 -616 
20000 -1200 1200 232 232 20000 -3000 2283 0 -717 -949 
22500 -1200 1200 0 0 22500 -3000 1866 0 -1134 -1134 
25000 -1200 1000 0 -200 25000 -3000 1449 0 -1551 -1351 
27500 -1200 750 0 -450 27500 -3000 1041 0 -1959 -1509 
30000 -1200 500 0 -700 30000 -3000 778 0 -2222 -1522 
32500 -1200 250 0 -950 32500 -3000 515 0 -2485 -1535 
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35000 -1200 0 0 -1200 35000 -3000 252 0 -2748 -1548 
37500 -1200 0 0 -1200 37500 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
40000 -1200 0 0 -1200 40000 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
42500 -1200 0 0 -1200 42500 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
45000 -1200 0 0 -1200 45000 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
47500 -1200 0 0 -1200 47500 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
50000 -1200 0 0 -1200 50000 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
52500 -1200 0 0 -1200 52500 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
55000 -1200 0 0 -1200 55000 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
57500 -1200 0 0 -1200 57500 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
60000 -1200 0 0 -1200 60000 -3000 0 0 -3000 -1800 
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Table A3: Data Cropping of the Original HESA Data 
 





Remove observations from The Open 
University 
118,650 3,491,530 
3,491,530 Remove exchange students 115,900 3,375,630 
3,375,630 




Keeping only undergraduate students 
registered for their first degree 
1,649,990 1,725,400 
1,725,400 Keeping only students who pay home fees 182,385 1,543,010 
1,543,010 
Removing students with unknown or 
missing socioeconomic code 
513,350 1,029,660 
1,029,660 
Removing observations from HEIs not 
included in Table A5 (i.e. vocational HEIs) 
59,520 970,140 
970,140 Removing observations with missing age 20 970,120 
970,120 Keeping only full time students 115,420 854,700 
854,700 
Removing observations with unknown or 
Non-UK postcodes at the time of application 
19,110 835,590 
835,590 
Keeping only observations who commenced 





all the above figures ending in 0, 1 and 2 are rounded to 0, and all other figures are rounded to the nearest 5. This 





Table A4: Median Gross Earnings by SOC 2000 and Socioeconomic Status 
 
SOC 2000 Code159 SOC 2000 Broad Category Median Annual Gross 
Earnings (£)160 
1 
Managers and senior 
officials 
£32, 928 
2 Professional occupations £31, 402 
3 







5 Skilled trades occupations £21, 207 
6 Personal service occupations £11, 066 
7 




Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
£19,330 
                                                          
159 The SOC 2000 classification is not mapped to the socioeconomic code perfectly as it is a complex 
hierarchical process, however this table provides an indication. For instance, the majority of the occupations 




160 Data from the 2006 release of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Table 2.7a: “Annual pay - Gross (£) 
- For all employee jobs: United Kingdom, 2006”. Figures reported are the median gross earnings for each broad 
SOC 2000 category.  
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Table A5: List of HEIs (Gibbons-Vignoles Augmented) 
England 
Anglia Ruskin University  
Aston University  
Bath Spa University  
Bournemouth University  
Brunel University  
Buckinghamshire Chilterns University  
Canterbury Christ Church University  
City University  
College of St Mark and St John  
Coventry University  
De Montfort University  
Edge Hill College of Higher Education  
Goldsmiths College  
Harper Adams University College  
Imperial College of Science, Technology  
King's College London  
Kingston University  
Leeds Metropolitan University  
Liverpool Hope University  
Liverpool John Moores University  
London Metropolitan University  
London School of Economics and Political 
Science  
London South Bank University  
Loughborough University  
Manchester Metropolitan University  
Middlesex University  
Newman College of HE  
University of Central Lancashire 
University of Chester  
University of Chichester 
University of Derby  
University of Durham  
University of East Anglia  
University of East London  
University of Essex  
University of Exeter  
University of Gloucestershire  
University of Greenwich  
University of Hertfordshire  
University of Huddersfield  
University of Hull  
University of Keele 
University of Kent  
University of Lancaster  
University of Leeds  
University of Leicester  
University of Lincoln  
University of Liverpool  
University of Luton (University of 
Bedfordshire) 
University of Manchester  
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne  
University of Northampton  
University of Northumbria at Newcastle  
University of Nottingham  
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Nottingham Trent University  
Oxford Brookes University  
Queen Mary and Westfield College  
Roehampton University  
Royal Holloway and Bedford New College 
Sheffield Hallam University  
Southampton Solent University  
St Mary's College  
Staffordshire University  
Thames Valley University  
Trinity and All Saints College 
University College Falmouth  
University College London  
University of Bath  
University of Birmingham  
University of Bolton  
University of Bradford 
University of Brighton  
University of Bristol  
University of Cambridge  
University of Central England in Birmingham 
   
University of Oxford  
University of Plymouth 
University of Portsmouth  
University of Reading  
University of Salford  
University of Sheffield  
University of Southampton  
University of Sunderland  
University of Surrey 
University of Sussex  
University of Teesside  
University of Warwick  
University of Westminster  
University of Winchester  
University of Wolverhampton  
University of Worcester  
University of York  
University of the West of England, 
Bristol  










Trinity University College 
University of Glamorgan 
University of Wales Institute, Cardiff 
University of Wales, Lampeter 




Edinburgh Napier University 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
Heriot-Watt University 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh 
Robert Gordon University 
University of Aberdeen 
University of Abertay, Dundee 
University of Dundee 
University of Edinburgh 
University of Glasgow 
University of Strathclyde 
University of St Andrews 
University of Stirling 





Table A6: Subject Groupings for DD and DDD 
 
JACS Code & Subject STEM Indicator HFI/non-HFI 
A     Medicine & Dentistry STEM HFI 
B     Allied to Medicine STEM HFI 
C     Biological Sciences STEM non-HFI 
D     Veterinary Sciences & Agriculture STEM - 
F     Physical Sciences STEM - 
G     Mathematical & Computer Sciences STEM HFI 
H     Engineering STEM HFI 
J     Technologies STEM non-HFI 
K     Architecture, Building & Planning STEM - 
L     Social Studies non-STEM - 
M     Law non-STEM HFI 
N     Business & Administrative Studies non-STEM HFI 
P     Mass Communication non-STEM non-HFI 
Q     Linguistics & Classics non-STEM non-HFI 
R     European Languages & Literature non-STEM non-HFI 
T     non-European Languages & Lit non-STEM non-HFI 
V     Historical and Philosophical Studies non-STEM non-HFI 
W     Creative Arts & Design non-STEM non-HFI 
X     Education non-STEM - 
STEM: STEM subjects are classified as those identified as being Broad STEM subjects, following 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldsctech/37/3705.htm 
The STEM classification is performed using 2-digits JACS codes, to distinguish between STEM and 
non-STEM courses within a 1-digit code. See section 1.4.3 for a full discussion. 
HFI: HFI classification calculated using individual rates of return to degree subjects as calculated by 
BIS (2011), Figure 13. Missing HFI classification is due to subject having close to average returns, so 





Table A7: Consistency of Baseline DiD Estimates across Estimation Type 
 
          All Universities   Non-Elite Universities 
     Probit Logit LPM  Probit Logit LPM 
          (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  
           
Panel A                       
SEC Code 4-8            
   Treatment Period Average  0.0340 0.0576 0.0117  0.0169 0.0290 0.00642 
      (0.0262) (0.0422) (0.00939)  (0.0183) (0.0301) (0.00647) 
    2006  -0.00484 -0.00849 -0.00251  -0.00964 -0.0165 -0.00371 
      (0.0160) (0.0261) (0.00554)  (0.0137) (0.0224) (0.00497) 
    2007  0.0459** 0.0773** 0.0166**  0.0285 0.0485* 0.0110* 




           
Panel B                       
SEC Code 4-5 Treatment Period Average  0.0494** 0.0954** 0.0103**  0.0386 0.0746 0.00859 
      (0.0223) (0.0423) (0.00484)  (0.0282) (0.0528) (0.00648) 
    2006  -0.0233 -0.0476 -0.00539  -0.0330 -0.0653 -0.00757 
      (0.0264) (0.0499) (0.00573)  (0.0307) (0.0564) (0.00709) 
    2007  0.0808** 0.157** 0.0172**  0.0751* 0.146* 0.0168* 





           
Panel C                       
SEC Code 6-8 Treatment Period Average  -0.00250 0.00219 0.00141  -0.0194 -0.0242 -0.00217 
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      (0.0436) (0.0707) (0.00987)  (0.0512) (0.0827) (0.0104) 
    2006  0.0137 0.0253 0.00288  0.0157 0.0270 0.00386 
      (0.0125) (0.0225) (0.00334)  (0.0144) (0.0254) (0.00413) 
    2007  -0.0140 -0.0174 -0.000618  -0.0356 -0.0497 -0.00584 
          (0.0550) (0.0888) (0.0125)   (0.0672) (0.108) (0.0147) 
            
            
Fixed Effects     University University University  University University University 
Controls     yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Obs (SEC Code 4-8)     691,475 691,475 691,475 
 
444,395 444,395 444,395 
Obs (SEC Code 4-5)     691,475 691,475 691,475 
 
444,395 444,395 444,395 
Obs (SEC Code 6-8)         691,475 691,475 691,475   444,395 444,395 444,395 
This table reports the results from the DiD estimation as outlined by equation (4), estimated across all universities (columns 1-3) and then across non-elite universities (columns 4-6). Elite status is 
denoted by membership of the Russell Group of universities, as seen in Appendix A, Table A1. This table establishes the consistency of the DiD estimates to linear and non-linear regression 
methods, where columns 1 and 4 estimate equation (4) using probit, columns 2 and 5 estimates equation (4) using logit, and columns 3 and 6 estimate equation (4) using OLS. Columns 3 and 6 are 
therefore identical to columns 1 and 3 in Table 1.6. The coefficients reported are the coefficients on the interaction between the treatment group indicator (English HEIs) and the treatment period 
indicator, and show the change in the probability of observing a low income student studying as a result of the 2006 funding reforms. To allow for the estimation of the effect of the policy averaged 
across the post-policy period and to capture the partial and full adjustment effects to the policy change,  the DiD is estimated separately for the average of the post-policy cohorts, and for the 
2006/07 and 2007/08 cohorts. There are therefore three rows of DiD estimates for each column, where each coefficient relates to the specific treatment period. There are three panels (A, B and C) to 
allow an estimation of the DiD across the broad low income background category (Panel A, SEC Code 4-8), and disaggregated across the upper-low income background category of students (Panel 
B, SEC Code 4-5) and the lower-low income background category of students (Panel C, SEC Code 6-8). University fixed effects are included for all specifications, as are controls for observable 
student heterogeneity. Namely, these individual controls are: gender, ethnicity, age, disability status, and nationality. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the HEI level. 











Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 2 
 










UKC 1 UKC1 1 Tees Valley & Durham 
UKC 1 
UKC2 2 
Northumberland & Tyne and 
Wear 
UKD 2 UKD1 3 Cumbria 
UKD 2 UKD3 4 Greater Manchester 
UKD 2 UKD4 5 Lancashire 
UKD 2 UKD6 6 Cheshire 
UKD 2 UKD7 7 Merseyside 
UKE 3 
UKE1 8 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
UKE 3 UKE2 9 North Yorkshire 
UKE 3 UKE3 10 South Yorkshire 
UKE 3 UKE4 11 West Yorkshire 
UKF 4 UKF1 12 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 
UKF 4 
UKF2 13 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
UKF 4 UKF3 14 Lincolnshire 
UKG 5 
UKG1 15 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire 
UKG 5 UKG2 16 Shropshire & Staffordshire 
UKG 5 UKG3 17 West Midlands 
UKH 6 UKH1 18 East Anglia 
UKH 6 UKH2 19 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 
UKH 6 UKH3 20 Essex 
UKI 7 UKI1 21 Inner London 
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UKI 7 UKI2 22 Outer London 
UKJ 8 
UKJ1 23 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
UKJ 8 UKJ2 24 Surrey, East and West Sussex 
UKJ 8 UKJ3 25 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 
UKJ 8 UKJ4 26 Kent 
UKK 9 
UKK1 27 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & 
Bristol/Bath Area 
UKK 9 UKK2 28 Dorset & Somerset 
UKK 9 UKK3 29 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly 
UKK 9 UKK4 30 Devon 
UKL 10 UKL1 31 West Wales & The Valleys 
UKL 10 UKL2 32 East Wales 
UKM 11 UKM2 33 Eastern Scotland 
UKM 11 UKM3 34 South Western Scotland 
UKM 11 UKM5 35 North Eastern Scotland 
UKM 11 UKM6 36 Highlands & Islands 


















A Medicine & dentistry Y   
B Subjects allied to medicine Y/N  Y/N 
C Biological sciences Y/N  Y/N 
D Veterinary science, agriculture & related subjects Y/N  Y/N 
F Physical sciences Y/N  Y/N 
G Mathematical & computer sciences Y   
H Engineering Y   
J Technologies Y/N  Y/N 
K Architecture, building & planning   Y 
L Social studies  Y/N Y/N 
M Law  Y  
N Business & administrative studies  Y  
P Mass communications & documentation   Y 
Q Linguistics, classics & related subjects   Y 
R European languages, literature & related subjects   Y 
T 
Eastern, Asiatic, African, American and Australasian 
languages, literature & related subjects 
  Y 
V Historical & philosophical studies   Y 
W Creative arts & design   Y 
X Education   Y 
Y Combined   Y 
                                                          
161 STEM subjects are classified as STEM through the JACS coding system using the 2-digit JACS code, where 
only Broad STEM subjects are defined as STEM, as given by 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldsctech/37/3705.htm 
162 In line with the Britton et al. (2016) definition of LEM subjects, only Economics (JACS 2 digit code ‘L1’) is 
classified as LEM within the social studies (L) classification in addition to JACS codes M and N. 
163 All remaining subjects from classifications B, C, D and F that are not classified as STEM, and all remaining 
subjects within the L classification that are not Economics (L1) are classified as ‘Other’. 
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Table B3: Full Regression Results from Table 2.5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM 
                    
Tariff -0.00216** -0.00210** -0.00228** -0.00212** -0.00195** -0.00195** -0.00228** -0.00213** -0.00228** 
 (0.000963) (0.000972) (0.000965) (0.000969) (0.000971) (0.000971) (0.000965) (0.000968) (0.000965) 
Female -0.117*** -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.116*** 
 (0.00598) (0.00599) (0.00585) (0.00585) (0.00603) (0.00603) (0.00585) (0.00585) (0.00585) 
White -0.0419*** -0.0426*** -0.0405*** -0.0424*** -0.0435*** -0.0427*** -0.0409*** -0.0429*** -0.0408*** 
 (0.00859) (0.00849) (0.00856) (0.00859) (0.00849) (0.00857) (0.00851) (0.00850) (0.00849) 
British 0.00699 0.00975 0.00447 0.0108 0.0101 0.0102 0.00427 0.0105 0.00425 
 (0.0153) (0.0164) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0151) 
Low Income 0.0181*** 0.0184*** 0.0189*** 0.0184*** 0.0192*** 0.0190*** 0.0190*** 0.0185*** 0.0190*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00293) (0.00292) (0.00296) (0.00292) (0.00293) (0.00291) (0.00294) (0.00291) 
Local 0.0149*** 0.0154*** 0.0158*** 0.0163*** 0.0172*** 0.0163*** 0.0162*** 0.0167*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00518) (0.00525) (0.00508) (0.00514) (0.00519) (0.00522) (0.00506) (0.00521) 
Disabled 0.0118*** 0.0127*** 0.0130*** 0.0144*** 0.0139*** 0.0139*** 0.0130*** 0.0144*** 0.0131*** 
 (0.00426) (0.00427) (0.00469) (0.00439) (0.00407) (0.00408) (0.00468) (0.00438) (0.00468) 
Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr) -0.00109*      -0.000812  -0.00105 
 (0.000635)      (0.000775)  (0.00110) 
Local Adult 
Unemployment (25-49yr)  -0.00231      -0.00258 0.000586 
  (0.00167)      (0.00180) (0.00244) 
Growth in Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.00928    -0.00559  -0.00244 
   (0.00624)    (0.00741)  (0.00902) 
Growth in Local Adult 
Unemployment (25-49yr)    -0.00879    -0.00530 -0.00922 
    (0.00851)    (0.00886) (0.00962) 
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00305**     
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     (0.00142)     
Growth in Local 
Aggregate Unemployment 
(16-49yr)      -0.00539**    
      (0.00216)    
Constant 0.217*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.221*** 0.201*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.220*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0284) (0.0251) (0.0276) (0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0290) (0.0273) 
          
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 158,720 178,995 158,720 
R-squared 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.105 
          
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
            
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to 
estimate equation 9. The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications 
are estimating column (3) from Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the unemployment variables 
separately, where specifications (7)-(8) include the level of local unemployment and the growth in local unemployment respectively. Specification (9) 
includes all measures of youth and adult local unemployment. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s 





Table B4: Full Regression Results from Table 2.6 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM 
                    
Tariff 0.00444*** 0.00442*** 0.00432*** 0.00437*** 0.00439*** 0.00439*** 0.00432*** 0.00437*** 0.00428*** 
 (0.00102) (0.00101) (0.00104) (0.00102) (0.000997) (0.000998) (0.00104) (0.00102) (0.00104) 
Female -0.0645*** -0.0647*** -0.0651*** -0.0650*** -0.0629*** -0.0629*** -0.0651*** -0.0650*** -0.0650*** 
 (0.00494) (0.00489) (0.00499) (0.00493) (0.00477) (0.00477) (0.00499) (0.00493) (0.00498) 
White -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.155*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0109) 
British -0.0177 -0.0182 -0.0211 -0.0216 -0.0180 -0.0183 -0.0210 -0.0218 -0.0219 
 (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0149) 
Low Income 0.00254 0.00190 0.00240 0.00153 0.00157 0.00158 0.00236 0.00163 0.00255 
 (0.00307) (0.00297) (0.00336) (0.00306) (0.00285) (0.00285) (0.00336) (0.00305) (0.00335) 
Local 0.0278*** 0.0293*** 0.0248*** 0.0280*** 0.0295*** 0.0297*** 0.0247*** 0.0284*** 0.0249*** 
 (0.00556) (0.00555) (0.00575) (0.00564) (0.00558) (0.00565) (0.00569) (0.00557) (0.00561) 
Disabled -0.0386*** -0.0380*** -0.0380*** -0.0385*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0380*** -0.0385*** -0.0379*** 
 (0.00446) (0.00432) (0.00470) (0.00440) (0.00420) (0.00420) (0.00470) (0.00439) (0.00469) 
Local Youth Unemployment 
(16-24yr) 0.000220      0.000363  0.00442*** 
 (0.000789)      (0.000979)  (0.00139) 
Local Adult Unemployment 
(25-49yr)  -0.00160      -0.00229 -0.0135*** 
  (0.00200)      (0.00235) (0.00307) 
Growth in Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.0216***    -0.0233***  -0.0467*** 
   (0.00679)    (0.00797)  (0.0104) 
Growth in Local Adult 
Unemployment (25-49yr)    -0.00421    -0.00112 0.0250** 
    (0.00743)    (0.00854) (0.0107) 
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.000436     
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     (0.00181)     
Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00417**    
      (0.00205)    
Constant 0.448*** 0.459*** 0.462*** 0.456*** 0.445*** 0.449*** 0.456*** 0.468*** 0.463*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0253) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0270) (0.0251) (0.0269) 
          
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 158,720 178,995 158,720 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.063 0.064 
          
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
            
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate 
equation 9. The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for LEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating 
column (6) from Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the unemployment variables separately, where 
specifications (7)-(8) include the level of local unemployment and the growth in local unemployment respectively. Specification (9) includes all measures of 
youth and adult local unemployment. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard Rounding Methodology. 





Table B5: Full Regression Results from Table 2.7 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER 
                    
Tariff -0.00227** -0.00232** -0.00204* -0.00225** -0.00245** -0.00244** -0.00204* -0.00224** -0.00200* 
 (0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00104) 
Female 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 
 (0.00669) (0.00687) (0.00652) (0.00684) (0.00688) (0.00688) (0.00652) (0.00683) (0.00651) 
White 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0128) 
British 0.0107 0.00847 0.0167 0.0108 0.00792 0.00803 0.0168 0.0113 0.0176 
 (0.0309) (0.0319) (0.0282) (0.0308) (0.0316) (0.0314) (0.0283) (0.0309) (0.0283) 
Low Income -0.0207*** -0.0203*** -0.0213*** -0.0199*** -0.0208*** -0.0206*** -0.0214*** -0.0202*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.00314) (0.00311) (0.00332) (0.00313) (0.00294) (0.00293) (0.00332) (0.00314) (0.00333) 
Local -0.0428*** -0.0447*** -0.0406*** -0.0444*** -0.0467*** -0.0460*** -0.0408*** -0.0451*** -0.0411*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00516) (0.00510) (0.00522) (0.00519) (0.00516) (0.00511) (0.00523) (0.00510) 
Disabled 0.0268*** 0.0253*** 0.0250*** 0.0241*** 0.0248*** 0.0247*** 0.0250*** 0.0240*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.00532) (0.00535) (0.00577) (0.00543) (0.00516) (0.00516) (0.00577) (0.00542) (0.00576) 
Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr) 0.000871      0.000448  -0.00337** 
 (0.000650)      (0.000814)  (0.00132) 
Local Adult 
Unemployment (25-49yr)  0.00390**      0.00486** 0.0129*** 
  (0.00183)      (0.00212) (0.00337) 
Growth in Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   0.0309***    0.0289***  0.0492*** 
   (0.00830)    (0.00934)  (0.0115) 
Growth in Local Adult 
Unemployment (25-49yr)    0.0130    0.00641 -0.0157 
    (0.00906)    (0.00976) (0.0122) 
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.00262*     
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     (0.00148)     
Growth in Local 
Aggregate Unemployment 
(16-49yr)      0.00956***    
      (0.00241)    
Constant 0.334*** 0.329*** 0.332*** 0.341*** 0.334*** 0.349*** 0.325*** 0.315*** 0.317*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0406) (0.0358) (0.0368) (0.0394) (0.0371) (0.0398) (0.0412) (0.0400) 
          
Observations 181,090 187,825 158,720 178,995 196,355 196,355 158,720 178,995 158,720 
R-squared 0.122 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.122 0.122 0.124 0.124 0.124 
          
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
            
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to 
estimate equation 9. The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for OTHER and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications 
are estimating column (9) from Table 2.4 with various indicators of unemployment. Specifications (1)-(6) estimate the unemployment variables separately, 
where specifications (7)-(8) include the level of local unemployment and the growth in local unemployment respectively. Specification (9) includes all 
measures of youth and adult local unemployment. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with HESA’s Standard 





Table B6: Full Regression Results from Table 2.8 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM STEM 
Tariff -0.00216** -0.00216** -0.00215** -0.00194** -0.00194** -0.00194** -0.00195** -0.00195** -0.00195** 
 (0.000963) (0.000963) (0.000963) (0.000971) (0.000971) (0.000971) (0.000972) (0.000972) (0.000972) 
Female -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.132*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.118*** 
 (0.00581) (0.00581) (0.0129) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.0127) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00599) 
White -0.0420*** -0.0419*** -0.0419*** -0.0435*** -0.0434*** -0.0433*** -0.0428*** -0.0428*** -0.0429*** 
 (0.00857) (0.00856) (0.00856) (0.00846) (0.00845) (0.00846) (0.00854) (0.00854) (0.00854) 
British 0.00687 0.00705 0.00706 0.00993 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0102 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0166) 
Low Income 0.0363*** 0.0169 0.0176 0.0376*** 0.0172* 0.0181* 0.0374*** 0.0374*** 0.0372*** 
 (0.00562) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.00562) (0.00999) (0.00994) (0.00562) (0.00562) (0.00561) 
Local 0.0188*** 0.0197*** 0.0196*** 0.0213*** 0.0225*** 0.0224*** 0.0205*** 0.0205*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.00539) (0.00542) (0.00542) (0.00531) (0.00530) (0.00530) (0.00536) (0.00537) (0.00537) 
Disabled 0.0118*** 0.0119*** 0.0118*** 0.0140*** 0.0140*** 0.0140*** 0.0140*** 0.0140*** 0.0139*** 
 (0.00427) (0.00427) (0.00427) (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00409) (0.00409) (0.00409) 
Low Income x Female -0.0256*** -0.0257*** -0.0262*** -0.0258*** -0.0259*** -0.0266*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0257*** 
 (0.00567) (0.00567) (0.00557) (0.00554) (0.00554) (0.00545) (0.00553) (0.00553) (0.00553) 
Local Youth Unemployment 
(16-24yr) -0.00108* -0.00153** -0.00212**       
 (0.000632) (0.000596) (0.000845)       
Low Income x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)  0.00152* 0.00149*       
  (0.000871) (0.000872)       
Female x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   0.00102       
   (0.000849)       
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)    -0.00302** -0.00424*** -0.00624***    
    (0.00142) (0.00137) (0.00192)    
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Low Income x Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)     0.00414** 0.00402**    
     (0.00184) (0.00184)    
Female x Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      0.00341*    
      (0.00202)    
Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)       -0.00534** -0.00541** -0.0134*** 
       (0.00216) (0.00223) (0.00330) 
Low Income x Growth in 
Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)        0.000235 -0.0000732 
        (0.00368) (0.00366) 
Female x Growth in Aggregate 
Local Unemployment (16-49yr)         0.0137*** 
         (0.00395) 
Constant 0.213*** 0.218*** 0.226*** 0.216*** 0.222*** 0.232*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0271) (0.0277) (0.0284) (0.0291) (0.0294) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0276) 
Observations 181,090 181,090 181,090 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.107 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. 
The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for STEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (3) from Table 
2.4 with various indicators of unemployment, and various interactions of the unemployment measures with the socioeconomic controls. Specifications (1)-(3) estimate the 
effect of local youth unemployment on the probability of a STEM subject being studied, whilst specifications (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) estimate the effect of aggregate and the 
growth of aggregate local unemployment respectively. Interactions are included between the unemployment variable and the socioeconomic indicators of low income and 
female, to allow the unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across these binary categories. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 





Table B7: Full Regression Results from Table 2.9 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM LEM 
Tariff 0.00444*** 0.00443*** 0.00443*** 0.00439*** 0.00439*** 0.00439*** 0.00439*** 0.00439*** 0.00439*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.000997) (0.000997) (0.000997) (0.000998) (0.000998) (0.000998) 
Female -0.0653*** -0.0653*** -0.0580*** -0.0637*** -0.0637*** -0.0571*** -0.0637*** -0.0637*** -0.0615*** 
 (0.00512) (0.00512) (0.0105) (0.00501) (0.00501) (0.00941) (0.00500) (0.00500) (0.00516) 
White -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
British -0.0177 -0.0178 -0.0178 -0.0180 -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0182 -0.0183 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
Low Income -0.000734 0.0131 0.0127 -0.00197 0.00998 0.00960 -0.00199 -0.00193 -0.00184 
 (0.00529) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00497) (0.00922) (0.00927) (0.00497) (0.00502) (0.00500) 
Local 0.0256*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 0.0268*** 0.0261*** 0.0261*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.00599) (0.00604) (0.00604) (0.00612) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00617) (0.00617) 
Disabled -0.0386*** -0.0386*** -0.0386*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0386*** 
 (0.00446) (0.00446) (0.00446) (0.00419) (0.00420) (0.00419) (0.00420) (0.00420) (0.00420) 
Low Income x Female 0.00293 0.00298 0.00326 0.00285 0.00290 0.00316 0.00289 0.00289 0.00274 
 (0.00539) (0.00538) (0.00532) (0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00528) (0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00533) 
Local Youth Unemployment 
(16-24yr) 0.000216 0.000534 0.000868       
 (0.000788) (0.000795) (0.000829)       
Low Income x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)  -0.00109 -0.00107       
  (0.000746) (0.000748)       
Female x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.000570       
   (0.000691)       
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)    0.000420 0.00114 0.00191    
    (0.00181) (0.00190) (0.00196)    
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Low Income x Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00242 -0.00238    
     (0.00170) (0.00171)    
Female x Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00131    
      (0.00158)    
Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)       -0.00418** -0.00410* 0.00237 
       (0.00205) (0.00207) (0.00326) 
Low Income x Growth in 
Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)        -0.000295 -4.74e-05 
        (0.00356) (0.00354) 
Female x Growth in Aggregate 
Local Unemployment (16-49yr)         -0.0110*** 
         (0.00408) 
Constant 0.449*** 0.445*** 0.441*** 0.446*** 0.443*** 0.439*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 0.449*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0271) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0252) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) 
Observations 181,090 181,090 181,090 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. 
The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for LEM and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (6) from Table 
2.4 with various indicators of unemployment, and various interactions of the unemployment measures with the socioeconomic controls. Specifications (1)-(3) estimate the 
effect of local youth unemployment on the probability of a LEM subject being studied, whilst specifications (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) estimate the effect of aggregate and the 
growth of aggregate local unemployment respectively. Interactions are included between the unemployment variable and the socioeconomic indicators of low income and 
female, to allow the unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across these binary categories. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 




Table B8: Full Regression Results from Table 2.10 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER OTHER 
Tariff -0.00228** -0.00228** -0.00228** -0.00245** -0.00245** -0.00245** -0.00244** -0.00244** -0.00244** 
 (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) 
Female 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.189*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
 (0.00686) (0.00686) (0.0143) (0.00712) (0.00712) (0.0142) (0.00712) (0.00711) (0.00725) 
White 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
British 0.0108 0.0108 0.0108 0.00803 0.00795 0.00796 0.00814 0.00814 0.00812 
 (0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314) 
Low Income -0.0355*** -0.0300** -0.0303** -0.0356*** -0.0271** -0.0277** -0.0354*** -0.0354*** -0.0354*** 
 (0.00525) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.00501) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.00501) (0.00506) (0.00506) 
Local -0.0444*** -0.0446*** -0.0446*** -0.0480*** -0.0485*** -0.0485*** -0.0474*** -0.0474*** -0.0474*** 
 (0.00570) (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00576) (0.00576) (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00569) 
Disabled 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 
 (0.00533) (0.00532) (0.00533) (0.00517) (0.00516) (0.00517) (0.00517) (0.00517) (0.00517) 
Low Income x Female 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 0.0229*** 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 0.0234*** 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.00595) (0.00595) (0.00591) (0.00575) (0.00575) (0.00570) (0.00575) (0.00575) (0.00575) 
Local Youth Unemployment 
(16-24yr) 0.000863 0.000991 0.00125       
 (0.000651) (0.000763) (0.000975)       
Low Income x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)  -0.000437 -0.000423       
  (0.000892) (0.000892)       
Female x Local Youth 
Unemployment (16-24yr)   -0.000451       
   (0.000914)       
Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)    0.00260* 0.00310* 0.00433*    
    (0.00148) (0.00175) (0.00225)    
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Low Income x Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)     -0.00172 -0.00165    
     (0.00201) (0.00201)    
Female x Aggregate Local 
Unemployment (16-49yr)      -0.00209    
      (0.00209)    
Growth in Local Aggregate 
Unemployment (16-49yr)       0.00952*** 0.00951*** 0.0111*** 
       (0.00241) (0.00253) (0.00367) 
Low Income x Growth in 
Aggregate Local  
Unemployment (16-49yr)        0.0000604 0.000121 
        (0.00460) (0.00460) 
Female x Growth in Aggregate 
Local Unemployment (16-49yr)         -0.00268 
         (0.00444) 
Constant 0.338*** 0.336*** 0.333*** 0.338*** 0.335*** 0.329*** 0.353*** 0.353*** 0.353*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0402) (0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0406) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0370) 
Observations 181,090 181,090 181,090 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 196,355 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
University FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE (NUTS 1 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Standard errors shown in the parentheses are clustered at the institutional level across all 9 specifications. All regressions are performed using OLS to estimate equation 9. 
The dependent variable is the binary subject group indicator, which takes the value 1 for OTHER and 0 otherwise. All 9 specifications are estimating column (9) from Table 
2.4 with various indicators of unemployment, and various interactions of the unemployment measures with the socioeconomic controls. Specifications (1)-(3) estimate the 
effect of local youth unemployment on the probability of an OTHER subject being studied, whilst specifications (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) estimate the effect of aggregate and the 
growth of aggregate local unemployment respectively. Interactions are included between the unemployment variable and the socioeconomic indicators of low income and 
female, to allow the unemployment effect to be heterogeneous across these binary categories. Raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 5 to comply with 




Figure B1: Histogram of Youth Unemployment 
 
 




Figure B3: Histogram of Adult Unemployment 
 
 
Figure B4: Histogram of Adult Unemployment Growth 
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Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
Table C1: UCAS Tariff Scores, by Qualification & Grade 
GCE/VCE 
Qualifications 
























Award Certificate Diploma Certificate Diploma 
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Diploma 








     DDD   D1    360       
     DDM   D2/M1    320       
           Distinction 285       
     DMM   M2    280       
  AA  DD MMM  D M3 A   240       
           Merit 225       
  AB          220       
  BB  DM MMP  M1 P1 B   200       
  BC          180       
           Pass 165       
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  CD          140       
 A DD D MP PPP D P2 P3 D A  120   A    
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            71 B1      
            64 B2      
A D         D  60    B   
            58 B3      
            52 C1      
B            50       
            48    C   
            45 C2      
            42    D A  
C E  P   P    E  40       
            39 C3 A1     
      
   
   38      
Band 
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            35     B  
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D            30       
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Band 
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            14  B2     
            13       
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Pass      120       
      75   D    
      70   M    
     A 60  D     
      55  M P    
     B 50       
      45 D      
 Distinction    C 40 M P     
   Level 4  D 30      D 
      25 P     M 
 Merit Higher Level 3 A E 20     D P 
    B  17       
      15    D M  
    C  13       
  Int 2 Level 2 D  10    M P  
    E  7       




1 The points shown are for the newly specified BTEC National Award, Certificate and Diploma  
2 The points for the OCR Nationals come into effect for entry to higher education in 2007 onwards  
3 Covers the CACHE Diploma in Child Care and Education 
4 The points for the Diploma in Foundation Studies (Art and Design) come into effect for entry to higher education in 2006 onwards 
5 The points shown for the Irish Leaving Certificate Higher and Ordinary levels, come into effect for entry to higher education in 2006 onwards 
6  Points for the Core of the Advanced Welsh Baccalaureate Qualification 
7 Points for Advanced Extension Awards are over and above those gained from the A level grade and come into effect for entry to higher education in 2006 
8 Covers the five Scottish Core Skills – Communication, Information Technology, Numeracy, Problem Solving & Working with Others 
9 Covers the three main three Key Skill subjects – Application of Number, Communication and Information Technology with the three Wider Key Skills coming into the Tariff for  
2007 entry  
10 Covers free-standing Mathematics qualifications – Additional Maths, Using and Applying Statistics, Working with Algebraic and Graphical Techniques, Modelling with Calculus 
11 The points shown are for the revised Institute of Financial Services Certificate in Financial Studies (CeFS) taught from September ‘03 








Adams, R. (2017). Oxford and Cambridge 'need to improve access for 




Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. 
Economic Letters, 80, 123-129 
 
Alecke, B., Burgard, C., & Mitze, T. (2013). The effect of tuition fees on student 
enrollment and location choice – interregional migration, border effects and gender 
differences. Ruhr Economic Paper, No. 404 
 
Anderberg, D. & Cerrone, C. (2016). Investment in education under disappointment 
aversion. Max Planck Instutute Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2016/16 
 
Anders, J. (2012). The link between household income, university applications and 
university attendance. Fiscal Studies, 33, 185-210 
 
Ardila, A. (2001). Predictors of university academic performance in Colombia. 
International Journal of Educational Research, 35, 411-417 
 
Arkes, J. (2010). Using unemployment rates as instruments to estimate returns to 
schooling. Southern Economic Journal, 76(3), 711-722 
 
Artess, J., McCulloch, A., & Mok, P. (2014). Learning from Futuretrack: studying 







Atherton, G., Jones, S., & Hall, A. (2015). Does cost matter? Students’ 
understanding of the higher education finance system and how cost affects their 
decisions. National Education Opportunities Network Report 
 
Barrow, M., Reilly, B. & Woodfield, R. (2009). The determinants of undergraduate 
degree performance: How important is gender? British Educational Research 
Journal, 35(4), 575-597 
 
Bartlett, S., Peel, M. J., & Pendlebury, M. (1993). From fresher to finalist: a three 
year analysis of student performance on an accounting degree programme. 
Accounting Education, 2(2), 111-122 
 
Battu, H., Belfield, C. R., & Sloane, P. J. (1999). Over-education among graduates: 
a cohort view. Education Economics, 7, 21-38 
 
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis, with 
special reference to education (3rd ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bell, D. N. F. & Blanchflower, D. G. (2011). Young people and the great recession. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27(2), 241-267 
 
Bennett, R., Glennerster, H., & Nevison, D. (1992). Investing in skill: to stay on or 
not to stay on? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8(2), 130-145 
 
Betts, J. R. & McFarland, L. L. (1995). Safe port in a storm: the impact of labor 
market conditions on community college enrollments. The Journal of Human 
Resources, 30(4), 741-765 
 
BIS (2010a). The impact of higher education finance on university participation in 




BIS (2010b). The impact of the 2006-07 HE finance reforms on HE participation. 
BIS Research Paper, No. 13 
 
BIS (2011). The returns to higher education qualifications. BIS Research Paper, 
No. 45 
 
Black, S. E. & Sufi, A. (2002). Who goes to college? Differential enrollment by 
race and family background. National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper, No. 9310 
 
Blom, E., Cadena, B. C., & Keys, B. J. (2015). Investment over the business cycle: 
insights from college major choice. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 9167 
 
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., Goodman, A., & Reed, H. (2000). The returns to higher 
education in Britain: evidence from a British cohort. The Economic Journal, 110, 
82-99 
 
Boffy-Ramirez, E. (2016). The heterogeneous impacts of business cycles on 
educational attainment. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 10167 
 
Bolton, P. (2014). Value of student maintenance support. House of Commons 
Library, SN/SG/916 
 
Boyle, R., Carter, J., & Clark, M. (2002). What makes them succeed? Entry, 
progression and graduation in Computer Science. Journal of Further and Higher 
Education, 26(1), 3-18 
 
Bradley, S., & Migali, G. (2015). The effect of a tuition fee reform on the risk of 
drop out from university in the UK. Lancaster University Management School 




Britton, J., Dearden, L., Shephard, N. & Vignoles, A. (2016). How English 
domiciled graduate earnings vary with gender, institution attended, subject and 
economic background. Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper, No. W16/06 
 
Broecke, S. & Nicholls, T. (2007). Ethnicity and degree attainment. Department of 
Education and Skills Research Report, No. RW92 
 
Browne Review of Higher Education. (2010). Securing a sustainable future for 
higher education: an independent review of higher education funding and student 




Bruckmeier, K., & Wigger, B. U. (2012). The effects of tuition fees on transition 
from high school to university in Germany. Economics of Education Review, 41(1), 
14-23 
 
Callender, C. (2003). Student financial support in higher education: access and 
exclusion, in Tight, M. (eds.) Access and Exclusion: International Perspectives on 
Higher Education Research, Elsevier Science, London 
 
Callender, C. & Jackson, J. (2008). Does fear of debt constrain choice of university 
and subject of study? Studies in Higher Education, 33(4), 405-429 
 
Canton, E., & De Jong, F. (2005). The demand for higher education in the 
Netherlands, 1950-1999. Economics of Education Review, 24, 651-663 
 
Card, D. & Lemieux, T. (2001). Dropout and enrolment trends in the post-war 
period: what went wrong in the 1970s? In J. Gruber (ed.), Risky Behavior among 




Cebula, R. & Lopes, J. (1982). Determinants of student choice of undergraduate 
major field. American Educational Research Journal, 19(2), 303-312 
 
Chevalier, A. (2003). Parental education and child’s education: a natural 
experiment. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 1153 
 
Chevalier, A. (2007). Education, occupation and career expectations: determinants 
of the gender pay gap for UK graduates. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 69(6), 819-842 
 
Chevalier, A. (2011). Subject choice and earnings of UK graduates. Economics of 
Education Review, 30(6), 1187-1201 
 
Chevalier, A. (2014). Does Higher Education quality matter in the UK? IZA 
Discussion Paper, No. 8363 
 
Chevalier, A., Harmon, C., Walker, I., & Zhu, Y. (2004). Does education raise 
productivity, or just reflect it? The Economic Journal, 114, 499-517 
 
Chowdry, H., Crawford, C., Dearden, L., Goodman, A., & Vignoles, A. (2013). 
Widening participation in higher education: analysis using linked administrative 
data. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A, 176, 431-457 
 
Clark, D. (2011). Do recessions keep students in school? The impact of youth 
unemployment on enrolment in post-compulsory education in England. Economica, 
78, 523-545 
 
Codiroli Mcmaster, N. (2017). Who studies STEM subjects at A level and degree 
in England? An investigation into the intersections between students’ family 
236 
 
background, gender and ethnicity in determining choice. British Educational 
Research Journal, doi:10.1002/berj.3270 
 
Collinson, P. (2016). More than a third of UK graduates regret going to university. 
The Guardian, 10 August. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/aug/10/more-than-a-third-of-uk-
graduates-regret-attending-university (Accessed on 26 September 2017) 
 
Connor, C., Tyers, T., Modood, J., & Hillage, J. (2004). Why the difference? A 
closer look at higher education minority ethnic students and graduates. Department 
of Education and Skills Research Report, No. RR552 
 
Crawford, C. (2014a). Socio-economic differences in university outcomes in the 
UK: drop-out, degree completion and degree class. Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Working Paper, No. W14/31 
 
Crawford, C. (2014b). The link between secondary school characteristics and 
university participation and outcomes. The Centre for Analysis of Youth 






Davies, P., Mangan, J., Hughes, A., & Slack, K. (2013). Labour market motivation 
and undergraduates’ choice of degree subject. British Educational Research 
Journal, 39(2), 361-382 
 
Davies, P., Telhaj, S., Hutton, D., Adnett, N., & Coe, R. (2008). Socioeconomic 
background, gender and subject choice in secondary schooling. Educational 




De Vries, R. & Rentfrow, J. (2016). A winning personality: the effects of 




Dearden, L., Ferri, J., & Meghir, C. (2002). The effect of school quality on 
educational attainment and wages. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 
1-20 
 
Dearden, L., Fitzsimons, E., Goodman, A., & Kaplan, G. (2008). Higher education 
funding reforms in England: the distributional effects and the shifting balance of 
costs. The Economic Journal, 118(526), F100-F125 
 
Dearden, L., Fitzsimons, E., & Wyness, G. (2011). The impact of tuition fees and 
support on university participation in the UK. Centre for the Economics of 
Education Discussion Paper, No. 126 
 
Delaney, L., Harmon, C., & Redmond, C. (2011). Parental education, grade 
attainment and earnings expectations among university students. Economics of 
Education Review, 30, 1136-1152 
 
Dellas, H. & Koubi, V. (2003). Business cycles and schooling. European Journal 
of Political Economy, 19, 843-859 
 
Dellas, H. & Sakellaris, P. (2003). On the cyclicality of schooling: theory and 
evidence. Oxford Economic Papers, 55, 148-172 
 
Denzler, S. & Wolter, S. C. (2011). Too far to go? Does distance determine study 




Devereux, P. J. & Hart, R. A. (2010). Forced to be rich? Returns to compulsory 
schooling in Britain. The Economic Journal, 120, 1345-1364 
 
DfES (2003). The future of higher education. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080205154241/http://www.dcsf.gov.
uk/hegateway/strategy/hestrategy/exec.shtml (Accessed on 26 September 2017) 
 
Di Pietro, G. (2004). The determinants of university dropout in Italy: a bivariate 
probability model with sample selection. Applied Economics Letters, 11(3), 187-
191 
 
Di Pietro, G. (2006). Regional labour market conditions and university dropout 
rates: evidence from Italy. Regional Studies, 40(6), 617-630 
 
Di Pietro, G. (2010). The impact of degree class on the first destinations of 
graduates: a regression discontinuity approach. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 4836 
 
Dickson, M. & Smith, S. (2011). What determines the return to education: an extra 
year or a hurdle cleared? Economics of Education Review, 30, 1167-1176  
 
Dietrich, H., & Gerner, H. (2012). The effects of tuition fees on the decision for 
higher education: evidence from a German policy experiment. Economics Bulletin, 
32(3), 2407-2413 
 
Dunnett, A., Moorhouse, J., Walsh, C., & Barry, C. (2012) Choosing a university: 
a conjoint analysis of the impact of higher fees on students applying for university 
in 2012. Tertiary Education and Management, 18(3), 199-220 
 
Duru, M. & Mingat, A. (1979). Comportement des bacheliers: modèle des choix de 




Dwenger, N., Storck, J., & Wrohlich, K. (2012). Do tuition fees affect the mobility 
of university applicants? Evidence from a natural experiment. Economics of 
Education Review, 31(1), 155-167 
 
Dynarski, S. M. (2003). Does aid matter? Measuring the effect of student aid on 
college attendance and completion. American Economic Review, 93(1), 279-288 
 
Eide, E. & Showalter, M. W. (1998). The effect of school quality on student 
performance: a quantile regression approach. Economics Letters, 58, 345-350 
 
Faggian, A. (2010). The effect of tuition fees on higher education participation in 
Northern Ireland: an interim report. DELNI Research Report, accessed at: 
http://www.delni.gov.uk/effect-of-variable-tuition-fees-interim-report.pdf 
 
Feng, A. & Graetz, G. (2013). A question of degree: the effects of degree class on 
labor market outcomes. CEP Discussion Paper, No. 1221 
 
Fernández, R. M. & Shioji, E. (2000). Human capital investment in the presence of 
unemployment: application to university enrolment in Spain. University of Oxford 
Department of Economics Working Paper, No. 66 
 
Fredriksson, P. (1997). Economic incentives and the demand for higher education. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(1), 129-142 
 
Freeman, R. (1971). The market for college-trained manpower. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Frenette, C. (2004). Access to college and university: does distance to school 




Galindo-Rueda, F., Marcenaro-Gutierrez, O., & Vignoles, A. (2004). The widening 
socio-economic gap in UK higher education. National Institute Economic Review, 
190, 70-82 
 
Gayle, V., Berridge, D., & Davies, R. (2002). Young people’s entry into higher 
education: quantifying influential factors. Oxford Review of Education, 28, 5-20 
 
Gibbons, S., & Vignoles, A. (2009). Geography, choice and participation in higher 
education in England. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42, 98-113 
 
Gist, W. E., Goedde, H., & Ward, B. H. (1996). The influence of mathematical 
skills and other factors on minority student performance in principles of accounting. 
Issues in Accounting Education, 11(1), 49-60 
 
Greenaway, D., & Haynes, M. (2003) Funding higher education in the UK: the role 
of fees and loans. The Economic Journal, 113, F150-F166 
 
Greene, W. H. (2010). Testing hypotheses about interaction terms in nonlinear 
models. Economics Letters, 107, 291-296 
 
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Greenwood, C., Harrison, M., & Vignoles, A. (2011). The labour market value of 
STEM qualifications and occupations. Institute of Education / The Royal Academy 
of Engineering. Retrieved from: 
http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/the_labour_market_value_of_stem 
 
Harmon, C., Oosterbeek, H., & Walker, I. (2000). The returns to education: a review 
of the evidence, issues and deficiencies in the literature. Centre for the Economics 




Harrison, M. (2012). Jobs and growth: the importance of engineering skills to the 
UK economy. The Royal Academy of Engineering. Retrieved from: 
http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/jobs-and-growth 
 
Harrison, N. (2011). Have the changes introduced by the 2004 Higher Education 
Act made higher education admissions in England wider and fairer? Journal of 
Education Policy, 26(3), 449-468 
 
Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Smith, J. (1998). Characterizing selection bias 
using experimental data. Econometrica, 66(5), 1017-1098 
 
HEFCE (2010). Student ethnicity: profile and progression of entrants to full-time, 
first degree study. Higher Education Funding Council for England. Retrieved from: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce1/pubs/hefce/2010/1013/10_13.pdf 
 
HEFCE (2013). Higher education and beyond: outcomes from full-time first degree 





HEFCE (2014). Differences in degree outcomes: Key findings. Higher Education 




HEFCE (2015a). Causes of differences in student outcomes. Higher Education 






HEFCE (2015b). Differences in degree outcomes: the effect of subject and student 




Heller, D. E., (1997). Student price response in higher education: An update to 
Leslie and Brinkman. Journal of Higher Education, 68(6), 624-659 
 
Hemelt, S. W., & Marcotte, D. E. (2008). Rising tuition and enrollment in public 
higher education. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 3827 
 
Hillman, N. W. & Orians, E. L. (2013). Community colleges and labor market 
conditions: how does enrollment demand change relative to unemployment rates? 
Research in Higher Education, 54, 765-780 
 
Hübner, M. (2012). Do tuition fees affect enrollment behavior? Evidence from a 
‘natural experiment’ in Germany. Economics of Education Review, 31(6), 949-960 
 
Huijsman, R., Kloek, T., Kodde, D. A., & Ritzen, J. M. M. (1986). An empirical 
analysis of college enrollment in the Netherlands. De Economist, 134(2), 181-90 
 
Hussain, I., McNally, S., & Telhaj, S. (2009). University quality and graduate 
wages in the UK. Centre for the Economics of Education Discussion Paper, No. 99 
 
Imbens, G. M., & Wooldridge, J. M. (2008). Recent developments in the 
econometrics of program evaluation. NBER Working Paper, No. 14251 
 
Johnes, G. & McNabb, R. (2004). Never give up on the good times: student attrition 




Johnson, M. T. (2013). The impact of business cycle fluctuations on graduate 
school enrollment. Economics of Education Review, 34, 122-134 
 
Kahn, L. B. (2010). The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from 
college in a bad economy. Labour Economics, 17(2), 303-316 
 
Kane, T., (1994). College entry by blacks since 1970: The role of college costs, 
family background, and the returns to education. Journal of Political Economy, 105, 
878-911 
 
Karaca-Mandiac, P., Norton, E., C., & Dowd, B. (2012). Interaction terms in 
nonlinear models. Health Services Research, 47, 255-274 
 
Kelchtermans, S., & Verboven, F. (2010). Participation and study decision in a 
public system of higher education. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25, 355–391 
 
Koch, J. V. (1972). Student choice of undergraduate major field of study and private 
internal rates of return. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 26(1), 680-685 
 
Koh, M. Y. & Koh, H. C. (1999). The determinants of performance in an 
accountancy degree programme. Accounting Education, 8(1), 13-29 
 
Laselle, L., McDougall-Bagnall, J., & Smith, I. (2014). School grades, school 
context and university degree performance: Evidence from an elite Scottish 
institution. Oxford Review of Education, 40(3), 293-314 
 
Lenton, P. (2014). Personality characteristics, educational attainment and wages: 
an economic analysis using the British Cohort Study. Sheffield Economic Research 




Leslie, L. L., & Brinkman, P. T. (1987). Student price response in higher education. 
Journal of Higher Education, 58, 181-204 
 
Long, B. T. (2004). How have college decisions changed over time? An application 
of the conditional logistic choice model. Journal of Econometrics, 121, 271-296 
 
Long, B. T. (2014). The financial crisis and college enrollment: how have students 
and their families responded? In J. Brown and C. Hoxby (Eds.), How the financial 
crisis and the great recession affected higher education. Forthcoming from 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
McGuigan, M., McNally, S., & Wyness, G. (2014). Student awareness of costs and 
benefits of educational decisions: effects of an information campaign and media 
exposure. Department of Quantitative Social Science Working Paper, No. 14-19 
 
McNabb, R., Pal, S., & Sloane, P. (2002). Gender differences in educational 
attainment: the case of university students in England and Wales. Economica, 69, 
481-503 
 
McPherson, M. S., & Shapiro, M. O. (1991). Does student aid affect college 
enrollment? New evidence on a persistent controversy. American Economic 
Review, 81(1), 309-318 
 
Mellanby, J., Maxtin, M., & O’Doherty, J. (2000). The ‘gender gap’ in final 
examination results at Oxford University. British Journal of Psychology, 91, 377-
390 
 
Mellors-Bourne, R., Connor, H., & Jackson, C. (2011). STEM graduates in non 





Mitze, T., Burgard, C., & Alecke, B. (2013). The tuition fee ‘shock’: analysing the 
response of first-year students to a spatially discontinuous policy change in 
Germany. Papers in Regional Science, 94(2), 385-419 
 
Montmarquette, C., Cannings, K., & Mahseredjian, S. (2002). How do young 
people choose college majors? Economics of Education Review, 21, 543-556 
 
Murphy, R., Scott-Clayton, J, & Wyness, G. (2017). The End of Free College in 
England: Implications for Quality, Enrolments, and Equity. NBER Working Paper, 
No. 23888 
 
Naylor, R., Smith. J., & McKnight, A. (2000). Sheer class? Returns to educational 
performance: evidence from UK graduates’ first destination labour market 
outcomes. University of Warwick Economics Research Paper, No. 786 
 
Naylor, R. & Smith, J. (2004). Determinants of educational success in higher 
education, in: G. Johnes & J. Johnes (Eds) International Handbook on the 
Economics of Education (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar), 415-461 
 
O’Leary, J. (2016). Are arts and humanities still worth pursuing? The Times, 27 
September. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/are-arts-and-
humanities-still-worth-pursuing-6dlzprm6g (Accessed at 26 September 2017) 
 
Oosterbeek, H. & Van Ophem, H. (2000). Schooling choices: preferences, discount 
rates and rates of return. Empirical Economics, 25(1), 15-34 
 
Oreopoulos, P. (2006). Estimating average and local average treatment effects of 
education when compulsory schooling laws really matter. American Economic 




Osborne, M., Leopold, J., & Ferrie, A. (1997). Does access work? The relative 
performance of access students at a Scottish university. Higher Education, 33(2), 
155-176 
 
Parker, J. D. A., Summerfeldt, L. J., Hogan, M. J., & Majeski, S. A. (2003). 
Emotional intelligence and academic success: examining the transition from high 
school to university. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 163-172 
 
Pennell, H. & West, A. (2005). The impact of increased fees on participation in 
higher education in England. Higher Education Quarterly, 59(2), 127-137 
 
Pissarides, C. A. (1981). Staying-on at school in England and Wales. Economica, 
48, 345-363 
 
Pitcher, J & Purcell, K. (1998). Diverse expectations and access to opportunities. 
Higher Education Quarterly, 52(2), 179-203 
 
Poropat, A. E. (2009). A meta-analysis of the five-factor model of personality and 
academic performance. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 322-338 
 
Powdthavee, N. & Vignoles, A. F. (2009). The socio-economic gap in university 
drop-out. The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 9, 19-39 
 
Puhani, P. A. (2012). The treatment effect, the cross difference, and the interaction 
term in nonlinear “difference-in-differences” models. Economics Letters, 115, 85-
87 
 
Rice, P G. (1987). The demand for post-compulsory education in the UK and the 




Royston, P., Altman, D. G., & Sauerbrei, W. (2006). Dichotomizing continuous 
predictors in multiple regression: a bad idea. Statistics in Medicine, 25(1), 127-141 
 
Skatova, A. & Ferguson, E. (2014). Why do different people choose different 
university degrees? Motivation and the choice of degree. Frontiers in Psychology, 
5, 1244 
 
SLC (2006). Higher Education Grants in England and Wales: Academic Year 
2005/06 (Provisional), accessed at: 
http://www.slc.co.uk/media/5510/slcsfr022006.pdf 
 
Sloane, P. J. & O’Leary, N. C. (2004). The return to a university education in Great 
Britain. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 1199 
 
Smith, H. L., & Powell, B. (1990). Great expectations: variations in income 
expectations among college seniors. Sociology of Education, 63(3), 194-207 
 
Smith, J., McKnight, A., & Naylor, R. (2000). Graduate employability: policy and 
performance in higher education in the UK. The Economic Journal, 110, F382-
F411 
 
Smith, J. & Naylor, R. (2001a). Determinants of degree performance in UK 
universities: a statistical analysis of the 1993 student cohort. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 63(1), 29-60 
 
Smith, J. & Naylor, R. (2001b). Dropping out of university: a statistical analysis of 
the probability of withdrawal for UK university students. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series A, 164, 389-405 
 
Smithers, A. & Griffin, A. (1986). Mature students at university: entry, experience 




Stratton, L S., O’Toole, D. M., & Wetzel, J. N. (2007). Are the factors affecting 
dropout behavior related to initial enrollment intensity for college undergraduates? 
Research in Higher Education, 48(4), 453-485 
 
Toutkoushian, R., K. & Paulsen, M., B. (2016). Private and social returns to higher 
education. In: Economics of Higher Education. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 93-147 
 
Universities UK. (2009). Variable tuition fees in England: assessing their impact 
on students and higher education institutions. A fourth report. 
 
Universities UK. (2010). Changes in student choices and graduate employment.  
 
Universities UK. (2014). Patterns and trends in UK higher education.  
 
Wakeling, P., & Jefferies, K. (2013). The effect of tuition fees on student mobility: 
the UK and Ireland as a natural experiment. British Educational Research Journal, 
39(3), 491-513 
 
Wales, P. (2010). Geography or economics? A micro-level analysis of the 
determinants of degree choice in the context of regional economic disparities in the 
UK. Spatial Economics Research Centre Discussion Paper, No. 56 
 
Walker, I. & Zhu, Y. (2011). Differences by degree: evidence of the net financial 
rates of return to undergraduate study in England and Wales. Economics of 
Education Review, 30, 1177-1186 
 
Walker, I. & Zhu, Y. (2013). The impact of university degrees on the lifecycle of 
earnings: some further analysis. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 




Whitfield, K. & Wilson, R. A. (1991). Staying on in full-time education: the 
educational participation rate of 16-year olds. Economica, 58, 391-404 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2011). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge, Mass, MIT. 
 
Wyness, G. (2010). Policy changes in UK higher education funding, 1963-2009. 
Department of Quantitative Social Science Working Paper, No. 10-15 
